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["Documentation References\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVersion 01  30 APR 2024\n(Refer to ISSM Ed. 7, Effective MAY 01st,  2024)"]
["(enter Airline name here)"]
["(enter Date here)"]

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["\nDISCLAIMER.\nThe information contained in this publication is subject to constant review in the light of changing government requirements and regulations. No subscriber or other reader should act on the basis of any such information without referring to applicable laws and regulations and/or without taking appropriate professional advice. Although every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, the International Air Transport Association shall not be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by errors, omissions, misprints or misinterpretation of the contents hereof. Furthermore, the International Air Transport Association expressly disclaims any and all liability to any person or entity, whether a purchaser of this publication or not, in respect of anything done or omitted, and the consequences of anything done or omitted, by any such person or entity in reliance on the contents of this publication. \n© International Air Transport Association. All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, recast, reformatted or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without the prior written permission from: \nSenior Vice President\nOperations, Safety and Security\nInternational Air Transport Association\n800 Place Victoria\nP.O. Box 113\nMontreal, Quebec\nCANADA H4Z 1M1"]

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["Discipline","#","ISARPs","Doc Reference/s","Standard/Recommendation","Guideline","Operators notes","Auditors notes"]
["ORG","ORG 1.1.1","The Operator shall have a management system that has continuity throughout the organization and ensures control of operations and management of safety and security outcomes. \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Operations, Operator, Safety (Operational), Security (Aviation) and State.\nA management system is documented in controlled company media at both the corporate and operational levels. Manuals or controlled electronic media are acceptable means of documenting the management system.\nDocumentation provides a comprehensive description of the scope, structure and functionality of the management system and depicts lines of accountability throughout the organization, as well as authorities, duties, responsibilities and the interrelation of functions and activities within the system for ensuring safe and secure operations.\nAcceptable means of documentation include, but are not limited to, organograms (organization charts), job descriptions and other descriptive written material that define and clearly delineate the management system.\nDocumentation also reflects a functional continuity within the management system that ensures the entire organization works as a system and not as a group of independent or fragmented units (i.e., silo effect).\nAn effective management system is fully implemented and functional with a clear consistency and unity of purpose between corporate management and management in the operational areas.\nThe management system ensures compliance with all applicable standards and regulatory requirements. In addition to internal standards and regulations of the State, an operator may also be required to comply with authorities that have jurisdiction over operations that are conducted over the high seas or within a foreign country."]
["ORG","ORG 1.1.2"," The Operator shall have a valid Air Operator Certificate (AOC) or equivalent document issued by the State of the Operator (hereinafter, the State) that authorizes the Operator to conduct commercial or non-commercial air transport operations in accordance with specified conditions and limitations. The AOC and/or associated documents shall include:\n(i) Operator identification (name and location);\n(ii) \tDate of issue and period of validity;\n(iii) \tDescription of types of operations authorized;\n(iv) Type(s) of aircraft authorized for use;\n(v) Authorized areas of operation or routes;\n(vi) Exemptions, deviations and waivers (listed by name);\n(vii) \tSpecial authorizations, to include, as applicable:\n(a) Low visibility takeoff (LVTO);\n(b) CAT II and/or III approaches;\n(c) \tAutomatic landing,\thead-up displays (HUD) and enhanced vision systems (EVS, SVS or CVS) operations and associated operational credit(s) granted (if such systems are used to gain operational benefit); \n(d) GPS approaches;\n(e) ETOPS/EDTO, as applicable, including the applicable threshold/maximum diversion times established for each particular aircraft and engine combination;\n(f) \tRVSM operations;\n(g) MNPS/NAT HLA operations;\n(h) Area of Magnetic Unreliability (AMU);\n(i) Basic RNAV/RNP operations;\n(j) Performance-Based Communication and Surveillance (PBCS) operations;\n(k) AR navigation specifications for PBN operations;\n(l) Transport of dangerous goods as cargo (if AOC authorization is required for the transport of dangerous goods);\n(m) \tElectronic Flight Bag (EFB) operations (if approval for such operations is required by the Authority).\n                           \n                     \n                  \nNote: \n\"Vision systems\" is a generic term referring to the existing systems designed to provide images, such as enhanced vision systems (EVS), synthetic vision systems (SVS) and combined vision systems (CVS).\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Electronic Flight Bag (EFB), EDTO (Extended Diversion Time operations), Enhanced Visual System (EVS), Head-up Display (HUD), Minimum Navigation Performance Specifications (MNPS), PBN Navigation Specification AR (Authorization Required), Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM), Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and State.\r\nThe specifications of this provision require the conditions and limitations of any State-approved or State-accepted air transport operations, conducted by the operator, to be described in the AOC, AOC equivalents and/or associated documents.\r\nThe AOC is produced (by the State) in a manner consistent with local conditions for State approval or acceptance. This should not preclude the operator from describing authorized operations, including conditions and limitations for such operations, in associated documents and in a manner consistent with the specifications of this provision. Such documents typically include the OM or any operational document that describes the conditions and limitations of authorized operations.\r\nThe exemptions, deviations, waivers and special authorizations in specifications vi) and vii) may be described in State-approved or State-accepted documents other than the AOC. Operators subject to laws or regulations of the State that prevent the issuance of an AOC consistent with the specifications of this provision and/or prohibit the description of authorized operations in a manner consistent with the specifications of this provision may demonstrate an equivalent method of ensuring the specifications of this provision are satisfied.\r\nThe period of validity is designated on the AOC or determined by reference to the dates of issuance and expiration.\r\nThe specification in item vii) e) refers to aircraft operated on routes where the diversion time from any point on the route to an en route alternate airport exceeds the threshold time but is within the maximum diversion time as established by the State."]
["ORG","ORG 1.1.3"," The Operator shall identify one senior management official as the Accountable Executive (AE) who is accountable for performance of the management system as specified in ORG 1.1.1 and:\n(i) Irrespective of other functions, has ultimate responsibility and accountability on behalf of the Operator for the implementation and maintenance of the safety management system (SMS) throughout the organization;\n(ii) Has the authority to ensure the allocation of resources necessary to manage safety and security risks to aircraft operations;\n(iii) Has overall responsibility and is accountable for ensuring operations are conducted in accordance with conditions and restrictions of the Air Operator Certificate (AOC), and in compliance with applicable regulations and standards of the Operator. [SMS]\n                   \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Accountability, Accountable Executive (AE), Authority, Aircraft Operations, Responsibility, Safety Risk Management and Senior Management.\r\nThe requirement for an AE is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS framework.\r\nThe designation of an AE means the accountability for safety and security performance is placed at a level in the organization having the authority to take action to ensure the management system is effective. Therefore, the AE is typically the chief executive officer (CEO), although, depending on the type and structure of the organization, it could be a different senior official (e.g. chairperson/member of the board of directors, company owner).\r\nThe AE has the authority, which includes financial control, to make policy decisions, provide adequate resources, resolve operational quality, safety and security issues and, in general, ensure necessary system components are in place and functioning properly.\r\nIn an SMS, the AE would typically have:\r\n- Ultimate responsibility and accountability for the safety of the entire operation together with the implementation and maintenance of the SMS;\r\n- Responsibility for ensuring the SMS is properly implemented in all areas of the organization and performing in accordance with specified requirements.\r\n                  \r\nThe AE also is responsible for ensuring the organization is in compliance with requirements of applicable authorities (i.e. regulations), as well as its own policies and procedures, which may exceed existing regulations or address areas that are not regulated (e.g. ground handling operations). An operator's policies and procedures are typically published in its Operations Manual (OM).\r\nTo ensure that the operator continues to meet applicable requirements, the AE might designate a manager with the responsibility for monitoring compliance. The role of such manager would be to ensure that the activities of the operator are monitored for compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements, as well as any additional requirements as established by the operator, and that these activities are being carried out properly under the supervision of the relevant head of functional area.\r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 1.1.4"," If required by the State of the Operator (hereinafter, the State), the Operator shall have post holders within the management system that are acceptable to the Authority and have the responsibility for ensuring, in their respective defined operational areas:\n(i) The management of safety risks and security threats to aircraft operations;\n(ii) \tOperations are conducted in accordance with conditions and restrictions of the Air Operator Certificate (AOC), and in compliance with applicable regulations and standards of the Operator. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Post Holder.\r\nManagers in such positions might be referred to as post holders, directors or another title as specified by each State."]
["ORG","ORG 1.1.5"," The Operator shall  designate a manager who is responsible for the implementation, maintenance and day-to-day administration of the SMS throughout the organization on behalf of the AE and senior management. [SMS]\n                  \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Safety Management System (SMS) and State Safety Program (SSP).\r\nThe specifications for an operator's SMS in this Recomendation are derived from the SMS Framework, which is published in Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO Annex 19). The SMS Framework specifies the four major components and 12 elements that make up the basic structure of an SMS.\r\nWhere applicable, an SMS is designed and implemented in accordance with the State Safety Program (SSP). The manner in which the elements of SMS are implemented typically reflects the size and complexity of the operator's organization.\r\nIn general, an SMS is designed and implemented to:\r\n- Identify safety hazards in operations;\r\n- Ensure remedial action is implemented to control safety risks;\r\n- Provide for ongoing monitoring and assessment of safety performance;\r\n- Make continual improvement to the level of safety in operations.\r\n                  \r\nThe specific requirements for each operator's SMS will normally be found in the regulations associated with the SSP. In addition, states would typically publish guidance designed to assist operators in the implementation of SMS.\r\nA description of an operator's SMS is contained in documentation as specified in ORG 2.5.4.\r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO Safety Management Manual (ICAO SMM), Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 1.1.10","The Operator should have an SMS that is implemented and integrated throughout the organization to ensure management of the safety risks associated with aircraft operations. [SMS]\n                  \n                  \nNotes: \n1. Conformity with this ORG Recomendation is possible only when the Operator is in conformity with all standards and Recomendations that are identified by the [SMS] symbol.\n2. Effective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Safety Management System (SMS) and State Safety Program (SSP).\nThe specifications for an operator's SMS in this Recomendation are derived from the SMS Framework, which is published in Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO Annex 19). The SMS Framework specifies the four major components and 12 elements that make up the basic structure of an SMS.\nWhere applicable, an SMS is designed and implemented in accordance with the State Safety Program (SSP). The manner in which the elements of SMS are implemented typically reflects the size and complexity of the operator's organization.\nIn general, an SMS is designed and implemented to:\n- Identify safety hazards in operations;\n- Ensure remedial action is implemented to control safety risks;\n- Provide for ongoing monitoring and assessment of safety performance;\n- Make continual improvement to the level of safety in operations.                  \nThe specific requirements for each operator's SMS will normally be found in the regulations associated with the SSP. In addition, states would typically publish guidance designed to assist operators in the implementation of SMS.\nA description of an operator's SMS is contained in documentation as specified in ORG 2.5.4.\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO Safety Management Manual (ICAO SMM), Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 1.2.1","ORG 1.2.1 The Operator shall have a corporate safety policy that reflects the organizational commitment regarding safety, including the promotion of a positive safety culture. Such policy shall be communicated throughout the organization and include the following: \n(i) A statement about the provision of the necessary resources for the implementation of the safety policy;\n(ii) A commitment to the continual improvement of the organization and the management system;\n(iii) A commitment to a periodic review of the policy to ensure its continued relevance to the organization. [SMS]\n                        \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The requirement for an operator to have a defined safety policy is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS framework.\nThe safety policy typically also reflects the commitment of senior management to:\n- Compliance with applicable regulations and standards of the Operator;\n- Ensuring the management of safety risks to aircraft operations;\n- The promotion of safety awareness;\n- Continual improvement of operational performance.                  \nThe safety policy is typically reviewed periodically to ensure continued relevance to the organization.\nSuch policy might be documented in the operations manual or other controlled document, and, to enhance effectiveness, is communicated and made visible throughout the organization through dissemination of communiquÃ©s, posters, banners and other forms of information in a form and language which can be easily understood. To ensure continuing relevance, the corporate policy is normally reviewed for possible update a minimum of every two years.\nConsistent with the structure and complexity of the operator's organization, the corporate safety policy may be issued as a stand-alone policy or combined with the policy specified in ORG 1.2.2.\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 1.2.2A"," The Operator shall have a corporate safety reporting policy that encourages personnel to report hazards to aircraft operations and, in addition, defines the Operator's policy regarding disciplinary action, to include:\n(i) Types of operational behaviors that are unacceptable;\n(ii) Conditions under which disciplinary action would not apply. [SMS]                   \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for ISSA registration renewal assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","The requirement for an operator to have a safety reporting policy is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS framework.\r\nSafety reporting is a key aspect of SMS hazard identification and risk management.\r\nSuch a policy is typically documented in operations manuals or other controlled documents.\r\nConsistent with the structure and complexity of the operator's organization, the safety reporting policy may be issued as a stand-alone policy or combined with the safety policy specified in ORG 1.2.1A.\r\nA safety reporting policy encourages and perhaps even provides incentive for individuals to report hazards and operational deficiencies to management. It also assures personnel that their candid input is highly desired and vital to safe and secure operations.\r\nThe safety reporting policy is typically reviewed periodically to ensure continuing relevance to the organization.\r\nRefer to ORG 3.1.2A, which specifies the operational safety reporting system."]
["ORG","ORG 1.2.2B"," The Operator should have a corporate safety reporting policy that encourages personnel to report hazards to aircraft operations and, in addition, defines the Operator's policy regarding disciplinary action, to include:\n(i) Types of operational behaviors that are unacceptable;\n(ii) Conditions under which disciplinary action would not apply. [SMS]                 \n               \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for initial ISSA assessments.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to Guidance Material of ORG 1.2.2A."]
["ORG","ORG 1.2.3"," The Operator should have a policy that informs operational personnel throughout the organization of their responsibility to comply with the applicable laws, regulations and procedures in all locations\nwhere operations are conducted.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","It is imperative for the operator to guarantee that all pilots possess thorough familiarity with the laws, regulations, and procedures pertaining to their duties, specifically those prescribed for the areas to be traversed, the aerodromes to be utilized, and the air navigation facilities associated with them. Additionally, the operator must ensure that all other members of the flight crew are equally acquainted with these laws, regulations, and procedures, to the extent that they are relevant to their respective responsibilities in the operation of the airplane. This comprehensive understanding is essential for maintaining safety and efficiency throughout flight operations."]
["ORG","ORG 1.3.1A","The Operator shall ensure the management system defines the safety accountabilities, authorities and responsibilities of management and non-management personnel throughout the organization, and specifies:\n(i) The levels of management with the authority to make decisions regarding risk tolerability with respect to the safety and/or security of aircraft operations;\n(ii) Responsibilities for ensuring operations are conducted in accordance with applicable regulations and standards of the Operator;\n(iii) Lines of safety accountability throughout the organization, including direct accountability for safety and/or security on the part of senior management; [SMS]\n                    \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for ISSA registration renewal assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","The definition of authorities and responsibilities of management and non-management personnel is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS framework.\nIn the context of the management system, the following typically apply:\n- \tAccountability is the obligation to accept ultimate responsibility and be answerable for decisions and policies, and for the performance of applicable functions, duties, tasks or actions. Accountability may not be delegated.\n- \tAuthority is the delegated power or right to command or direct activities, and to make decisions.\n- \tResponsibility is the obligation to execute or perform assigned functions, duties, tasks and/or actions. Responsibility may be accompanied by an appropriate level of delegated authority.                   \nIn the context of an SMS, the assignment of responsibility to individual personnel means such personnel are ultimately accountable for safety performance, whether at the overall SMS level (accountable executive) or at specific product and/or process levels (other applicable members of management). An effective management system ensures that responsibilities, and thus accountability, for safety and security are allocated to relevant management and non-management personnel that perform safety- or security-related functions, or that have a defined role in the SMS.\nResponsibilities and accountability are typically defined in the functional job description for such personnel and are designed to flow from corporate senior management into all operational areas of the organization.\nResponsibilities and accountability are normally described and communicated in a manner that ensures a clear understanding throughout the organization. Organization charts, or organograms, are typically used to depict the functional reporting system of an organization, and thus are an acceptable means for defining the flow (or \"lines\" as depicted on an organogram) of responsibilities and accountability within the management system.\nManagement positions critical to operational safety or security may require enhanced job descriptions or terms of reference that reflect specialized requirements inherent in certain key positions. Such specialized requirements would include any delegation of authority exercised by personnel on behalf of an authority (e.g., designated or authorized flight examiner).\nCompliance with regulatory requirements, as well as internal policies and procedures, is an essential element of a safe and secure operational environment. The responsibility for ensuring compliance with both regulatory and internal requirements is specified and assigned within the management system. Job descriptions, terms of reference and operating manuals are examples of appropriate locations for documenting management system responsibilities.\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 1.3.1B"," The Operator should ensure the management system defines the safety accountabilities, authorities and responsibilities of management and non-management personnel throughout the organization, and specifies:\n(i) The levels of management with the authority to make decisions regarding risk tolerability with respect to the safety and/or security of aircraft operations;\n(ii) Responsibilities for ensuring operations are conducted in accordance with applicable regulations and standards of the Operator;\n(iii) Lines of safety accountability throughout the organization, including direct accountability for safety and/or security on the part of senior management; [SMS]\n                         \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for initial ISSA assessments.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to Guidance Material of ORG 1.3.1A.\r\n"]
["ORG","ORG 1.4.1A","The Operator  shall have a process to define safety objectives. Such safety objectives should: \n(i) Reflect the Operator's commitment to maintain or continuously improve the overall effectiveness of the SMS;\n(ii) Be communicated throughout the organization;\n(iii) Be periodically reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the Operator. [SMS]\n                 \n                     \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for ISSA registration renewal assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Safety Assurance and Safety Objective.\r\nSafety objectives provide direction to the operator's safety management activities and would therefore be consistent with the safety policy that sets out the organization's high-level safety commitment.\r\nA safety objective is a high-level statement that typically expresses a desired safety outcome that is to be achieved over a defined period of time (e.g. one year). \r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 1.4.1B"," The Operator should have a process to define safety objectives. Such safety objectives should: \n(i) Reflect the Operator's commitment to maintain or continuously improve the overall effectiveness of the SMS;\n(ii) Be communicated throughout the organization;\n(iii) Be periodically reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the Operator. [SMS]\n                        \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for initial ISSA assessments.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to Guidance Material of ORG 1.4.1A."]
["ORG","ORG 1.4.2"," The Operator should have processes for setting safety performance indicators (SPIs) and, as applicable, safety performance targets (SPTs) as means to monitor its safety performance, the achievement of its safety objectives and to validate the effectiveness of safety risk controls.  [SMS]\n    \n                  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Safety Performance Indicator (SPI) and Safety Performance Target (SPT).\r\nSetting SPIs in support of the operator's safety objectives is an element of the Safety Assurance component of the SMS framework.\r\nSPIs and SPTs are used by an operator to track and compare its operational performance against the achievement of its safety objectives and to focus attention on the performance of the organization in managing operational risks and maintaining compliance with relevant regulatory requirements. \r\nSPTs define short-term and medium-term safety performance management desired achievements. They act as 'milestones' that provide confidence that the organization is on track to achieving its safety objectives and provide a measurable way of verifying the effectiveness of safety performance management activities. The setting of SPTs is normally accomplished after considering what is realistically achievable and, where historical trend data are available, the recent performance of the particular SPI.\r\nIn addressing operational performance, meaningful indicators might focus on lower level (i.e. lower consequence) occurrences or conditions that are considered by the operator to be precursors to more serious events. SPIs may be specific to a certain area of operations or may be broad and apply to the entire system.\r\nIn addressing compliance, meaningful indicators, as a minimum, would focus on compliance with significant regulatory requirements (as determined by the operator) in all operational areas. \r\nSPIs may be set in almost any operations or maintenance area and are usually expressed as a reduction in the rate or number of specifically identified occurrences or conditions. \r\nSome possible examples of operational occurrences or conditions that could be monitored using SPIs include:\r\n- Flight operations (e.g. takeoff and landing tail strikes, unsatisfactory line or training evaluations, unstabilized approaches, runway incursions/excursions); \r\n- Operational control (e.g., flight diversions due to fuel);\r\n- Engineering and maintenance (in-flight engine shutdowns, aircraft component/equipment failures, diversions due to maintenance errors, damage caused by maintenance); \r\n- Cabin operations (inadvertent slide deployments);\r\n- Ground handling (aircraft damages due to vehicles or equipment);\r\n- Cargo operations (dangerous goods spills);\r\n- Operational security (unauthorized interference or access events).\r\n                  \r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 1.5.5","ORG 1.5.5 The Operator shall have a policy that addresses the use of psychoactive substances by personnel that perform operational functions and, as a minimum:\r\n                  \r\n(i) Prohibits the exercise of duties while under the influence of psychoactive substances;\r\n(ii) Prohibits the problematic use of psychoactive substances;\r\n(iii) Requires that all personnel who are identified as engaging in any kind of problematic use of psychoactive substances are removed from operational functions;\r\n(iv) Conforms to the requirements of the Authority, if applicable. \r\n                     \r\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Biochemical Testing, Psychoactive Substance and Problematic Use of Substances.\r\nPersonnel that perform operational safety and security functions  as specified in this provision refers to persons in all operational disciplines who perform a function that, if performed improperly, could endanger the safety of aircraft operations. This includes operational personnel in all areas (flight crew, cabin crew, flight dispatch personnel (FOO/FOA), maintenance, ground handling, cargo, security).\r\nOperators subject to laws or regulations of the State that preclude the publication of a psychoactive substance prohibition policy as specified in this provision may demonstrate an equivalent method of ensuring that personnel engaging in any kind of problematic use of psychoactive substance abuse do not exercise their duties and are removed from safety-critical functions.\r\nRe-instatement to safety-critical duties could be possible after cessation of the problematic use and upon determination that continued performance of such duties is unlikely to jeopardize safety.\r\nExamples of other subjects that might be addressed in a comprehensive and proactive policy include:\r\n- \tEducation regarding the use of psychoactive substances;\r\n- Identification, treatment and rehabilitation;\r\n- \tEmployment consequences of problematic use of psychoactive substances;\r\n- \tBiochemical testing;\r\n- \tRequirements of ICAO and the Authority.\r\n                  \r\nAdditional guidance may be found in the ICAO Manual on Prevention of Problematic use of Substances in the Aviation Workplace (Doc 9654-AN/945)."]
["ORG","ORG 1.6.2"," The Operator shall have processes to ensure a contract or agreement is executed with external\nservice providers that conduct outsourced operational functions for the Operator. Such contract or\nagreement shall identify specific documented requirements that can be monitored by the Operator to ensure the safety and/or security of operations are being fulfilled by the service provider.  \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Outsourcing and Service Level Agreement.\nAn operator would always retain full responsibility for ensuring an outsourced function is performed properly by an external provider, even if such provider is the parent organization or an affiliate of the operator.\nA contract or agreement is necessary to ensure details of the outsourced functions to be performed by the external service provider are formally documented. The contract or agreement not only sets forth the services the provider is expected to perform, but also describes the application of specific performance indicators or targets (i.e. measurable specifications) that will be monitored (by the operator) in the provider's performance of those services. \nExamples of specific documented requirements could include the following: \n- Processes or procedures from the operator's own documentation system (e.g. operational manuals, working instructions) that can be included in the contract by reference. \n- Infrastructure, resource or certification requirements (e.g. number of personnel, certification standards for equipment, support equipment standards). \n- SPIs that specify a maximum number of occurrences or deviations), which could be based on the operator's own SPIs in accordance with ORG 1.4.2                      \n                  \nThe structure of contracts or agreements will vary with individual operators and, depending on such structure, defined measurable specifications may or may not be contained in any of the contractual documents. When the measurable specifications are not contained in the contract, they may be defined (in technical terms) in a controlled document that is part of the operator's documentation system, and then conveyed to the provider (perhaps periodically) in a manner that ensures understanding.\nNote: \nFor the purpose of this provision, the contract or agreement as specified above may comprise multiple parts, including the basic document that sets forth legal and commercial terms, and, as applicable, other associated documents that state terms or conditions of service (e.g. appendices, addenda, service level agreement)."]
["ORG","ORG 1.7.1","The Operator shall have a corporate emergency response plan (ERP) for the central management and coordination of all activities should it be necessary to respond to a major aircraft accident or other type of adverse event that results in fatalities, serious injuries, considerable damage and/or a significant disruption of operations. [SMS]\n\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Emergency Response Plan (ERP).\r\nEmergency response planning is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS framework.\r\nAn emergency (or crisis) response plan is based upon an assessment of risk appropriate to the size and type of operations, and includes consideration of a major aircraft accident and other potential aircraft and/or non-aircraft events that would require a full corporate emergency response.\r\nIn some states, emergency or crisis response is assumed by a governmental authority rather than by the operator. In such case, an emergency response plan focuses on and addresses interaction with and/or participation in the governmental response to an emergency or crisis.\r\nAs a best practice, an operator might consider defining in its ERP an appropriately coordinated response to a public health emergency.\r\nAn effective ERP includes industry best practices and ensure community expectations are addressed. Additionally, an ERP:\r\n- Specifies general conditions for implementation;\r\n- Provides a framework for an orderly implementation;\r\n- Ensures proper coordination with external entities at all potential locations;\r\n- Addresses all potential aspects of an event, including casualties;\r\n- Ensures regulatory requirements associated with specific events are satisfied;\r\n- Provides a scenario for the transition back to normal operations;\r\n- Ensures regular practice exercises as a means to achieve continual improvement.\r\n                  \r\nIATA provides a guide for use by operators in addressing a public health emergency. Such document, titled Emergency Response Plan and Action Checklist, may be found at http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/safety/health/Pages/diseases.aspx."]
["ORG","ORG 1.7.4A"," The Operator  shall ensure the ERP as specified in ORG 1.7.1 includes provisions for the appropriate coordination with the emergency response plans of other applicable organizations relevant to the particular event or crisis. [SMS]\n                     \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for ISSA registration renewal assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","ERP transition and reporting is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS framework.\r\nAn ERP typically defines:\r\n- Coordination procedures for action by key personnel;\r\n- External entities that will interact with the organization during emergency situations;\r\n- \tERPs of external entities that will require coordination;\r\n- \tMethod(s) of establishing coordination with external ERPs.\r\n                  \r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 1.7.4B","ORG 1.7.4Bthe appropriate coordination with the emergency response plans of other applicable organizations relevant to the particular event or crisis. [SMS]\n                        \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for initial ISSA assessments.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to Guidance Material of ORG 1.7.4A."]
["ORG","ORG 2.1.1"," The Operator shall have a quality assurance program that provides for the auditing and evaluation of the management system, and of operations and maintenance functions, to ensure the organization is:\n(i) Complying with applicable regulations and standards of the Operator;\n(ii) Satisfying stated operational needs;\n(iii) Identifying areas requiring improvement;\n(iv) Identifying hazards to operations.\n(v) Assessing the effectiveness of safety risk controls.  [SMS]\n                    \n                  \nNote: \nIf the quality assurance audit function is performed by an external organization, the Operator, as the AOC holder, shall be responsible for ensuring the quality assurance program is in conformity with the specifications of this provision.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Quality Assurance.\nThe quality assurance program comprises two complementary functions: To monitor an operator's compliance with relevant regulations and standards, as well as to evaluate and continually improve operational safety performance. Such functions are elements of the Safety Assurance component of the SMS framework.\nIn some organizations the quality assurance program may have a different name (e.g. internal audit program, internal evaluation program).\nIn certain circumstances, an operator may have the quality assurance audit function performed by an external organization. This typically occurs when the operator is affiliated with one or more other organizations in a Group Company. However, an operator might also choose to simply outsource the quality assurance audit function to a qualified external service provider that is not part of or associated with a Group Company. In both cases, the operator, as the AOC holder, has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the quality assurance program meets the needs of its organization in accordance with the specifications of this standard. A robust program ensures a scope of auditing that encompasses all areas of the organization that impact operational quality in terms of safety and/or security Operational functions include flight operations, operational control/flight dispatch, maintenance operations, cabin operations, ground handling and cargo operations.\nThis provision is designed to permit flexibility in the implementation of the quality assurance program.\nThe structure and organization of the program within an operator's management system, whether centralized, non-centralized or a combination thereof, is at the discretion of the operator in accordance with its corporate culture and regulatory environment.\nAn effective audit program includes:\n- Audit initiation, including scope and objectives;\n- Planning and preparation, including audit plan and checklist development;\n- Observation and gathering of evidence to assess documentation and implementation;\n- Analysis, findings, actions;\n- Reporting and audit summary;\n- Follow-up and close out.                  \nTo ensure auditors gather sufficient evidence to produce realistic assessments during an audit, the program typically includes guidance that defines the various sampling techniques that are expected to be used by auditors in the evidence collection phase of the audit.\nThe audit process typically includes a means whereby the auditor and responsible personnel from the audited area have a comprehensive discussion and reach agreement on the findings and corresponding corrective actions. Clear procedures are established to resolve any disagreement between the auditor and audited area.\nAll action items require follow-up to ensure closeout within an appropriate period of time."]
["ORG","ORG 2.1.2"," The Operator shall have a designated manager with appropriate qualifications, authority and independence that is responsible for:\n(i) The performance of the quality assurance program;\n(ii) Ensuring communication and coordination with operational managers in the management of operational risk;\n(iii) Dissemination of information to management and non-management operational personnel as appropriate to ensure an organizational awareness of relevant quality assurance issues and results.                      \n                  \nNote: \nIf the Operator outsources operational functions to an external service provider, the use of the external service provider's quality assurance program manager for the purpose of conforming to the specifications of this provision shall be considered a conflict of interest, unless the Operator and the external service provider are both affiliates within the same Group Company.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Quality Assurance Manager.\nThe designated manager (or multiple managers if an operator does not have a centralized program) is appointed to oversee the implementation of the activities and processes associated with the quality assurance program.\nThe exact title of the manager(s) designated as responsible for the quality assurance program may vary depending on the organization.\nOperational managers have direct responsibility for the safety and security of operations, and therefore always have the authority to develop and implement corrective action as necessary to address audit findings in their respective areas of operations.\nThe manager of the quality assurance program is \"operationally independent\" in a manner that ensures objectivity is not subject to bias due to conflicting responsibilities.\nTo be effective, an individual designated as manager of the quality assurance program has appropriate qualifications for the position, which may include:\n- Formal training or certification as a quality auditor;\n- Relevant operational and auditing experience;\n- Formal training in risk management.                  \nQuality assurance audit activities may be centrally controlled or controlled within each relevant operational function as long as independence is maintained.\nTypically, the manager of the quality assurance program has direct lines of communication to senior management to ensure the efficient reporting of safety and security issues, and to ensure such issues are appropriately addressed.\nAn effective quality assurance program includes the dissemination of appropriate information for the purpose of maintaining an ongoing awareness of quality assurance results that might affect compliance, operational safety or security or identify opportunities for improvement. As an example, such information might include a summary of audit program results such as finding, causation, risk, error trends and opportunities for continuous improvement.\nThe method of dissemination is commensurate with the target audience and the size of the organization. Typical means could include periodic briefings or presentations, or the issuance of magazines, newsletters or bulletins in either an electronic or paper form.\nIn certain circumstances, an operator may have the quality assurance audit function performed by an external organization. In such cases, the operator will still ensure its quality assurance program has a manager in accordance with the specifications of this standard."]
["ORG","ORG 2.1.5","The Operator shall have an audit planning process and sufficient resources to ensure audits are:\n(i) Scheduled at intervals to meet regulatory and management system requirements;\n(ii) Conducted within a specified time period. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The planning process produces a schedule of all audit modules to be conducted within the planning period (e.g., calendar year) and reflect the status of each audit module, to include the applicable audit interval (e.g., 12, 24, 36 months), the date of the previous audit and the scheduled due date for the next audit.\r\nThe planning process would typically include provisions for re-scheduling or deferral of audits in accordance with the operator's program limitations. "]
["ORG","ORG 2.1.7"," The Operator shall have a process for addressing findings that result from audits conducted under the quality assurance program, which ensures:\n(i) Identification of root cause(s);\n(ii) Development of corrective action as appropriate to address findings;\n(iii) Implementation of corrective action in appropriate operational area(s);\n(iv) Evaluation of corrective action to determine effectiveness. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Certain audit findings might fall under the category of hazards to operations. In such cases, the hazard would be subject to the risk assessment and mitigation process in the development of corrective action.\r\nRefer to the IAH for information relevant to auditing under the quality assurance program."]
["ORG","ORG 2.1.8"," The Operator shall ensure the quality assurance program uses auditors that are impartial and functionally independent from the operational activities to be audited. \n                  \nNote: \nIf the Operator outsources operational functions to an external service provider and uses auditing as the process to monitor the external service provider as specified in ORG 2.2.1, the use of the external service provider's auditors to perform such auditing shall be considered a conflict of interest, unless the Operator and the external service provider are both affiliates within the same Group Company.\n               ",null,"Standard","A quality assurance program is independent in a manner that permits the scheduling and conduct of audits as deemed appropriate for the size and scope of operations. Functional independence ensures auditors are not put in a position where their objectivity may be subject to bias due to conflicting responsibilities.\r\nA code of conduct may be used to enhance the impartiality and independence of auditors. An effective auditor code of ethics would require auditors:\r\n- To act in a strictly trustworthy and unbiased manner in relation to both the organization to which they are employed, contracted or otherwise formally engaged and any other organization involved in an audit performed by them or by personnel under their direct control;\r\n- To disclose to their employer any relationship they may have with the organization to be audited before undertaking any audit function in respect of that organization;\r\n- Not to accept any gift, commission, discount or any other profit from the organization audited, from their representatives, or from any other interested person nor knowingly allow personnel for whom they are responsible to do so;\r\n- Not to disclose the findings, or any part of them, nor to disclose any other information gained in the course of the audit to any third party, unless authorized in writing by both the auditee and the audit organization, if applicable;\r\n- Not to act in any way prejudicial to the reputation or interest of the audit organization; and\r\n- In the event of any alleged breach of this code, to co-operate fully in any formal enquiry procedure.\r\n                  \r\nAn auditor may be considered functionally independent from the operational activities to be audited when he/she is not responsible for the activity being audited (at the time of the audit). For example, a flight crew member may audit line flight operations from the flight deck jump seat as an independent observer (supernumerary) but may not do so when functioning as part of the operating crew (or functioning as an augmenting crew member).\r\nRefer to the IAH for information relevant to auditor qualification and independence."]
["ORG","ORG 2.2.1","ORG 2.2.1 The Operator shall have processes to monitor external service providers that conduct outsourced operational functions for the Operator to ensure requirements that affect the safety and/or security of operations are being fulfilled. \r\n                  \r\nNote: \r\nIOSA, ISSA or ISAGO registration as the only means to monitor is acceptable provided the Operator obtains the latest of the applicable audit report(s) through official program channels and considers the content of such report(s).\r\n               ",null,"Standard","An operator has a responsibility to ensure outsourced operational functions are conducted in a manner that meets its own operational safety and security requirements. A monitoring process is necessary to satisfy that responsibility, and such process would be applicable to any external service provider that conducts outsourced operational functions, including the parent organization or a separate affiliate of the operator.\r\nIn some regulatory jurisdictions, there may be a regulatory control process that permits certain organizations to meet rigorous standards and become approved to conduct outsourced operations or maintenance for an operator. Such regulatory control process would be an acceptable means for meeting the specification of this provision if it can be demonstrated by the operator that the regulatory control process:\r\n- Includes ongoing monitoring of the approved service providers;\r\n- Such monitoring is sufficiently robust to ensure the approved service providers fulfill the operational requirements of the operator on a continuing basis.\r\n                  \r\nAchieving and maintaining IOSA, ISSA and/or ISAGO registration is a way for an external service provider to demonstrate fulfillment of requirements that affect the safety and/or security of operations. Thus, an operator's process that requires such service providers to maintain IOSA, ISSA and/or ISAGO registration would be acceptable as a method of monitoring when such registration(s) is/are used in conjunction with a risk assessment of the provider.\r\nTo ensure effective monitoring, consideration is given to a range of internal and external methods for use in the oversight of external service providers. Methods might include auditing, systematic review and risk assessment of reported hazards and/or occurrences, monitoring of performance output (KPIs), reporting and governance processes; monitoring and analysis of targeted risk areas, as well as the establishment of an effective two-way communication link with the service provider.\r\nUnder certain circumstances, operational functions may be involuntarily removed from an operator and conducted by a governmental or quasi-governmental authority that is not under the control of the operator (e.g., passenger or baggage security screening at some airports). Under such circumstances, the operator would have a process to monitor output of the function being conducted by the authority to ascertain desired results are being achieved.\r\nIf an operator is part of a Group Company and has management and/or operational functions performed by an affiliate organization that is part of the same Group Company, an operator may demonstrate monitoring of the external organization by processes that ensure functions performed by the affiliate organization for the operator are:\r\n- \tSubjected to auditing under the quality assurance program of the affiliate organization;\r\n- \tContinually satisfying the needs of the operator.\r\n                  "]
["ORG","ORG 2.5.1"," The Operator shall have a system for the management and control of documentation and/or data used directly in the conduct or support of operations. Such system shall ensure documentation: \n(i)  Meets all required elements specified in Table 1.1;\n(ii) Contains legible and accurate information;\n(iii) Is presented in a format appropriate for use in operations. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Documentation and Electronic Documentation.\nThe primary purpose of document control is to ensure necessary, accurate and up-to-date documents are available to those personnel required to use them, to include, in the case of outsourced operational functions, employees of external service providers.\nExamples of documents that are controlled include, but are not limited to, operations manuals, checklists, quality manuals, training manuals, process standards, policy manuals, and standard operating procedures.\nDocumentation received from external sources would include manuals and other types of relevant documents that contain material that is pertinent to the safety of operations conducted by the operator (e.g. regulations, operating standards, technical information and data).\nAn electronic system of document management and control is an acceptable means of conformance. Within such a system, document files are typically created, maintained, identified, revised, distributed, accessed, presented, retained and/or deleted using computer systems (e.g. a web-based system). Some systems specify immediate obsolescence for any information or data that is downloaded or otherwise extracted (e.g. printed on paper) from the electronic files.\nDocument control might include:\n- Retention of a master copy;\n- Examination and approval prior to issue;\n- Review and update, to include an approval process;\n- Version control (electronic documents);\n- Identification of revision status;\n- Identification and retention of revisions as history;\n- Identification and retention of background or source references as history;\n- Distribution to ensure appropriate availability at points of use;\n- Checking of documents to verify they remain legible and readily identifiable;\n- As required, identification, update, distribution and retention of documents of external origin;\n- As applicable, identification and retention of obsolete documents;\n- As applicable, disposal of documents.                  \nAdditionally, control of operational manuals might include:\n- Assignment of an individual with responsibility for approval for contents;\n- A title page that generally identifies the operational applicability and functionality;\n- A table of contents that identifies parts and sub-parts;\n- A preface or introduction outlining the general contents of the manual;\n- Reference numbers for the content of the manual;\n- A defined distribution method and identification of recipients;\n- Identification of responsibility for authorizing the manual;\n- A record of revisions, both temporary and permanent;\n- A list of effective pages within the manual;\n- Identification of revised content.                  \nEach \"loose\" documented procedure that is not held within a manual typically includes:\n- A title page that identifies the operational applicability and functionality;\n- Identification of the date(s) of issue and date of effectiveness;\n- Reference numbers for the content;\n- A distribution list;\n- Identification of responsibility for authorizing the document.\n                  "]
["ORG","ORG 2.5.4A"," The Operator shall have SMS documentation that includes:\n(i) The safety policy and objectives;\n(ii) SMS requirements;\n(iii) SMS processes and procedures;\n(iv) Accountability, authorities and responsibilities for SMS processes and procedures. \n                        [SMS]\n                     \n                  \nNotes: \n1. \n1. An SMS manual may be in the form of a stand-alone document or may be integrated with other organizational documents (or documentation) maintained by the Operator.\n2. \n2. This provision is only applicable for ISSA registration renewal assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","SMS documentation is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS framework.\r\nSMS documentation is typically scaled to the size and complexity of the organization, and describes both the corporate and operational areas of safety management to show continuity of the SMS throughout the organization. Typical documentation would include a description of management positions and associated accountabilities, authorities, and responsibilities within the SMS.\r\nTo ensure personnel throughout the organization are informed, SMS documentation includes a description of the operator's approach to safety management. Such descriptive information would be contained in a manual and presented in a manner that ensures the SMS information is clearly identifiable. The exact title and structure of such manual will vary with each operator.\r\nDepending on the size, structure and scope of an operator's organization, as well as the complexity of its operations, SMS documentation may be in the form of stand-alone documents or may be integrated into other organizational documents. Requirements for SMS documentation will vary according to the individual state safety program (SSP).\r\nSMS documentation typically addresses:\r\n- Scope of the SMS;\r\n- Safety policy and objectives;\r\n- Safety accountabilities;\r\n- Key safety personnel;\r\n- Documentation control procedures;\r\n- Coordination of emergency response planning;\r\n- Hazard identification and risk management schemes;\r\n- Safety assurance;\r\n- Safety performance monitoring;\r\n- Safety auditing (safety and quality auditing may be combined);\r\n- Management of change;\r\n- Safety promotion;\r\n- Outsourced services.\r\n                  \r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 2.5.4B"," The Operator should have SMS documentation that includes:\n(i) The safety policy and objectives;\n(ii) SMS requirements;\n(iii) SMS processes and procedures;\n(iv) Accountability, authorities and responsibilities for SMS processes and procedures.                                \n                  \nNotes: \n\n1. An SMS manual may be in the form of a stand-alone document or may be integrated with other organizational documents (or documentation) maintained by the Operator.\n2. This provision is only applicable for initial ISSA assessments.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to Guidance Material of ORG 2.5.4A."]
["ORG","ORG 2.6.1"," The Operator shall have a system for the management and control of operational records to ensure the content and retention of such records is in accordance with requirements of the Authority, as applicable, and to ensure operational records are subjected to standardized processes for:\n(i) Identification;\n(ii) Legibility;\n(iii) Maintenance;\n(iv) Retrieval;\n(v) Protection and security;\n(vi) Disposal, deletion (electronic records) and archiving.                      \n                  \nNote: \nThe operational records system specified in this standard shall also include the management and control of SMS operational records.\n               ",null,"Standard","The system addresses the management and control of all records associated with operations, which includes personnel training records, and also includes any other records that document the fulfillment of operational requirements (e.g. aircraft maintenance, operational control, operational security).\r\nSMS operational records substantiate the ongoing operation of the operator's SMS and may be managed and controlled within either a centralized or standalone records system. SMS operational records typically include or provide a record of the following: \r\n- Hazards register and hazard/safety reports; \r\n- Safety performance indicators (SPIs) and related charts; \r\n- Completed safety risk assessments; \r\n- SMS internal reviews or audits;\r\n- SMS/safety training; \r\n- SMS/safety committee meeting minutes. \r\n                  "]
["ORG","ORG 3.1.1A","The Operator  shall have a hazard identification program that is implemented and integrated throughout the organization, to include:\n(i) A combination of reactive and proactive methods for safety data collection;\n(ii) Processes for safety data analysis that identify existing hazards and predict future hazards to aircraft operations. [SMS]\n                     \n                  \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for ISSA registration renewal assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Hazard (Aircraft Operations) and Safety Risk.\r\nHazard identification is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS framework.\r\nThe methods used to identify hazards will typically depend on the resources and constraints of each particular organization. Some organizations might deploy comprehensive, technology-intensive hazard identification processes, while organizations with smaller, less complex operations might implement more modest hazard identification processes. Regardless of organizational size or complexity, to ensure all hazards are identified to the extent possible, hazard identification processes are necessarily formalized, coordinated and consistently applied on an on-going basis in all areas of the organization where there is a potential for hazards that could affect aircraft operations.\r\nTo be effective, reactive and proactive processes are used to acquire information and data, which are then analyzed to identify existing or predict future (i.e. potential) hazards to aircraft operations.\r\nExamples of processes that typically yield information or data for hazard identification include the list below, in parenthesis the general type of process, although many can be used both reactively and proactively:\r\n- Confidential or other reporting by personnel (proactive);\r\n- Investigation of accidents, incidents, irregularities and other non-normal events (reactive);\r\n- Flight data analysis (proactive);\r\n- Observation of flight crew performance in line operations and training (proactive);\r\n- Quality assurance and/or safety auditing  (proactive);\r\n- Safety information gathering or exchange (external sources).\r\n                  \r\nProcesses would be designed to identify hazards that might be associated with organizational business changes (e.g. addition of new routes or destinations, acquisition of new aircraft type(s), the introduction of significant outsourcing of operational functions).\r\nTypically hazards are assigned a tracking number and recorded in a log or database. Each log or database entry would normally include a description of the hazard, as well as other information necessary to track associated risk assessment and mitigation activities.\r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 3.1.1B"," The Operator  should have a hazard identification program that is implemented and integrated throughout the organization, to include:\n(i) A combination of reactive and proactive methods for safety data collection;\n(ii) Processes for safety data analysis that identify existing hazards and predict future hazards to aircraft operations. [SMS]\n                             \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for initial ISSA assessments.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to Guidance Material of ORG 3.1.1A."]
["ORG","ORG 3.1.2","The Operator shall have an operational safety reporting system that is implemented throughout the organization in a manner that:\n(i) Encourages and facilitates personnel to submit reports that identify safety hazards, expose safety deficiencies and raise safety concerns;\n(ii) Ensures mandatory reporting in accordance with applicable regulations;\n(iii) Includes analysis and management action as necessary to address safety issues identified through the reporting system. [SMS]\n                   \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Safety reporting id a key aspect of SMS hazard identification and risk management.\r\nFrontline personnel, such as flight or cabin crew members and maintenance technicians, are exposed to hazards and face challenging situations as part of their everyday activities. An operational reporting system provides such personnel with a means to report these hazards or any other safety concerns so they may be brought to the attention of relevant managers.\r\nTo build confidence in the reporting process and encourage more reporting, an acknowledgement of receipt is typically provided to each person that submits a report.\r\nAn effective system provides for a review and analysis of each report to determine whether a real safety issue exists, and if so, ensure development and implementation of appropriate action by responsible management to correct the situation.\r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 3.1.5"," The Operator should have a process to identify changes within or external to the organization that have the potential to affect the level of safety risks associated with aircraft operations, and to manage risks that may arise from or are affected by such changes in accordance with ORG 3.1.1 and ORG 3.1.2. [SMS] \n Note: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Change Management.\r\nChange management is an element of the Safety Assurance component of the SMS framework and is considered a proactive hazard identification activity in an SMS.\r\nSafety risk management requires an operator to have a formal process to identify hazards that may affect aircraft operations. Hazards may exist in ongoing aircraft operations or be inadvertently introduced whenever internal or external changes occur that could affect aircraft operations. In such cases, hazard identification as specified in ORG 3.1.1 and safety risk assessment and mitigation as specified in ORG 3.1.2 (both are repeated in other ISM sections) are integral elements of an operator's change management process.\r\nA change management process is normally designed to ensure risk management is applied to any internal or external change that has the potential to affect an operator's established operational processes, procedures, products, equipment and services.\r\nThe change management process typically takes into account the following three considerations:\r\n- \r\n                           Criticality. Criticality assessments determine the systems, equipment or activities that are essential to the safe operation of aircraft. While criticality is normally assessed during the system design process, it is also relevant during a situation of change. Systems, equipment and activities that have higher safety criticality are reviewed following change to make sure that corrective actions can be taken to control potentially emerging safety risks.\r\n- \r\n                           Stability of systems and operational environments. Changes might be planned and under the direct control of the operator. Examples of such changes include organizational growth or contraction, the expansion of products or services delivered, or the introduction of new technologies. Changes might also be unplanned and external to the operator, such as changing economic cycles, labor unrest and changes to the political, regulatory or operating environments.\r\n- \r\n                           Past performance. Past performance of critical systems and trend analyses in the safety assurance process is typically employed to anticipate and monitor safety performance under situations of change. The monitoring of past performance will also assure the effectiveness of corrective actions taken to address safety deficiencies identified as a result of audits, evaluations, investigations or reports.\r\n                  \r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 3.2.1A"," The Operator shall have a safety risk assessment and mitigation program that includes processes implemented and integrated throughout the organization to ensure:\n(i) Hazards are analyzed to determine corresponding safety risks to aircraft operations;\n(ii) Safety risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk mitigation action(s);\n(iii) When required, risk mitigation actions are developed and implemented in operations. [SMS]\n                      \n                     \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for ISSA registration renewal assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to IRM for the definition of Safety Risk Assessment (SRA).\r\nRisk assessment and mitigation is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS framework.\r\nTo be completely effective, a risk assessment and mitigation program would typically be implemented in a manner that:\r\n- Is active in all areas of the organization where there is a potential for hazards that could affect aircraft operations;\r\n- Has some form of central coordination to ensure all existing or potential hazards that have been identified are subjected to risk assessment and, if applicable, mitigation.\r\n                  \r\nThe safety risks associated with an identified existing or potential hazard are assessed in the context of the potentially damaging consequences related to the hazard. Safety risks are generally expressed in two components:\r\n- Likelihood of an occurrence;\r\n- Severity of the consequence of an occurrence.\r\n                  \r\nTypically, matrices that quantify safety risk acceptance levels are developed to ensure standardization and consistency in the risk assessment process. Separate matrices with different risk acceptance criteria are sometimes utilized to address long-term versus short-term operations.\r\nA risk register is often employed for the purpose of documenting risk assessment information and monitoring risk mitigation (control) actions.\r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 3.2.1B"," The Operator should have a safety risk assessment and mitigation program that includes processes implemented and integrated throughout the organization to ensure:\n(i) Hazards are analyzed to determine corresponding safety risks to aircraft operations;\n(ii) Safety risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk mitigation action(s);\n(iii) When required, risk mitigation actions are developed and implemented in operations. [SMS]\n                             \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for initial ISSA assessments.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to Guidance Material of ORG 3.2.1A."]
["ORG","ORG 3.3.1","The Operator shall have a flight data analysis program that provides for the identification of hazards and the analysis of information and data associated with aircraft operations, to include:\n(i) Implementation of systematic processes for identifying and analyzing hazards and potentially hazardous conditions;\n(ii) Production of relevant analytical information and data for use by operational managers in the prevention of accidents and incidents. [SMS]\n                       \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Safety Analysis  Program.\r\nA primary function of a flight safety analysis program is hazard identification, which is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS framework.\r\nIn many organizations the flight safety analysis program is typically known as the flight safety program.\r\nThe flight safety analysis program primarily provides operational hazard identification and data analysis services for use by operational managers.\r\nFor some operators the flight data analysis program is part of an independent corporate safety structure, which typically has a direct line of reporting to senior management. This type of structure allows an effective and fully integrated system of prevention and safety across all relevant operational disciplines of the organization.\r\nOther operators choose to have a flight data analysis program reside within an operational unit (e.g., flight operations). In this type of system, to ensure objectivity in addressing safety matters and independence from frontline operational managers, the program manager would not only have a direct reporting line to the head of that operational unit, but also an indirect reporting line to senior management.\r\nDocumentation of the program typically includes a description of the structure, individual responsibilities, available resources and core processes associated with the program."]
["ORG","ORG 3.3.2"," If the Operator conducts flights with aircraft of a maximum certified takeoff mass in excess of 27,000 kg (59,525 lb), the Operator shall have a flight data analysis (FDA) program applicable to such aircraft that is non-punitive and contains adequate safeguards to protect data sources. The FDA program shall include either:\n(i) A systematic download and analysis of electronically recorded aircraft flight data, or                     \n(ii) A systematic acquisition, correlation and analysis of flight information derived from a combination of some or all of the following sources:\n(a) Aircraft flight data recorder (FDR) readouts;\n(b) Confidential flight and cabin crew operational safety reports;\n(c) Flight and cabin crew interviews;\n(d) Quality assurance findings;\n(e) Flight and cabin crew evaluation reports;\n(f) Aircraft engineering and maintenance reports. [SMS]\n                                           \n                     \n                  \nNote: \nThis standard is applicable only for the initial ISSA registration assessment.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Data Analysis (FDA) Program.\r\nFlight data analysis is considered a reactive and proactive hazard identification activity in an SMS.\r\nA primary purpose of an FDA program is hazard identification, which is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS framework.\r\nThe systematic download and analysis of recorded flight data has been used by international airlines for many years to identify hazards, evaluate the operational environment, validate operating criteria and establish training effectiveness.\r\nAs a minimum, an acceptable program for the analysis of recorded aircraft flight data includes the following elements:\r\n- A manager and staff of flight operations experts, commensurate with the size of the operation, to provide verification and analysis of the data collected from the aircraft fleet under the operator's program;\r\n- Aircraft designated within the operator's fleet that provide downloadable flight data from onboard recording systems, such as the flight data recorder (FDR) or quick access recorder (QAR);\r\n- A system for downloading and transferring recorded data from the aircraft to a data analysis system;\r\n- A data analysis system that transforms raw digital data into a usable form of information that can then be verified, processed, categorized and analyzed by flight operations experts for flight safety purposes;\r\n- A process for applying the output from flight data analysis to the management of risk and assessment of flight operations performance;\r\n- A process for management of the data, to include security and retention.\r\n                  \r\nAll or certain of the elements could be outsourced to an external party; however, the operator would retain overall responsibility for the maintenance of the program.\r\nThe most comprehensive approach to flight data analysis would be a program that includes not only systematic download and analysis of electronically recorded aircraft flight data (as described above), but also acquisition, correlation and analysis of flight information derived from other sources (as described below).\r\nFurther guidance may be found in the following source documents:\r\n- CAO Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual, and ICAO Doc 10000, Manual on Flight Data Analysis Programmes (FDAP).\r\n- \tCASA CAAP SMS-4(0), Guidance on the establishment of a Flight Data Analysis Program (FDAP)-Safety Management Systems (SMS).\r\n- FAA Advisor Circular AC No: 120-82, Flight Operational Quality Assurance.\r\n- UK CAA CAP 739, Flight Data Monitoring.\r\n                  \r\nIf an operator does not have a process for the regular download and analysis of recorded flight data, then as an alternative the operator may have a systematic process for acquiring and correlating flight information from other sources that can be analyzed to identify hazards or potential hazards to flight.\r\nUseful information can be derived from external sources to supplement flight data derived internally. Other such sources include:\r\n- Regulatory authorities;\r\n- Investigative bodies;\r\n- Safety organizations;\r\n- Manufacturers;\r\n- Other operators.\r\n                  \r\nFlight information is analyzed collectively to identify hazards, system weaknesses, process breakdowns, regulatory violations and other trends or conditions that could potentially lead to accidents or serious incidents. The process includes a method of risk analysis and prioritization to enable the development and implementation of effective corrective or preventive action."]
["ORG","ORG 3.5.1","The Operator shall have a process for the investigation of aircraft accidents and incidents, to include reporting of events in accordance with requirements of the State. [SMS]\n              \n               ",null,"Standard","Accident and incident investigation is considered a reactive hazard identification activity in an SMS.\r\nA primary purpose of accident and incident investigation is hazard identification, which is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS framework.\r\nInvestigations typically result in a report that describes the factors that contributed to the event, which is then made available to responsible senior operational managers to permit them to evaluate and implement appropriate corrective or preventive action.\r\nAn effective investigation process typically includes:\r\n- Qualified personnel to conduct investigations (commensurate with operation size);\r\n- Procedures for the conduct of investigations;\r\n- A process for reporting investigative results;\r\n- A system for implementing any corrective or preventive action;\r\n- An interface with relevant external investigative authorities (when applicable);\r\n- A process for the dissemination of information derived from investigations.\r\n                  \r\nTo ensure awareness among operational personnel, information derived from investigations is disseminated to relevant areas throughout the organization.\r\nIn the event of a major accident, an operator responds to and possibly participates in an investigation in accordance with provisions contained in ICAO Annex 13. Such capability requires an operator to maintain an ongoing interface with relevant investigative authorities to ensure preparedness in the event a major accident occurs.\r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 3.5.2A"," The Operator shall have a process for identifying and investigating irregularities and other non-routine operational occurrences that might be precursors to an aircraft accident or incident.  [SMS]\n                  \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for ISSA registration renewal assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","Investigation of operational irregularities  is considered a reactive hazard identification activity in an SMS.\r\nA primary purpose of investigating non-routine operational occurrences is hazard identification, which is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS framework. \r\nThe investigation of irregularities or non-routine occurrences is a hazard identification activity. Minor events, irregularities and occurrences occur often during normal operations, many times without noticeable consequences. Identifying and investigating certain irregular operational occurrences can reveal system weaknesses or deficiencies that, if left un-checked, could eventually lead to an accident or serious incident. These types of events are referred to as accidentprecursors.  \r\nA process to monitor operations on a regular basis permits the identification and capture of information associated with internal activities and events that could be considered precursors. Such events are then investigated to identify undesirable trends and determine contributory factors. \r\nThe monitoring process is typically not limited to occurrences, but also includes a regular review of operational threats and errors that have manifested during normal operations. Monitoring of normal operations can produce data that further serve to identify operational weaknesses and, in turn, assist the organization in developing system solutions. \r\nAs with the investigation of accidents and serious incidents, the investigation of minor internal occurrences results in a report that is communicated to relevant operational managers for analysis and the possible development of corrective or preventive action. \r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 3.5.2B"," The Operator should have a process for identifying and investigating irregularities and other non-routine operational occurrences that might be precursors to an aircraft accident or incident.  [SMS]\n                  \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for initial ISSA assessments.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to Guidance Material of ORG 3.5.2A\r\n                  "]
["ORG","ORG 4.1.1","The Operator shall  ensure   the management system is reviewed at intervals not exceeding one year to ensure its continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness in the management and control of operations and associated risks. The review shall include assessing opportunities for improvement and the need for changes to the system, including, but not limited to:\n(i) Organizational structure; \n(ii) Defined safety objectives; \n(iii) Reporting lines, authorities, responsibilities; \n(iv) Policies, processes and procedures; \n(v) Allocation of resources; \n(vi) Identification of training needs.\n                        \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Management review is a necessary element of a well-managed company that provides a medium through which organizational control and continual improvement can be delivered. To be effective, a formal management review takes place on a regular basis, typically once or more per year. The management review would focus on the entire management system.\r\nThe management review would typically be conducted by a strategic committee of senior management officials that are familiar with the workings and objectives of the management system. If the review of the SMS is conducted separately, such committee is typically referred to as a Safety Review Board (SRB), which is a very high level, strategic committee chaired by the AE and composed of senior managers, including senior line managers responsible for functional areas in operations (e.g. flight operations, engineering and maintenance, cabin operations). \r\nTo ensure frontline input as part of the review process, an operator would form multiple units of specially selected operational personnel (e.g. managers, supervisors, frontline personnel) that function to oversee safety in areas where operations are conducted. Such units are typically referred to as Safety Action Groups (SAGs), which are tactical committees that function to address implementation issues in frontline operations to satisfy the strategic directives of the SRB.\r\nAn appropriate method to satisfy this requirement is a periodic formal meeting of senior executives. The agenda of the meeting would typically include a general assessment of the management system to ensure all defined elements are functioning effectively and producing the desired operational safety outcomes consistent with defined safety objectives.\r\nSenior management ensures deficiencies identified during the management review are addressed through the implementation of organizational changes that will result in improvements to the management system.\r\nInput to the management review process would typically include:\r\n- \tResults of audits;\r\n- \tFindings from operational inspections and investigations;\r\n- \tOperational feedback;\r\n- \tIncidents and near-miss reports;\r\n- \tChanges in regulatory policy or civil aviation legislation;\r\n- \tProcess performance and organizational conformance;\r\n- \tStatus of corrective and preventative actions;\r\n- \tResults from implementation or rehearsal of the emergency response plan (ERP);\r\n- \tFollow-up actions from previous management reviews;\r\n- \tFeedback and recommendations for management system improvement;\r\n- \tRegulatory violations.\r\n                  \r\nOutput from the management review process would typically include decisions and actions related to:\r\n- Improvement of the processes throughout the management system;\r\n- Safety and security requirements;\r\n- \tResource needs.\r\n                  \r\nThe management review is a formal process, which means documentation in the form of meeting schedules, agendas and minutes are produced and retained. Additionally, the output of the management review process would normally include action plans for changes to be implemented within the system where deemed appropriate.\r\nExamples of strategies that might improve the overall effectiveness of the management review process include:\r\n- \tIntegrating the management review meeting into other performance review meetings;\r\n- \tScheduling management review meetings frequently enough to ensure any action that might be required is timely;\r\n- \tEnsuring senior managers understand their responsibilities as part of the review process;\r\n- \tEnsuring action items resulting from meetings are documented and progress is tracked;\r\n- Ensuring there is always a responsible name associated with action items.\r\n                  \r\nExpanded guidance related to review of the SMS may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 4.1.3"," The Operator should processes to monitor and assess its SMS processes in order to maintain or\ncontinually improve the overall effectiveness of the SMS. [SMS] \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Safety Assurance, Safety Action Group (SAG) and Safety\r\nReview Board (SRB).\r\nSafety performance monitoring and measurement is an element of the Safety Assurance component\r\nof the SMS framework.\r\nMonitoring and assessing the effectiveness of SMS processes would normally be the function of a\r\nstrategic committee of senior management officials that are familiar with the workings and objectives\r\nof the SMS. Such committee is typically referred to as a Safety Review Board (SRB), which is a very\r\nhigh-level, strategic committee chaired by the AE and composed of senior managers, including\r\nsenior line managers responsible for functional areas in operations (e.g. flight operations,\r\nengineering and maintenance, cabin operations).\r\nTo ensure frontline input as part of the SMS review process, an operator would form multiple units of\r\nspecially selected operational personnel (e.g. managers, supervisors, frontline personnel) that\r\nfunction to oversee safety in areas where operations are conducted. Such units are typically referred\r\nto as Safety Action Groups (SAGs), which are tactical committees that function to address\r\nimplementation issues in frontline operations to satisfy the strategic directives of the SRB.\r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 4.2.1A","ORG 4.2.1A The Operator shall have a system that enables effective communication of safety and operational information throughout the management system and in all areas where operations are conducted. Such system shall ensure:\n(i) \tPersonnel maintain an awareness of the SMS;\n(ii) Safety-critical information is conveyed;\n(iii) External service providers are provided with information relevant to operations conducted. [SMS]\n                        \n                    \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for ISSA registration renewal assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","Safety communication is an element of the Safety Promotion component of the SMS framework.\r\nAn effective communication system ensures the exchange of operational and safety-related information throughout all areas of the organization and includes senior managers, operational managers and front-line personnel. \r\nTo be totally effective, the communication system would also include external organizations that conduct outsourced operational functions. Communication with external service providers would typically be limited to information that is pertinent and relevant to the provider's services delivered to the operator. It would be at the operator's discretion to define the extent and content of such communication and the delivery method(s) to be used.\r\nMethods of internal communication will vary according to the size and scope of the organization. However, to be effective, methods are as uncomplicated and easy to use as is possible and facilitate the reporting of operational deficiencies, hazards or concerns by operational personnel.\r\nSpecific methods of communication between management and operational personnel could include:\r\n- Email, Internet;\r\n- Safety or operational reporting system;\r\n- CommuniquÃ©s (e.g. letters, memos, bulletins);\r\n- Publications (e.g. newsletters, magazines).\r\n                  \r\nIf email is used as an official medium for communication with operational personnel, the process is typically formalized by the operator to ensure control and effectiveness.\r\nThe general intent of safety communication is to foster a positive safety culture in which all employees receive ongoing information on safety issues, safety metrics, specific hazards existing in the workplace and initiatives to address known safety issues. Such communication typically conveys safety-critical information, explains why particular actions are taken to improve safety and why safety procedures are introduced or changed.\r\nInformation and issues relevant to safety performance are typically derived from various sources such as, but not limited to, the quality assurance/flight safety analysis programs, operational safety reporting and accident/incident investigations.\r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 4.2.1B"," The Operator should have a system that enables effective communication of safety and operational information throughout the management system and in all areas where operations are conducted. Such system shall ensure:\n(i) \tPersonnel maintain an awareness of the SMS;\n(ii) Safety-critical information is conveyed;\n(iii) External service providers are provided with information relevant to operations conducted. [SMS]\n                        \n                     \n                  \nNote: \nThis provision is only applicable for initial ISSA assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to Guidance Material of ORG 4.2.1A\r\n                  "]
["ORG","ORG 4.3.1A","The Operator shall  have a program that ensures its personnel are trained to understand SMS\nresponsibilities and competent to perform associated duties. The scope of such training shall be appropriate to each individual's involvement in the SMS. [SMS]\n                  \n                  \nNotes: \n1. \n1. The specifications of this provision are applicable to personnel of the Operator.\n2. \n2. This provision is only applicable for ISSA registration renewal assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","SMS training is an element of the Safety Promotion component of the SMS framework.\r\nAn SMS typically specifies initial and recurrent safety training standards for personnel that perform operational functions for the operator, to include managers and supervisors, senior managers and the AE.\r\n The content of such training is appropriate to the individual's responsibilities and involvement in the SMS, and typically includes or addresses some or all of the following subject areas:\r\n- Organizational safety policies, goals and objectives;\r\n- Organizational safety roles and responsibilities related to safety;\r\n- Basic safety risk management principles;\r\n- Safety reporting systems;\r\n- Safety management support (including evaluation and audit programs);\r\n- Lines of communication for dissemination of safety information;\r\n- A validation process that measures the effectiveness of training;\r\n- Initial indoctrination and, when applicable, recurrent training requirements.\r\n                  \r\nExpanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859."]
["ORG","ORG 4.3.1B","ORG 4.3.1B The Operator should have a program that ensures its personnel are trained to understand SMS\nresponsibilities and competent to perform associated duties. The scope of such training shall be appropriate to each individual's involvement in the SMS. [SMS]\n                  \n                  \nNotes: \n\n1. The specifications of this provision are applicable to personnel of the Operator.\n\n2. This provision is only applicable for initial ISSA assessments.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to Guidance Material of ORG 4.3.1A\r\n                  "]
["FLT","FLT 1.3.6","The Operator should assign responsibility to the pilot-in-command (PIC) for:\n(i) The safety of all crew members, passengers and/or cargo on board the aircraft when the doors are closed;\n(ii) The operation and safety of the aircraft from the moment the aircraft is ready to move for the purpose of taking off until the moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the flight and the engine(s) are shut down;\n(iii)  Ensuring checklists are complied with.  \n               \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is to ensure that the specified responsibilities are assigned to the PIC and\r\nsuch assignment is evident in Operator policies or procedures.\r\nSpecifications in item i) and ii) may be satisfied by policies documented in, or referenced in, the OM\r\nthat assign responsibilities to the PIC in a manner consistent with regulations of the State and the\r\nintent of the provision. Slight variations in the wording of policies are permissible if the periods of\r\nresponsibility as specified in each item are addressed by the operator's policies.\r\nFor example, an operator could assign responsibility to the PIC for the safety of passengers from the\r\ntime they board the aircraft until they deplane. Such policy would satisfy this provision because it\r\nexceeds the period of PIC responsibility as specified in this provision.\r\nThe specification in item iii) may be satisfied by any policy or combination of policies that assign the\r\nresponsibility for compliance with standard operating procedures to the PIC."]
["FLT","FLT 1.3.7"," The Operator should ensure, for the duration of each flight, one pilot is designated to act as PIC. \n               \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The specification of this provision is satisfied if one pilot is designated to act as PIC, regardless of\r\ncrew configuration or en route crew changes."]
["FLT","FLT 1.6.6"," The Operator should ensure documents that comprise the onboard library, as specified in Table 2.1, are carried on board the aircraft for each flight and located in a manner that provides for access by the flight crew.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to Table 2.1 for specifications related to accessing performance calculations via telecom\r\nsystems (e.g. ACARS) in lieu of onboard documentation."]
["FLT","FLT 1.7.1"," The Operator shall have an Operations Manual (OM) for the use of personnel in the flight operations organization, which may be issued in separate parts, and which contains or references the policies, procedures, checklists and other guidance or information necessary for compliance with applicable regulations, laws, rules and Operator standards. As a minimum, the OM shall be managed and controlled in accordance with ORG 2.5.1 and be in accordance with specifications contained in Table 2.2. \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure the flight crew will find all information necessary to perform its functions within the OM, or within another document that is referenced in the OM. The OM is identified as a source of operational information approved or accepted for the purpose by the operator or the State.\r\nGuidance and procedures in the OM enable the flight crew to comply with the conditions and limitations specified in the AOC."]
["FLT","FLT 1.7.4"," The Operator should have a process to develop and establish procedures and checklists for use by the\nflight crew. Such process shall ensure:\n(i) Human factors principles are observed in the design of the OM, checklists and associated\nprocedures;\n(ii) The specific parts of the OM relevant to flight crew are clearly identified and defined;\n(iii) If applicable, any differences from procedures and checklists provided by the\nmanufacturer(s) are based on operational considerations.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Human Factors Principles.\r\nThe intent of this provision is to ensure procedures and checklists are developed in a manner that\r\nensures they are useable, identifiable and consistent with manufacturer specifications. Any\r\ndeviations from manufacturer procedures or checklists are typically based on operational concerns\r\nidentified by the operator.\r\nHuman factors principles in document design and checklist usage typically address the following:\r\n- Preparation of documentation in a useable format for information presentation, at the\r\nappropriate reading level and with the required degree of technical sophistication and clarity.\r\n- Improving user performance through the use of effective and consistent labels, symbols,\r\ncolors, terms, acronyms, abbreviations, formats and data fields.\r\n- Ensuring the availability and usability of information to the user for specific tasks, when\r\nneeded, and in a form that is directly usable.\r\n- Designing operational procedures for simplicity, consistency and ease of use.\r\n- Enabling operators to perceive and understand elements of the current situation and project\r\nthem to future operational situations.\r\n- Minimizing the need for special or unique operator skills, abilities, tools or characteristics.\r\n- Assessing the net demands or impacts upon the physical, cognitive and decision-making\r\nresources of the operator, using objective and subjective performance measures.\r\n- The specification in item ii) ensures the relevant sections of the OM are clearly identified as\r\nthe OM can, in some instances, include sections published for flight operations personnel\r\nother than flight crew. As such, all OM sections need not be provided to the flight crew (e.g.,\r\ntraining syllabi are usually restricted to training/checking personnel)"]
["FLT","FLT 2.1.1"," The Operator shall have a training and evaluation program, approved or accepted by the Authority, that consists of ground and flight training and, when applicable, evaluations to ensure flight crew members are competent to perform assigned duties. The program shall address traditional and, if applicable, advanced (or alternative) training and qualification, and ensure training and evaluation is conducted for each type of aircraft in the fleet. Such program shall also, as a minimum, address:\n(i) Initial qualification;\n(ii) Continuing qualification;\n(iii) Re-qualification;\n(iv) As applicable, aircraft transition or conversion;\n(v) Upgrade to PIC;\n(vi) As applicable, other specialized training requirements,\nincluding those associated with operations authorized the AOC.  \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator's training program contains the elements necessary to ensure flight crew members are continuously competent to perform assigned duties.\r\nThe initial qualification process provided to newly hired crew members includes company indoctrination and initial endorsement on company aircraft types. This presupposes that the newly hired crew member already holds a commercial flying license.\r\nInitial endorsement training may not be required as part of initial qualification if a newly hired crew member already holds a type endorsement acceptable to both the State and the operator. Company indoctrination training, however, is always considered a part of initial qualification.\r\nContinuing qualification includes recurrent or refresher training and also includes any training necessary to meet recency-of-experience requirements.\r\nTransition (conversion) training refers to an aircraft type qualification training and evaluation program for each type of aircraft in the fleet and is not required when an operator only utilizes one type of aircraft.\r\nSpecialized training could include training on a specific type of new equipment (e.g., ACAS) or training for specific operations to meet requirements of the Authority.\r\nTraining could be outsourced, in which case services typically range from simple dry lease of a training device to delegation of all training to an external organization (e.g., Authorized Flight Training School)."]
["FLT","FLT 2.1.4"," If the Operator uses distance learning and/or distance evaluation in the flight crew training and qualification program, the Operator shall ensure such training and/or evaluation is monitored in accordance with FLT 2.1.28  and, if required, is approved or accepted by the State. \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Distance Learning.\r\nDistance learning refers to flight crew training or evaluation that is not conducted in a classroom or face-to-face with an instructor or evaluator, but rather is conducted through the use of distributed printed material or electronic media (e.g., Internet, compact disc, etc.).\r\n"]
["FLT","FLT 2.1.10"," The Operator shall have a Training Manual for the use of flight operations personnel, which may be issued in separate parts, that contains the details of all relevant training programs, policies, procedures, requirements and other guidance or information necessary to administer the Operator's Training Program and the Training Manual shall, as a minimum, be managed and controlled as specified in ORG 2.5.1 and be in accordance with specifications contained in Table 2.2. \n                  \n               ",null,"Standard","The training manual typically applies to instructors, evaluators, line-check airmen, flight crew members, training schedulers, simulator operations personnel, administrative support personnel and other applicable flight operations personnel.\r\nThe training manual may be split among several publications with the relevant parts made easily accessible to the appropriate personnel."]
["FLT","FLT 2.1.28"," The Operator shall have processes for ensuring continual improvement of the flight crew training and evaluation program, to include, as a minimum, the monitoring, recording and evaluation of results of successful and unsuccessful flight crew evaluations. \n               ",null,"Standard","Flight crew operational non-compliances, training deficiencies and evaluation trends (simulator, aircraft and line operations) are typically used by the training organization for trend analysis and program improvement. \r\nGrading scale criteria (e.g. numerical, letter grade) provides a means to accurately identify areas for improvement."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.7","The Operator should ensure flight crew members complete Operator familiarization training prior to\nbeing assigned to duties in line operations. Such training shall ensure familiarity with:\n(i) Duties and responsibilities;\n(ii) Relevant state regulations;\n(iii) Authorized operations;\n(iv) Relevant sections of the OM.  \nTable: \n  Conformance Applicability \nSpecific to Aircraft Type Included in Initial/Transition/\nConversion Training Included in Recurrent Training/Continuing Qualification Conformance through AQP/ATQP/EBT \nYes* YesNoNo\n* This training may be provided as a complete package included in a company indoctrination course\nor, if applicable, tailored to address requirements that are different from the individual's previous\ntraining.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","This provision and many of the ensuing flight crew training provisions contain a Conformance\r\nApplicability (CA) Table. Refer to the General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2,\r\nTraining and Qualification, for a detailed description of the CA Table.\r\nTraining is applicable to all flight crew members.\r\nMany operators refer to this training course as Basic Company Indoctrination."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.12","If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and an evaluation in dangerous goods during initial ground training and subsequently once during recurrent training within the 24-month period from the previous training in dangerous goods.",null,"Standard","Training and evaluation is applicable to all flight crew members.\r\nRecurrent training in dangerous goods is typically completed within a validity period that expires 24 months from the previous training to ensure knowledge is current, unless a shorter period is defined by a competent authority. However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final 3 months of the 24-month validity period, the new validity period may extend from the month on which the recurrent training was completed until 24 months from the expiry month of the current validity period. If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months (or 90 days) of the validity period, the new validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent training was completed.\r\nThe curriculum for dangerous goods training for flight crew members will typically address the following subject areas:\r\n- General philosophy;\r\n- Limitations;\r\n- List of dangerous goods;\r\n- Labeling and marking;\r\n- Recognition of undeclared dangerous goods;\r\n- Storage and loading procedures;\r\n- Pilot's notification;\r\n- Provisions for passengers and crew;\r\n- Emergency procedures.\r\n                  \r\nGuidance may be found in the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) 1.5, Table 1.5.A."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.13"," If the Operator does not transport dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and an evaluation in dangerous goods during initial ground training and subsequently once during recurrent training within the 24-month period from the previous training in dangerous goods.",null,"Standard","Training and evaluation is applicable to all flight crew members.\r\nRecurrent training in dangerous goods is typically completed within a validity period that expires 24 months from the previous training to ensure knowledge is current, unless a shorter period is defined by a competent authority. However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final 3 months of the 24-month validity period, the new validity period may extend from the month on which the recurrent training was completed until 24 months from the expiry month of the current validity period. If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months (or 90 days) of the validity period, the new validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent training was completed.\r\nThe curriculum for dangerous goods training for flight crew members is commensurate with responsibilities and will typically address:\r\n- General philosophy;\r\n- Limitations;\r\n- Labeling and marking;\r\n- Recognition of undeclared dangerous goods;\r\n- Provisions for passengers and crew;\r\n- Emergency procedures.\r\n                  \r\nGuidance may be found in DGR 1.5, Table 1.5.B."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.16"," The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and an evaluation in subjects associated with adverse weather and/or environmental conditions during initial ground training and subsequently during recurrent training once every three (3) calendar years.\n(i) Cold weather operations;\n(ii) De-/anti-icing policies and procedures;\n(iii) Contaminated runway Operations;\n(iv) Thunderstorm avoidance. \n                     \n                  \nNote: \nItem ii) is applicable if the Operator conducts flights from any airport when conditions are conducive to ground aircraft icing.\n               ",null,"Standard","Training and evaluation is applicable to all flight crew members.\r\nThe specifications in this provision are related to the prevention of runway excursions and in-flight loss of control. \r\nThe intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew members receive recurrent training and an evaluation in the subjects associated with the adverse weather or environmental conditions they may encounter in operations."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.20"," If the Operator  conducts flights into areas where English is the primary language of Air Traffic Control (ATC) and whose duties include communication with ATC, the Operator should require flight crew members to complete an evaluation during initial ground training to demonstrate a sufficient level of English language proficiency that will ensure effective communication during the performance of such duties.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is to ensure a pilot who is required to communicate with air traffic control\r\nin English demonstrates a sufficient level of English language proficiency to ensure effective\r\ncommunication during the performance of duties.\r\nSuch evaluation applies to each operating member of the flight crew, as required by the AFM, whose\r\nduties require communication in English with ATC.\r\nEnglish proficiency requirements do not apply to flight engineers or flight navigators unless their\r\nduties include air/ground communication in English.\r\nA State requirement, as part of flight crew licensing, for an individual to demonstrate expert English\r\nlanguage proficiency may be used to satisfy the specifications of this provision."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.26"," The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training in normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers during initial training and subsequently during recurrent training once every 12 months.\n                  \n(i) Pilot Monitoring (PM), Pilot Flying (PF) and other flight crew division of duties (task sharing), if applicable;\n(ii) If applicable, positive transfer of aircraft control;\n(iii) Consistent checklist philosophy;\n(iv) Emphasis on a prioritization of tasks (e.g. \"aviate, navigate, communicate\");\n(v) Proper use of all levels of flight automation. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM).\r\nTraining is applicable to all flight crew members.\r\nThe intent of this provision is to set a training interval for normal and non-normal procedures, and additionally to ensure the training manual, curricula, lesson plans, or other guidance associated with such training addresses the specifications in items (i) through (v).\r\nDivision of flight crew duties, transfer of aircraft control, checklist use and prioritization of tasks are in accordance with the operator's policy for task sharing and as specified in FLT 3.11.18.\r\nElements of training may be accomplished as part of ground, simulator, aircraft or line training.\r\nThe term Pilot Monitoring (PM) has the same meaning as the term Pilot Not Flying (PNF) for the purpose of applying the specifications of this provision to two-pilot operations.\r\nThe specification in item iv) refers to the following prioritization of tasks during any normal or abnormal situation or maneuver:\r\n- Aviate: fly the aircraft in accordance with restrictions and limitations set forth in the OM;\r\n- Navigate: guide the aircraft along the intended or appropriate route;\r\n- Communicate: verbalize intentions to other crew members and ATC, as applicable.\r\n                  \r\nThe term \"abnormal\" is used to describe a condition or situation (e.g. abnormal airframe vibration, abnormal landing configuration).\r\nThe terms \"normal\" and \"non-normal/emergency\" typically refer to AOM checklists, procedures and/or maneuvers. The term \"non-normal\" includes AOM emergency checklists and/or procedures (i.e. an emergency procedure is a subset of non-normal).\r\nThe terms can also be used to describe an event, situation or operation that would be addressed by normal or non-normal/emergency procedures or checklists. When used in this manner, the terms may be separated by forward slash marks (e.g. normal/non-normal/emergency).\r\nThe term \"emergency\" used alone refers to declarations and non-AOM procedures."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.27"," The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and, when applicable, an evaluation, that includes a demonstration of competence in normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers, to include, as a minimum, rejected takeoff, emergency evacuation, engine failure. Such training and, when applicable, evaluation shall be accomplished during initial training and subsequently during recurrent training once every 12 months. \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to define the basic initial and subsequent recurrent training and evaluation cycles that ensure flight crew members are competent to perform normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers. It is understood that competence in all potential normal and non-normal procedures may not be demonstrated annually but in accordance with a schedule that is acceptable to the Authority.\r\nTraining and, when applicable, a demonstration of competence in specified normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers is applicable to all pilot crew members.\r\nTraining and, when applicable, evaluation is to be accomplished as part of ground, simulator/aircraft and line training.\r\nLine training is in normal procedures/maneuvers only.\r\nSuch evaluation of competence in the normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers specified is applicable when such procedures and/or maneuvers are stipulated by the operator and/or State in conjunction with State-approved or State-accepted training courses that require a method of evaluation. Such courses typically include:\r\n- Type qualification;\r\n- Transition (conversion);\r\n- Upgrade to PIC;\r\n- Re-qualification;\r\n- Recurrent training.\r\n                  \r\nOperators that conduct training flights and cannot safely train/evaluate a non-normal procedure or maneuver in an aircraft or in a representative flight training device may demonstrate an alternative means of conformance.\r\n                  "]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.28","  The Operator should ensure flight crew members complete practical training exercises:\n(i) In the use of emergency and safety equipment required to be on board the aircraft;\n(ii)  That address emergency evacuation and coordination among flight crew members and, as applicable, cabin crew members and/or supernumeraries required for the safety of operations.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The specification of this provision is not intended to preclude flight crews from knowing the city pairs\r\nto be flown or the general maneuver requirements prior to the evaluation; however, flight crews would\r\ntypically not be provided with the exact evaluation scenario.\r\nOperators that conduct training flights in an aircraft may divulge as much information about the\r\nintended training/evaluation as is necessary to ensure the safety of the planned operation."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.30"," The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training in CRM skills, which may be accomplished as part of simulator, aircraft and/or line training, as applicable. Such training shall be completed during initial training and subsequently during recurrent training once every 12 months. \n               ",null,"Standard","Training is applicable to all flight crew members.\r\nThis specification is intended to ensure CRM skills are emphasized during and integrated into simulator or aircraft training, as applicable, and line training."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.32"," The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and, when applicable, an evaluation that includes a demonstration of competence, in wind shear avoidance and recovery from predictive and actual wind shear. Such training shall be completed during initial ground and simulator training, and subsequently during recurrent simulator training once every 36 months. \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Wind Shear.\r\nThe intent of this provision is to ensure training and evaluation occurs, as applicable, in the maneuvers specified within the intervals specified. Such training and evaluation can occur in conjunction with any State-approved or State-accepted training course.\r\nTraining and, when applicable, an evaluation in the specified normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers is applicable to all pilot crew members.\r\nTraining is accomplished in a representative flight simulator approved for the purpose by the State.\r\nSuch evaluation of competence in the normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers specified is applicable when such procedures and/or maneuvers are stipulated by the operator and/or State in conjunction with State-approved or State-accepted training courses that require a method of evaluation. Such courses typically include:\r\n- Type qualification;\r\n- Transition (conversion);\r\n- Upgrade to PIC;\r\n- Re-qualification;\r\n- Recurrent training.\r\n                  \r\nOperators that cannot conform to the specifications of this provision due to the non-existence of a representative flight training device may demonstrate an alternative means of conforming to these specifications.\r\n                  \r\nThe additional ground and line training and evaluation used to satisfy the specifications of this provision typically include a review of:\r\n- Conditions conducive to wind shear;\r\n- Effects on aircraft performance;\r\n- Indications of wind shear presence;\r\n- Avoidance and recovery techniques;\r\n- Wind shear case studies or scenarios.\r\n                  "]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.33"," If the Operator operates the aircraft which is GPWS installed on board, the Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and an evaluation, which includes a demonstration of competence in terrain awareness procedures and maneuvers. Such training shall be completed during initial ground and simulator training and subsequently during recurrent simulator training once every 36 months. Such training and evaluation shall include:\n(i) Knowledge and conduct of associated procedures;\n(ii) Response to GPWS alerts and warnings;\n(iii) The avoidance of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure training and evaluation occurs, as applicable, in the maneuvers specified within the intervals specified. Such training and evaluation can occur in conjunction with any State-approved or State-accepted training course.\r\nTraining and evaluation in the specified normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers in a representative flight simulator approved for the purpose by the State is applicable to pilot crew members.\r\nTraining and evaluation of the non-normal procedures and maneuvers specified in this provision cannot be safely accomplished in an aircraft on a training flight.\r\nOperators that cannot conform to the specifications of this provision due to the non-existence of a representative flight simulator may demonstrate an alternative means of conforming to these specifications.\r\n                  \r\nThe additional ground and line training and evaluation used to satisfy the specifications of this provision typically includes a review of:\r\n- CFIT avoidance techniques;\r\n- CFIT recovery techniques and maximizing aircraft performance;\r\n- GPWS alerts and warnings;\r\n- CFIT case studies or scenarios.\r\n                  "]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.34"," If the Operator conducts low visibility operations (LVO), the Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and an evaluation that includes a demonstration of competence in such operations, as well as operations with inoperative ground based and/or aircraft equipment. Such training shall be completed during initial ground and simulator training and subsequently during recurrent simulator training once every 12 months. \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Low Visibility Operations (LVO).\r\nTraining and evaluation in low visibility operations is applicable to all pilot crew members.\r\nFor the purposes of this provision, low visibility operations are considered in effect when the Runway Visual Range (RVR) is below 400 m for takeoff and/or below Category I limits for landing.\r\nOperators that conduct training flights and cannot safely train/evaluate the specified procedures in an aircraft or in a representative flight training device may demonstrate an alternative means of conformance."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.42"," If the Operator transports passengers or supernumeraries, the Operator should  ensure flight crew\nmembers complete security training as approved or accepted by the State, and in accordance with\nthe Operator's security training program as specified in SEC 2.1.1 Flight crew security training shall\naddress the following subject areas:\n(i) Determination of the seriousness of the occurrence;\n(ii) Crew communication and coordination;\n(iii) Policy and procedures associated with flight deck access;\n(iv) Appropriate self-defense responses;\n(v) Use of non-lethal protective devices assigned to crew members for use as authorized by the\nState;\n(vi) Understanding the behavior of terrorists so as to facilitate the ability to cope with hijacker\nbehavior and passenger responses;\n(vii) Situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions;\n(viii) Flight deck procedures to protect the aircraft;\n(ix) Aircraft search procedures;\n(x) As practicable, guidance on least-risk bomb locations.  \nTable: \n  Conformance Applicability \nSpecific to Aircraft Type Included in Initial/Transition/\nConversion Training Included in Recurrent Training/Continuing Qualification Conformance through AQP/ATQP/EBT \nYes* YesYes (every 36 months)Yes\n* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft\ntype or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous flight crew\nsecurity training.\nNotes: \n1. \n1. Flight crew members shall complete initial security training prior to being assigned to operational duties.\n2. \n2. The specifications of this provision are applicable to flight crew members used on board an aircraft during commercial and/or non-commercial operations.\n3. \n3. Effective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Air Operator Security Program (AOSP) and Non-Lethal\r\nProtective Device.\r\nFlight crew members are directly involved in the implementation of security measures and thereby\r\nrequire an awareness of obligations to the Security Program of the operator.\r\nCrew security training would normally be in accordance with applicable regulations and/or the civil\r\naviation security program of the State, and where no regulatory guidance exists, in accordance with\r\nthe policy of the operator.\r\nSecurity training for flight crew members typically focuses on the need for the flight crew to maintain\r\ncontrol of the flight deck.\r\nSpecific subject areas included in recurrent security training are typically identified and derived from\r\nan analysis of actual or likely situations or trends experienced during line operations.\r\nFight deck access as specified in item (iii) would typically include persons authorized for flight deck\r\naccess as well as procedures for flight deck entry/exit.\r\nFlight crew training in self-defense responses as specified in item (iv) typically focuses on ensuring\r\nthe security of the flight deck and takes into consideration relevant operational factors (e.g. type of\r\noperation, phase of flight, aircraft type/configuration, responses by cabin crew members or, if\r\napplicable, supernumeraries).\r\nTraining as specified in item (vi) typically addresses topics or tactics as appropriate for the operator\r\nthat might be associated with or could be used to facilitate crew-passenger reaction to or interaction\r\nwith hijackers (e.g. conflict management, use of passive or non-passive cooperation, understanding\r\nStockholm Syndrome, identification of and response to hijacker types/motives).\r\nTraining exercises as specified in item (vii) are typically interactive in nature, and scenarios or\r\nsituations (e.g. bomb threat, hijacking, unruly passenger) may be presented using various accepted\r\ntraining methods (e.g. live role playing, table top, computer-based training).\r\nTraining as specified in item (x) is applicable to aircraft types that have designated least-risk bomb\r\nlocations. Least-risk bomb locations are typically not identified on all-cargo aircraft.\r\nRefer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for\r\nexplanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements."]
["FLT","FLT 2.2.43"," If the Operator conducts passenger flights without cabin crew, the Operator shall ensure flight crew\nmembers, complete training and demonstrate competence in the performance of any assigned duties\nand functions related to passenger cabin safety.  \nTable: \n  Conformance Applicability \nSpecific to Aircraft Type Included in Initial/Transition/\nConversion Training Included in Recurrent Training/Continuing Qualification Conformance through AQP/ATQP/EBT \nYes* YesYes (every 24 months)Yes\n* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft\ntype or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous training in duties\nand functions related to passenger cabin safety.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","The training specified in the provision is to be accomplished as part of initial ground, simulator/aircraft\r\nor line training.\r\nCabin safety training would typically address:\r\n- Aircraft systems and emergency equipment including:\r\n- Cabin safety duties and responsibilities including:\r\n- Emergency procedures including:\r\nCabin safety training elements incorporated into other curricula of the flight crew member training\r\nprogram may satisfy the specifications of this provision.\r\nRefer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for\r\nexplanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements."]
["FLT","FLT 2.3.1","FLT 2.3.1 The Operator shall have a line qualification program consisting of line training and, where applicable, evaluations, approved or accepted by the State, which ensures flight crew members are qualified to operate in areas, on routes or route segments and into the airports to be used in operations for the Operator. Such program shall:\r\n(i) Be published in the Training Manual or equivalent documents;\r\n(ii) Ensure each pilot flight crew member has adequate knowledge of the elements specified in Table 2.5, as applicable to the areas, routes and route segments of intended operation;\r\n(iii) Specify qualification requirements for operations in all areas, on all routes or route segments, and into all airports of intended use;\r\n(iv) Ensure line training and evaluation for each pilot crew member is completed during initial qualification.\r\n(v) Ensure line training and evaluation is completed prior to a pilot crew member being used as a PIC in operations. \r\n                     \r\n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew members are qualified to conduct routine operations within each theater of operation as defined by the operator. It does not address the additional and specialized knowledge.\r\nThis specification in item v) applies to all candidates for the position of PIC, to include SIC upgrade candidates and pilots hired directly into PIC positions in operations for the operator.\r\nThe training and evaluation specified in this provision is accomplished by pilot flight crew members as part of; ground training, simulator/aircraft training or line training."]
["FLT","FLT 2.3.5"," If the Operator conducts single-pilot operations, the Operator should ensure all pilots-in-command conducting single-pilot operations meet the following requirments:\n(i) for operations under IFR or at night, have accumulated at least 50 hours of flight time on the class of aeroplane, of which at least 10 hours shall be as pilot-in-command;\n(ii) for operations under IFR, have accumulated at least 25 hours of flight time under IFR on the class of aeroplane,\n(iii) for operations at night, have accumulated at least 15 hours of flight time at night, which may form part of the 50 hours of flight time in sub-item i);\n(iv) for operations under IFR, have acquired recent experience as a pilot engaged in single-pilot operations under IFR, which includes:\n(a) at least five IFR flights, including three instrument approaches carried out during the preceding 90 days on the class of aeroplane in the single-pilot role; or \n(b) an IFR instrument approach check carried out on such an aeroplane during the preceding 90 days;\n(v) for operations at night, have completed at least three take-offs and landings at night on the class of aeroplane in the single-pilot role in the preceding 90 days; and \n(vi) have successfully completed training programmes that include, passenger briefing with respect to emergency evacuation, autopilot management, and the use of simplified in-flight documentation.   \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard"]
["FLT","FLT 2.4.1","  If the Operator conducts flights in areas or on routes or route segments over difficult terrain and/or\ninto special airports as designated by the State or by the Operator, should ensure each\nPIC completes training and, if required, an evaluation in the special skills and/or knowledge required\nto qualify or requalify for such operations. The content of training shall ensure the PIC has adequate\nknowledge of the elements specified in Table 2.5 as applicable to the areas, routes, route segments\nand special airports of intended operation. \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","This provision applies to candidates for the position of PIC, to include SIC upgrade candidates and\r\npilots hired directly into PIC positions in operations for the operator.\r\nTraining as specified in this provision may include aircraft type-specific elements as applicable to\r\nareas of operations, routes, airports, and equipment operated.\r\nThe specifications of this provision address the training required to operate over difficult terrain\r\nand/or into special airports based on a determination, by the operator and/or State, that pilots require\r\nspecial skills or knowledge for such operations. Such training typically addresses routes and/or\r\nairports that are over or in areas:\r\n- With mountainous terrain, including high terrain, rapidly rising terrain or terrain with steep\r\ngradients;\r\n- With terrain that contributes to the existence of mountain waves, turbulence, high surface\r\nwinds, sudden wind changes and/or other atmospheric phenomena that could affect the\r\nperformance of the aircraft;\r\n- Containing topographical variations such as ridgelines, valleys, ravines, fjords or other areas\r\nwhere downdrafts on the leeward or downwind side can make traversing the area or\r\naccomplishing a crosswind landing hazardous;\r\n- Where the airport, runway and/or approach environment is difficult to identify at night due to\r\nsurrounding lights;\r\n- Where featureless or expansive terrain could contribute to optical illusions during the day or\r\nat night;\r\n- That are devoid of lighting where airport, runway and/or approach area identification is\r\ndifficult at night due to lack of visible landmarks;\r\n- That are devoid of lighting and sole reference to external or visual cues is insufficient for the\r\nmaintenance of proper aircraft attitude control;\r\n- That require the application of any other specific skills or knowledge, as determined by the\r\noperator and/or State."]
["FLT","FLT 2.4.3"," If the Operator uses flight crew members to concurrently operate aircraft of different types, or operate\nvariants within one type, the Operator should have qualification processes that are approved or\naccepted by the State and ensure such flight crew members complete training and an evaluation that\nemphasizes the differences between aircraft types and variants.  \nTable: \n  Conformance Applicability \nSpecific to Aircraft Type Included in Initial/Transition/\nConversion Training Included in Recurrent Training/Continuing Qualification Conformance through AQP/ATQP/EBT \nYes* YesYes (every 12 months)Yes\n* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft\ntype or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous training in duties\nand functions related to passenger cabin safety.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Aircraft Type and Aircraft Variant (within Type).\r\nThe intent of this specification is to ensure flight crew members are familiarized with the significant\r\ndifferences in equipment and/or procedures between concurrently operated types or variants.\r\nThe determination of variant within type is within the domain of the State as part of flight crew\r\nlicensing.\r\nQualification processes are applicable to all flight crew members used in such operations and as\r\ndefined in the IRM.\r\nRefer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements."]
["FLT","FLT 3.1.1","The Operator should ensure the designation of a common language(s) for use by all flight crew\nmembers for communication:\n(i) On the flight deck during line operations;\n(ii) If the Operator conducts passenger flights with cabin crew, between the flight crew and\ncabin crew during line operations;\n(iii) During flight crew training and evaluation activities.  \n               \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","More than one common reference language might be designated.\r\nCommunication in the designated common language is applicable to all flight crew members,\r\nincluding foreign nationals and expatriates used as flight crew members, instructors or evaluators by\r\nthe operator.\r\nThe operator is expected to be in compliance with the common language requirements of the State\r\n(e.g. mandatory for operations, a condition for employment or a condition for airman certification), if\r\nsuch requirements exist. If no State requirements exist, the operator is expected to designate an\r\nappropriate common operational language for use by flight crew members, as specified in this\r\nprovision.\r\nThe existence (and application) of a State common language requirement that satisfies the\r\nspecifications of this provision relieves the operator of such a designation in operational\r\ndocumentation."]
["FLT","FLT 3.3.1","The Operator should specify the composition and required number of flight crew members taking into\naccount the type of aircraft, flight crew qualification requirements and flight/duty time limitations.\n               \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crews are composed of the flight crew members\r\nappropriate for the aircraft type and planned operation.\r\nAs applicable to an operator, crew composition requirements would typically also address the use of\r\nrelief pilots and/or augmented crews."]
["FLT","FLT 3.3.4","The Operator shall ensure flight crew members will not operate an aircraft unless issued a medical assessment in accordance with requirements of the State; such assessment shall not be valid for a period greater than 12 calendar months. \n                  \nNote: \nIf authorized by the State, it is permissible to extend the validity beyond 12 months (to preserve the original expiry date) when the medical assessment is renewed up to 45 days prior to its expiry date.\n               ",null,"Standard","Requirements of the State and/or an applicable authority that are associated with medical classifications, aircraft types, flight crew positions and/or licensing could require a more restrictive assessment interval than specified in this provision. An applicable authority is one that has jurisdiction over international operations conducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of the Operator."]
["FLT","FLT 3.3.7","The Operator should have a process to ensure flight crew member recency-of-experience\nrequirements are satisfied as follows:\n(i) A pilot does not act as PIC or SIC of an aircraft unless either:\n(a) On the same type or variant of aircraft within the preceding 90 days (120 days if\nunder the supervision of an instructor or evaluator), that pilot has operated the flight\ncontrols during at least three takeoffs and landings in the aircraft type or in a flight\nsimulator approved for the purpose by the appropriate authority, or\n(b) On the same type or variant of aircraft within a time period acceptable to the State\nand applicable authorities, that pilot has operated the flight controls during the\nnumber of takeoffs and landings in the aircraft type or in a flight simulator approved\nfor the purpose by the appropriate authority, necessary to conform to a defined\nrecency of experience schedule approved or accepted by the State and applicable\nauthorities.\n(ii) A pilot does not act in the capacity of a cruise relief pilot unless, within the preceding\n90 days, that pilot has either:\n(a) Operated as PIC, SIC or cruise relief pilot on the same type or variant of aircraft, or\n(b) Completed flying skill refresher training to include normal, abnormal and emergency\nprocedures specific to cruise flight on the same type of aircraft or in a flight simulator\napproved for the purpose, and has practiced approach and landing procedures,\nwhere the approach and landing procedure practice may be performed as the PM.\n(iii) flight engineer does not perform duties in an aircraft unless either:\n(a) Within the preceding 6 months, that individual has had at least 50 hours of flight\ntime as a flight engineer on that aircraft type aircraft, or\n(b) Within the preceding 90 days, that individual has operated as a flight engineer on\nboard that aircraft type or in a simulator of the aircraft type.\n(iv) A flight navigator or radio operator does not perform duties in an aircraft unless recency-ofexperience\nrequirements of the Operator and the State have been satisfied.\n(v) If a flight crew member does not satisfy recency-of-experience requirements in accordance\nwith i), ii), iii) or iv), such flight crew member completes re-qualification in accordance with\nthe Operator's training and evaluation program.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The specification in item i) requires the pilots to operate the flight controls: PM duties do not satisfy\r\nrecency-of-experience requirements for this specification.\r\nThe specifications in item (i) also ensure that newly qualifying pilots have the necessary experience\r\nto operate as a required crewmember in the line training qualification program. The process to\r\nensure such pilots meet recency-of-experience requirements may be integral to the line qualification\r\nprogram in accordance with FLT 2.3.1.\r\nThe term Pilot Monitoring (PM) has the same meaning as the term Pilot Not Flying (PNF) for the purpose of applying the specifications of this provision.\r\naccording to a defined schedule in order to establish an equivalent level of recency experience. Such\r\nschedule would not have to adhere exactly to the specification in item i) a) of this provision if the level\r\nof recent experience is acceptable to the State and applicable authorities, and the PIC or SIC, as\r\napplicable, is required to operate the flight controls in order to satisfy recency-of-experience\r\nrequirements.\r\nItem v) specifies that a flight crew member whose recency has lapsed for any reason becomes\r\nunqualified and must be re-qualified by the operator. The requalification program for such a flight\r\ncrewmember need not specify the same number of takeoffs and landings as the recency\r\nrequirements.\r\nApplicable authorities include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations\r\nconducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of\r\nthe Operator.\r\nThe term \"abnormal\" is used to describe a condition or situation (e.g. abnormal airframe vibration,\r\nabnormal landing configuration).\r\nThe terms \"normal\" and \"non-normal/emergency\" typically refer to AOM checklists, procedures\r\nand/or maneuvers. The term \"non-normal\" includes AOM emergency checklists and/or procedures\r\n(i.e. an emergency procedure is a subset of non-normal).\r\nThe terms can also be used to describe an event, situation or operation that would be addressed by\r\nnormal or non-normal/emergency procedures or checklists. When used in this manner, the terms\r\nmay be separated by forward slash marks (e.g. normal/non-normal/emergency).\r\nThe term \"emergency\" used alone refers to declarations and non-AOM procedures."]
["FLT","FLT 3.3.9"," The Operator should  have an airport qualification process that ensures a PIC has made an actual\napproach and landing at each airport within the Operator's route system accompanied by a pilot,\neither as a crew member or flight deck observer, that is qualified for that airport, unless:\n(i) The approach to the airport is not over difficult terrain and the instrument approach\nprocedures and aids available are similar to those with which the pilot is familiar, and the\nnormal operating minima are adjusted by the addition of a margin of safety that is approved\nor accepted by the State, or there is reasonable certainty that approach and landing can be\nmade in visual meteorological conditions (VMC), or\n(ii) The descent from the initial approach altitude can be made by day in VMC, or\n(iii) The Operator has qualified the PIC for operations into the airport by means a pictorial\nrepresentation that is approved or accepted the Authority, or\n(iv) The airport is adjacent to another airport into which the PIC is currently qualified to operate.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The specification in item (i) may be satisfied by a process, approved or accepted by the State, that:\r\n- Identifies instrument approach procedures that require the application of margins to\r\noperating minima;\r\n- Specifies the operating margin to be applied.\r\nThe specification in item (iii) may be satisfied by any pictorial representation approved or accepted\r\nfor the purpose by the Authority, such as an instrument approach plate or chart.\r\nRefer to  FLT 2.4.1 and associated Guidance for additional specifications and information that\r\naddresses training for operations associated with special areas, routes, route segments and special\r\nairports."]
["FLT","FLT 3.3.10","The Operator should have a process to ensure a pilot is not used as a PIC in operations that require\nthe application of special skills or knowledge within areas, on routes over difficult terrain and/or into\nspecial airports, as designated by the State or by the Operator, unless, within the preceding 12\nmonths, that pilot has either:\n(i) Made at least one trip as a pilot flight crew member, line check airman or observer on the\nflight deck on a route in close proximity and over similar terrain within the specified area(s),\non the specified route and/or into the special airport, as applicable, or\n(ii) Completed training and an evaluation in the special skills and/or knowledge required to\nqualify or requalify for such operations. The content of training shall ensure the PIC has\nadequate knowledge of the elements specified in Table 2.5 as applicable to the areas,\nroutes, route segments and special airports of intended operation.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","Special airport and/or route/area re-qualification (if applicable) could take the form of pictorial review,\nsimulator training, line check airmen briefing or operation into the airport accompanied by a line\ncheck airman or other qualified airman and could include exemptions for VFR operations.\nThe intent of this provision is to ensure the PIC has a level of knowledge of terrain, minimum safe\naltitudes, seasonal meteorological conditions, communication and air traffic facilities, services and\nprocedures, search and rescue services and navigational facilities and procedures, including any\nlong-range navigation procedures, required for safe operations.\nThe specification in item (iii) may be satisfied by any pictorial representation approved or accepted\nfor the purpose by the Authority, such as an instrument approach plate or chart.\nRefer to  FLT 2.4.1 and associated Guidance for additional specifications and information that\naddresses training for operations associated with special areas, routes route segments and special\nairports."]
["FLT","FLT 3.4.1","The Operator shall have a means to ensure flight crew members are qualified and current prior to accepting and/or being assigned to duty. Such means shall consist of:\n\t\t\t   \n- A requirement that prohibits flight crew members from operating an aircraft if not qualified for duty in accordance with requirements contained in Table 2.3; \n- \tA scheduling process that ensures flight crew members, prior to being assigned to duty, are qualified and current in accordance with the applicable flight crew qualification requirements contained in Table 2.3 and, if applicable, additional requirements of the State. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew member requirements and related scheduling processes preclude operation of an aircraft by a flight crew member that is not qualified and current in accordance with the specifications of the provision.\r\n                  "]
["FLT","FLT 3.4.3","The Operator shall have a methodology for the purpose of managing fatigue-related safety risks to ensure fatigue occurring in one flight, successive flights or accumulated over a period of time does not impair a flight crew member's alertness and ability to safely operate an aircraft or perform safety-related duties. Such methodology shall consist of flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations that are in accordance with the applicable prescriptive fatigue management regulations of the State.",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator establishes a methodology for the management of crew member fatigue in a manner that:\r\n- Is based upon scientific principles and knowledge;\r\n- Is consistent with the prescriptive fatigue management;\r\n- Precludes fatigue from endangering safety of the flight.\r\n                  "]
["FLT","FLT 3.6.4","The Operator should have guidance that enables the flight crew to determine Runway Visual Range\n(RVR) requirements for runways of intended use, to include, as a minimum:\n(i) Requirement for the availability of RVR reporting in order for CAT II and CAT III approach\nand landing operations to be authorized;\n(ii) Required minimum RVR values for takeoff and authorized approaches;\n(iii) Required minimum RVR values that consider inoperative approach/runway lighting,\ninoperative transmissometers or inadequate visual reference.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The means of RVR measurement typically varies depending on the State.\r\nThe specification in item iii) may be satisfied by a corrections table or manual corrections for\r\ninoperative equipment applied to published minima."]
["FLT","FLT 3.7.2","The Operator should  delegate the authority to the PIC to ensure:\n(i) A flight is not commenced unless the usable fuel required in accordance with DSP 4.3.1 is\non board the aircraft and is sufficient to complete the planned flight safely;\n(ii) If fuel is consumed during a flight for purposes other than originally intended during pre-flight\nplanning, such flight is not continued without a re-analysis and, if applicable, adjustment of\nthe planned operation to ensure sufficient fuel remains to complete the flight safely.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Discretionary Fuel.\r\nThe intent of this provision is for the PIC to have the authority to ensure sufficient fuel is on board the\r\naircraft to commence or continue the planned flight safely, and to be able to authorize the loading of\r\nDiscretionary Fuel  if such fuel is required for the safe conduct of the flight and will not cause\r\noperating limits to be exceeded\r\nIn a shared system of operational control, the PIC and the Flight Dispatcher/Flight Operations Officer\r\nshare the responsibility to ensure operating limitations are not exceeded and sufficient fuel is on\r\nboard to commence or continue the planned flight safely\r\nThe extent of the re-analysis or adjustment specified in item ii) is commensurate with the scope and\r\ncomplexity of the planned operation."]
["FLT","FLT 3.8.1"," The Operator should have guidance and procedures that describe flight crew duties and\nresponsibilities for the use and/or application of the ATL, MEL and CDL. Such guidance and\nprocedures shall be included in the OM or in other documents that are available to the flight crew\nduring flight preparation and accessible to the flight crew during flight, and shall address, as a\nminimum, PIC responsibilities for:\n(i) Determining the airworthiness status of the aircraft;\n(ii) Ensuring, for each flight, a description of known or suspected defects that affect the\noperation of the aircraft is recorded in the ATL;\n(iii) Precluding a flight from departing until any defect affecting airworthiness is processed in\naccordance with the MEL/CDL;\n(iv) Ensuring the aircraft is operated in accordance with any applicable MEL/CDL Operational\nProcedure.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","RThe intent of this provision is for the operator to have guidance that ensures the proper use and\r\napplication of the ATL, MEL and CDL. Such guidance typically addresses:\r\n- Flight crew responsibilities related to a review of the ATL and the application of the\r\nMEL/CDL;\r\n- Instructions for when to reference the MEL/CDL regarding a malfunctioning system or\r\ncomponent;\r\n- Instructions for the completion of log book entries that ensure defects are properly recorded\r\nfor the purpose of remediation and processing in accordance with the MEL/CDL, as\r\napplicable;\r\n- If applicable, the fault identification codes, trouble codes or other entries that ensure defects\r\nare appropriately identified, categorized and tracked for the purposes of remediation and/or\r\nto identify chronic or repetitive unserviceable items;\r\n- Flight crew responsibilities related to the repetitive system or component checks that are\r\nrequired to conform to the MEL (e.g. verifying a redundant system is operable in the case of\r\na single system failure);\r\n- Any additional guidance necessary to ensure the ATL, MEL and CDL are used and applied in\r\naccordance with operator requirements.\r\nThe specifications of this provision also apply to equivalents for the MEL and CDL."]
["FLT","FLT 3.8.10","If the Operator transports passengers and/or supernumeraries without cabin crew, the Operator should have procedures to ensure, prior to departure of a flight, passengers and/or supernumeraries, as\napplicable, have been briefed and are familiar with the location and use of safety equipment, to\ninclude:\n(i) Seat belts;\n(ii) Emergency exits;\n(iii) Life jackets (individual flotation devices), if required\n(iv) Lifesaving rafts, if required\n(v) Oxygen masks;\n(vi) Emergency equipment for collective use.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The briefing related to the specification in item ii) also typically addresses any applicable\r\nrequirements and restrictions for personnel seated adjacent to cabin emergency exits."]
["FLT","FLT 3.9.1"," If the Operator conducts passenger flights with or without cabin crew, the Operator shall have a procedure to ensure verification that:\n(i) Passenger and crew baggage in the passenger cabin is securely stowed;\n(ii) If applicable, cargo packages and/or passenger items being transported in passenger seats\nare properly secured.\n \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is for an operator to have a procedure for verification by the flight crew or cabin crew\r\nthat all baggage and, if applicable, cargo packages and/or passenger items being transported in\r\npassenger seats are stowed or properly secured.\r\nSome operators might transport smaller cargo packages (e.g. mail, COMAT items) secured in cabin\r\npassenger seats.\r\nSome operators might transport certain passenger items secured in cabin passenger seats. These\r\ntypes of items are typically large, valuable or fragile articles belonging to passengers that are not\r\nconducive to transport as checked baggage or appropriate for stowage in overhead bins/lockers (e.g.\r\nlarge musical instruments, certain electronic equipment, prominent trophies, works of art). Such\r\nitems might thus be secured and carried in a dedicated cabin passenger seat (which might be\r\npurchased by the passenger-owner for the purpose of transporting the item)."]
["FLT","FLT 3.9.6","If the Operator conducts flights from any airport when conditions are conducive to ground aircraft icing, the Operator shall have de-/anti-Icing policies and procedures published in the OM or in other documents that are available to the flight crew during flight preparation and accessible to the flight crew during flight. Such policies and procedures shall address any flight crew duties and responsibilities related to de-/anti-Icing and include:\n(i) Holdover Time tables;\n(ii) A requirement for a member of the flight crew or qualified ground personnel to perform a visual check of the wings before takeoff, if any contamination is suspected;\n(iii) A requirement that takeoff will not commence unless the critical surfaces are clear of any deposits that might adversely affect the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft;\n(iv) A statement that delegates authority to the PIC to order De-/Anti-icing whenever deemed necessary. \n                     \n                  \nNote: \nThe specifications of this provision are also applicable for flights such as ferry, maintenance check/test and training.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of De-/Anti-icing Program and Holdover Time.\r\nThe intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew members adhere to the clean aircraft concept prior to takeoff anytime there is a potential for the accretion of ice on aircraft critical surfaces during ground operations.\r\nRefer to Guidance associated with GRH 4.2.1 located in ISM Section 6 for specifications and associated guidance related to the establishment and maintenance of a De-/Anti-icing Program.\r\nQualified ground personnel specified in item (ii) are typically used to perform a visual wing check in instances when the wings are not visible to the flight crew from the interior of the aircraft (e.g., cargo aircraft operations).\r\nThe surfaces specified in item (iii) include: wings, flight controls, engine inlets, fuselage surfaces in front of engines or other areas defined in the AOM."]
["FLT","FLT 3.10.1"," The Operator should require all commercial and non-commercial flights to be conducted under an IFR Flight Plan and in accordance with an IFR clearance. \n                  \nNote: \nNon-commercial flights in this ISARP does not mean ferry flights, test/maintenance check flights or training flights.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and Visual Flight Rules (VFR).\r\nThe intent of this provision is for an operator to file an IFR flight plan with the appropriate ATS unit and obtain an IFR clearance in order to ensure its flights are afforded all of the air traffic services applicable to aircraft operating under IFR within controlled airspace. Such services typically include:\r\n- Maintenance of minimum separation standards;\r\n- Traffic advisory information;\r\n- Terrain or obstruction alerting;\r\n- Low altitude alerting;\r\n- Strategic route planning;\r\n- Automatic flight plan closure at airports with functioning control towers.\r\n                  \r\nThe specifications of this provision do not preclude an operator from:\r\n- Operating certain portions of a commercial  or non-commercial flight under VFR (visual flight rules);\r\n                        \r\n- Where possible, identifying portions of flights to be flown under VFR on the ATS flight plan (in lieu of filing a purely IFR Flight Plan);\r\n- Operating  flight such as, maintenance, repositioning, trainig under VFR.\r\n                  "]
["FLT","FLT 3.10.4","The Operator should have guidance that addresses the use of standard radio phraseology when\ncommunicating with ATC, the acceptance and readback of ATC clearances and, when necessary,\nthe clarification of such clearances to ensure understanding. Such guidance shall include, as a\nminimum:\n(i) A requirement for the use of the call sign;\n(ii) A requirement for at least two flight crew members to monitor and confirm clearances to\nensure a mutual (flight crew) understanding of accepted clearances under circumstances,\nas determined by the operator or flight crew, when a missed or misunderstood clearance\ncould pose a safety risk to the flight;\n(iii) A requirement to clarify clearances with ATC whenever any flight crew member is in doubt\nregarding the clearance or instruction received.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is for an operator to have policies and procedures that ensure:\r\n- The use of standard radio phraseology;\r\n- ATC clearances are clearly understood during times of increased operational risk.\r\nThe specification in item ii) refers to situations when a missed or misunderstood clearance could\r\npose a safety risk to the flight (e.g. inadequate terrain clearance, runway incursion, loss of\r\nseparation). ATC clearances that have the potential to pose such safety risks, if misunderstood by\r\nthe flight crew, typically include the following:\r\n- Heading, altitude/flight level, assigned route/waypoint changes;\r\n- Frequency changes during critical phases of flight;\r\n- Instructions for any operation on or near a runway."]
["FLT","FLT 3.10.6"," The Operator shall have procedures and/or limitations that address operations into and out of uncontrolled airspace and/or airports, to include, if applicable, a prohibition if such operations are not permitted in accordance with restrictions of the AOC or equivalent documents.  \n               ",null,"Standard","An uncontrolled airport is an airport without an operating control tower.\r\nA controlled airport is an airport with a manned and operating control tower surrounded by controlled airspace.\r\nProcedures and limitations typically include aircraft position radio broadcast procedures, VFR weather requirements and the ability to receive ATC clearance within a specified time/distance from the departure airport. "]
["FLT","FLT 3.11.4"," The Operator should ensure minimum flight altitude information applicable to all phases of a flight,\nincluding guidance that specifies when descent below any applicable prescribed minimum altitude is\npermissible, is made available to the flight crew along with instructions for the use of such\ninformation.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","Minimum prescribed safety altitudes typically include:\r\n- Minimum Safety Altitude (MSA);\r\n- Minimum Descent Altitude/Height (MDA/H);\r\n- Minimum En route Altitude (MEA);\r\n- Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude (MOCA);\r\n- Minimum Off-Route Altitude (MORA);\r\n- Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA);\r\n- Any other minimum altitudes prescribed by the Authority.\r\nThe specification in item ii) refers to situations when a missed or misunderstood clearance could\r\npose a safety risk to the flight (e.g. inadequate terrain clearance, runway incursion, loss of\r\nseparation). ATC clearances that have the potential to pose such safety risks, if misunderstood by\r\nthe flight crew, typically include the following:\r\n- Heading, altitude/flight level, assigned route/waypoint changes;\r\n- Frequency changes during critical phases of flight;\r\n- Instructions for any operation on or near a runway."]
["FLT","FLT 3.11.6","If the Operator conducts single-pilot operations, the Operator should ensure the operation is not conducted under IFR or at night by a single pilot unless:\n(i)  the flight manual does not require a flight crew of more than one;\n(ii) the airplane is propeller-driven;\n(iii)  the maximum approved passenger seating configuration of the aereplane is not more than nine;\n(iv) the maximum certificated take-off mass does not exceed 5,700 kg;\n(v) the pilot-in-command has satisfied the requirements of experience, training, checking, and recency according to the requirments of the Authority\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation"]
["FLT","FLT 3.11.7","The Operator should have a policy and/or procedures that require the flight crew to monitor fuel during\nflight to ensure a fuel quantity upon landing that is not less than final reserve fuel.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","Refer to FLT 3.14.16 and  FLT 3.14.17 for actions to be taken by the PIC in the event the final reserve\r\nminimum fuel quantity specified in DSP 4.3.12 cannot be protected in flight and preserved upon\r\nlanding."]
["FLT","FLT 3.11.18","If the Operator conducts two pilot operations, the Operator shall have policies and guidance that define and address the division of duties related to the performance and prioritization of flight crew member operational tasks, to include, as a minimum:\n\t\t\t   \n(i) A requirement and procedures for the use of checklists prior to, during and after all phases of flight, and in abnormal and emergency situations;\n(ii) PM/PF duties for all phases of flight, to include normal, abnormal and emergency situations;\n(iii) PM/PF actions during manual and automatic flight;\n(iv) Flight and cabin crew duties during situations that require coordination, to include, as a minimum, emergency evacuation, medical emergency and incapacitated flight crew member. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew duties are defined and appropriately divided, and that compliance with all applicable checklists contained in the AOM, MEL and CDL occurs in accordance with the operator's task sharing policy.\r\nElements of task sharing are described in the following table.\r\nTable: \r\nTask sharing is observed during most phases of flight and addresses areas such as:\r\n- Philosophy for the use of checklists;\r\n- Performance calculations;\r\n- Automated flight procedures for flight crew;\r\n- Manual flight procedures for flight crew;\r\n- Flight crew briefings;\r\n- Administrative duties at the appropriate times (such as top of descent and prior to commencing approach).\r\n                                 \r\nTask sharing is applicable during emergency situations such as:\r\n                                 \r\n- Rejected takeoff;\r\n- Engine failure or fire at V1;\r\n- TCAS/ACAS resolution advisory (RA) if applicable;\r\n- GPWS Alert if applicable;\r\n- Emergency descent.\r\n                                 \r\nTask sharing is applicable during emergency situations that require coordination with the cabin crew such as:\r\n                                 \r\n- Emergency evacuation;\r\n- Medical emergency;\r\n- Flight crew member incapacitation.\r\n                              \r\nThe term Pilot Monitoring (PM) has the same meaning as the term Pilot Not Flying (PNF) for the purpose of applying the specifications of this provision.\r\nThe term \"abnormal\" is used to describe a condition or situation (e.g. abnormal airframe vibration, abnormal landing configuration).\r\nThe terms \"normal\" and \"non-normal/emergency\" typically refer to AOM checklists, procedures and/or maneuvers. The term \"non-normal\" includes AOM emergency checklists and/or procedures (i.e. an emergency procedure is a subset of non-normal).\r\nThe terms can also be used to describe an event, situation or operation that would be addressed by normal or non-normal/emergency procedures or checklists. When used in this manner, the terms may be separated by forward slash marks (e.g. normal/non-normal/emergency).\r\nThe term \"emergency\" used alone refers to declarations and non-AOM procedures."]
["FLT","FLT 3.11.46"," The Operator should provide, and require compliance with, operating limitations, as defined by the\noriginal equipment manufacturer (OEM) and established by the State of Registry for each aircraft\ntype used in operations.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","Refer to FLT 3.14.16 and FLT 3.14.17 for actions to be taken by the PIC in the event the final reserve\r\nminimum fuel quantity specified in DSP 4.3.12 cannot be protected in flight and preserved upon\r\nlanding."]
["FLT","FLT 3.11.59","The Operator shall have a stabilized approach policy with associated guidance, criteria and procedures to ensure the conduct of stabilized approaches. Such policy shall specify:\n(i) A minimum height for stabilization not less than 1000 feet AAL for approaches in IMC or not less than 500 ft. AAL for approaches in IMC as designated by the operator and/or State where a lower stabilization height is operationally required;\n(ii) A minimum height for stabilization not less than 500 feet AAL for approaches in VMC;\n(iii) Aircraft configuration requirements specific to each aircraft type (landing gear, wing flaps, speed brakes);\n(iv) Speed and thrust limitations;\n(v) Vertical speed limitations;\n(vi) Acceptable vertical and lateral displacement from the normal approach path. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Data Analysis (FDA) Program, Stabilized Approach and Stabilization Heights.\r\nThe intent of this provision is for the operator to implement a stabilized approach policy, as well as have guidance, criteria and procedures that ensure the maintenance of the intended lateral and vertical flight path during visual approaches and/or as depicted in published approach procedures without excessive maneuvering. The parameters to be considered at the 1000 ft. AAL and 500 ft. gates as well as in the definition of a stabilized approach are listed in items iii) through vi) of the provision.\r\nThe specifications in item (i) permit an operator, in accordance with operational requirements approved or accepted by the Authority, to establish stabilization criteria for heights lower than 1000 ft. AAL, but no lower than 500 ft. AAL (IMC or VMC), for approaches designated by the operator and/or State where:\r\n- Lower minimum approach stabilization heights are authorized for turbo-propeller aircraft operations (e.g., 500 feet AAL on VMC/IMC approaches), and/or\r\n                        \r\n- Maneuvering at a lower height AAL is required to meet instrument or other charted approach constraints (e.g. RNAV/RNP approaches, circling approaches and charted visual approaches), and/or\r\n                        \r\n- Aircraft are required to comply with ATC speed constraints on final approach, and/or\r\n                        \r\n- Deviations from selected approach stabilization criteria at a height lower than 1000 feet AAL, but above 500 feet AAL, are operationally required, and the operator can demonstrate pilot adherence to its stabilized approach policy via a continually monitored, managed and active flight data analysis (FDA) program.\r\n                  \r\nThe criteria used to conform to the specifications in item (vi) also typically address the maneuvering that may be required in accordance with a charted visual or instrument approach procedure."]
["FLT","FLT 3.11.60"," The Operator shall have a go-around policy with associated procedures and guidance to ensure, when necessary, flight crews discontinue or go around from an approach in accordance with criteria established by the Operator. Such policy, procedures and guidance shall, as a minimum, address or define: \n(i) Management support for flight crew go-around decision making;\n(ii) Criteria that require flight crews to discontinue or go around from an approach or a landing (prior to the selection of reverse thrust, if applicable); \n(iii) The go-around maneuver;\n(iv) Duties and responsibilities of the PF and PM. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The specifications of this provision are directly related to the prevention of approach and landing accidents (ALAs) such as CFIT and runway excursions.\nThe intent of this provision is to reduce the risk of ALAs by ensuring the flight crew will always discontinue or go around from an approach or landing (prior to  the selection of reverse thrust) when a safe landing cannot be assured or a go-around is otherwise required.\nThe specification in item (i) is intended to foster a culture that supports flight crew go-around decision making. It is typically expressed by senior management in a manner that: \n- Promotes the go-around as a normal procedure;\n- Encourages go-around preparedness and considers the risk of the go-around maneuver itself; \n- Empowers the PM (or the SIC) to call for a go-around at any time during approach and landing until the selection of reverse thrust;  \n- Ensures that go-around decision making does not affect the PIC's emergency authority in the event of (impending) abnormal or emergency situations; \n- Does not inhibit flight crew reporting of go-around related events.  \n                  \nThe criteria referred to in item (ii), which would require a go-around or discontinuation of an approach, typically include:\n- The visibility or ceiling is below the minimum required for the type of approach at the specified gates (e.g. outer marker, 1,000' AAL or at minimums).\n- The appropriate visual references are not obtained or are lost at or below MDA (or minimum descent height) or DA (or decision height) and through flare and touchdown by either pilot. \n- Prior to touchdown the wind is above the operational or pre-determined wind limit, or the runway status is below the limit determined by the flight crew's landing performance assessment. \n- The criteria for a stable approach are not met at the relevant approach gate(s) or can no longer be maintained until touchdown. \n- Technical defects or failures occur during approach that might inhibit a safe continuation of approach, landing or go-around. \n- Doubts by either pilot about the aircraft's geographic or spatial position. \n- \tConfusion by either pilot about the use or behavior of the automation. \n- It is foreseeable that the go-around routing and path will not be sufficiently clear of adverse weather or restricting traffic. \n- If instructed by ATC. \n- If required for type-specific reasons as outlined in the respective AOM, \n- If required by special considerations associated with a CAT II/III operation.                    \nThe specification in item (iii) refers to the aircraft type-specific maneuver(s) for discontinuing a visual approach, an instrument approach or a landing prior to the selection of reverse thrust (i.e. rejected landing). \nThe specification in item (iv) typically addresses: \n- Timely and effective PF briefings. \n- PM stabilized approach criteria deviation callouts and compliance checks: \n- PF and/or PM go-around callouts and subsequent execution of the go-around maneuver. \n- PF/PM go-around-related memory items. \n- PM actions in the event of (subtle) PF incapacitation or delayed response to a go-around callout. \n- PF/PM actions in the event of destabilization below stabilization height including PM monitoring for possible excessive deviations from flight path, speed, vertical speed, pitch or bank during the approach, during the transition from approach to landing and during flare and touchdown. \n- As applicable, the role of additional flight crew members on the flight deck (e.g., augmented crew members).                   \nTo support SRM activities an operator would typically: \n- \tInclude and monitor aircraft parameters related to CFIT and runway excursions in their flight data analysis (FDA) program in accordance with provisions in ORG sub-section 3.3. \n- Monitor go-around policy compliance through their FDA program and establish go-around safety performance indicators (SPIs). In addition to monitoring go-arounds, aircraft operators would also monitor discontinued approaches. \n- Include unstable approaches followed by a landing as a reporting event by the flight crew. \n- Minimize the need for the flight crew to report a go-around due to an unstable approach unless there is another significant event associated with the go-around (e.g. flap overspeed).                   \nAn operator, in accordance with requirements of the Authority and consistent with OEM guidance, typically develops a go-around policy, guidance, criteria and procedures based onâ€¯one or moreâ€¯of the following sourceâ€¯references:\n- Global Action Plan for theâ€¯Prevention of Runway Excursionsâ€¯Coordinated byâ€¯EUROCONTROLâ€¯andâ€¯the Flight Safety Foundation - January 2021;â€¯   \n- Flight Safety Foundation Go-Around Decision-Making and Execution Project Final Report March 2017; \n- Flight Safety Foundation Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions - Report of the Runway Safety Initiative - May 2009;  \n- BEA Study on Aeroplane State Awareness during Go-Around - August 2013 \n- Any equivalent reference document approved or accepted by the Authority for theâ€¯development of flight crew guidance related to the establishment of go-around policy and the prevention of unstable approaches and runway excursions.\n                  "]
["FLT","FLT 3.11.62"," The Operator shall have a policy and procedures to ensure the flight crew will not continue an instrument approach to land at any airport beyond a point at which the limits of the operating minima specified for the approach in use would be infringed. \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure a transition to the missed approach is initiated at a designated point or height AAL that prevents infringing on the operating minima specified for the approach. \r\nThe standard specifies actions required from the flight crew when reaching the limit of the approach, (i.e. when reaching the DA(H) or MDA(H) or equivalent)."]
["FLT","FLT 3.11.68"," The Operator should have a policy and procedures to ensure an approach is not continued below 300 m (1 000 ft) AAL unless the PIC is satisfied that, with the runway surface condition information\navailable, the aircraft landing performance assessment indicates that a safe landing can be made.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","This specifications of this provision are directly related to the prevention of runway excursions."]
["FLT","FLT 3.12.1","The Operator should have a corrective lenses policy that addresses the need for flight crew members, who are required to use corrective lenses, to have a spare set of corrective lenses readily available. \n \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","Corrective lens requirements are typically listed on a medical certificate or license issued by the\r\nState."]
["FLT","FLT 3.12.2"," The Operator should have a policy that requires flight crew members to keep their seat belts fastened when at their assigned stations and:\n(i) Those flight crew members occupying a pilot's seat to keep their safety harnesses (shoulder\nstraps and seat belts) fastened during the takeoff and landing phases of flight;\n(ii) Other flight crew members to keep their safety harnesses fastened during the takeoff and\nlanding phases of flight, unless the shoulder straps interfere with the performance of duties,\nin which case the shoulder straps may be unfastened but the seat belts shall remain\nfastened. \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard"]
["FLT","FLT 3.12.4"," The Operator should have a policy and procedures to ensure flight crew members are only permitted to leave their duty stations during flight in the performance of duties or to meet physiological needs and shall always remain on their stations during take-off and landing.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","The specifications of this provision do not apply to crew changes that occur in conjunction with relief\r\nand/or augmented crews."]
["FLT","FLT 3.14.1"," If the Operator utilizes single-engine aircraft, the Operator should   ensure that all single-engine aeroplanes are operated in conditions of weather and light, and over routes and diversions therefrom, that allow for a safe forced landing to be executed in the event of engine failure.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation"]
["FLT","FLT 3.14.2","The Operator should have a policy that prohibits the in-flight simulation of emergencies while\npassengers and/or cargo are being transported on board the aircraft.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation"]
["FLT","FLT 3.14.16"," The Operator should have an in-flight fuel management policy that requires the PIC to advise ATC of a minimum fuel state: \n(i) When, having committed to land at a specific airport, the PIC calculates that any change to\nthe existing clearance to that airport may result in landing with less than planned final\nreserve fuel;\n(ii) By declaring \"MINIMUM FUEL\".  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The intent of a \"MINIMUM FUEL\" declaration is to inform ATC that the flight has committed to land at\r\na specific airport and any change to the existing clearance may result in landing with less than\r\nplanned final reserve fuel. This is not an emergency situation, but rather an indication that an\r\nemergency situation is possible should any additional delay occur.\r\nGuidance on in-flight fuel management, including minimum fuel declarations, is contained in the\r\nICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976)."]
["FLT","FLT 3.14.17"," The Operator should have an in-flight fuel management policy that requires the PIC to declare a\nsituation of fuel emergency:\n(i) When the calculated usable fuel predicted to be available upon landing at the nearest airport\nwhere a safe landing can be made is less than the planned final reserve fuel;\n(ii) By declaring \"MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, FUEL\".  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is to specify the last procedural step in a series of steps to ensure the safe\r\ncompletion of a flight. The \"MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, FUEL\" declaration provides the clearest\r\nand most urgent expression of an emergency situation brought about by insufficient usable fuel\r\nremaining to protect the planned final reserve. It communicates that immediate action must be taken\r\nby the PIC and the air traffic control authority to ensure that the aircraft can land as soon as possible.\r\nIt is used when all opportunities to protect final reserve fuel have been exploited and in the judgment\r\nof the PIC, the flight will now land with less than final reserve fuel remaining in the tanks. The word\r\nfuel is used as part of the declaration simply to convey the exact nature of the emergency to ATC.\r\nGuidance on in-flight fuel management including emergency fuel declarations is contained in the\r\nICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976)."]
["FLT","FLT 3.15.2"," The Operator should have a policy that requires the PIC to report any hazardous flight condition to the appropriate ATC facility without delay.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is to ensure hazards with the potential to pose safety risks to the reporting\r\naircraft or flight operations are appropriately identified and reported to the applicable ATS unit as\r\nsoon as possible. Such required reports are typically defined by the State or applicable authorities\r\nand may include types of hazards as described in the following table.\r\nTable: \r\nGeneric HazardReport Description\r\nMeteorological ConditionsUn-forecast or severe weather, icing, wind shear, severe turbulence\r\nGeophysical EventsVolcanic ash observed or encountered\r\nSecurity BreachesAir Piracy or other hostile acts that threaten the safety of the aircraft or its passengers\r\nWildlifeBirds or large animals in the vicinity of the airport or runways\r\nFacilities and InfrastructureInadequacy of navigational facilities or undesirable navigational aid performance or other irregularity in navigational or ground facilities\r\nAircraft PerformanceUnable to accept or maintain RVSM and reason (e.g. turbulence, mountain wave, wake turbulence, etc.), loss of navigational capability\r\nLasersIllumination activities, events or exposure\r\nDangerous GoodsDangerous goods on board the aircraft in the case of an in-flight emergency and for the information of airport authorities.\r\nGPS AnomaliesLocations of GPS interference/jamming\r\nNote: \r\nPreviously promulgated hazard information (e.g., via NOTAM) would not typically require additional reporting by the PIC."]
["FLT","FLT 3.15.3"," The Operator should have a policy that assigns responsibility to the PIC for notifying the nearest\nauthority, by the quickest available means, of any accident or serious incident resulting in injury,\ndeath, or substantial aircraft damage.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is to ensure the appropriate authority in the state where an event occurred\r\nand any other organization required by such state are expeditiously informed of any accident or\r\nserious incident resulting in injury, death, or substantial aircraft damage. Such authority and\r\norganization(s) are typically defined in the applicable Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) and\r\nmay refer to one or more entities including but not limited to local law enforcement agencies,\r\nemergency service providers, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and related air accident branches,\r\nsafety bureaus or boards (e.g., NTSB).\r\nThe PIC, if able, typically reports an applicable event to the operator who then forwards it to the\r\nappropriate authority and other relevant organization(s)."]
["FLT","FLT 3.15.4","The Operator should have a policy that assigns responsibility to the PIC for:\n(i) Notifying the appropriate local authority without delay in the event of any emergency\nsituation that necessitated action in violation of local regulations and/or procedures;\n(ii) Submitting, if required by the state of occurrence, a report to the appropriate local authority\nand also to the Authority of the State of the Operator.   \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The intent of item (i) is to ensure the appropriate authority, as specified in local instructions, is notified\r\nwhen an in-flight emergency requires the PIC to deviate from a local rule or procedure to the extent\r\nrequired to meet that emergency. Such notifications are typically made through the appropriate air\r\ntraffic services (ATS) unit and involve a deviation from an assigned clearance or instrument\r\nprocedure.\r\nThe intent of item (ii) is to ensure required occurrence/incident reporting takes place in accordance\r\nwith local regulations or procedures. This includes reports submitted to the ATS unit concerned for\r\noccurrences/incidents specifically related to the provision of air traffic services."]
["FLT","FLT 3.15.5"," The Operator should have a policy that requires the PIC to report the runway braking action special airreport\n(AIREP) when the runway braking action encountered is not as good as reported.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Air-report (AIREP).\r\nRefer to ICAO PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), Chapter 4 and Appendix 1, for reporting instructions and\r\nguidance that addresses special air-reports regarding runway braking action and the format for\r\ntransmitting such reports by voice or data link.\r\nRefer to ICAO Circular 355 AN/211 for ATS actions when receiving AIREPs concerning braking\r\naction that is not as good as that reported."]
["FLT","FLT 4.1.1"," The Operator should have a process, performed by Operations Engineering, to determine and maintain guidance, procedures and performance data in the OM, applicable to each aircraft type, for\napplicable departure, destination and alternate airports. Such guidance and data shall enable the\nflight crew to determine or compute:\n(i) Maximum structural weights (taxi, takeoff, landing);\n(ii) Takeoff performance (accelerate - stop, close-in obstacles) that also ensures charting\naccuracy is accounted for, when necessary, in assessing takeoff performance in the event\nof a critical power unit failing at any point in the takeoff;\n(iii) Maximum brake energy and minimum cooling time if applicable;\n(iv) Climb performance (distant obstacles);\n(v) Landing performance (minimum landing distance, go-around).  \n               \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","The specifications in this provision are related to the prevention of CFIT and runway excursions.\r\nThe intent is to ensure the operator has a process or processes to obtain or determine the specified\r\nperformance data for use by flight crew. Such process(s) also address the maintenance and\r\npublication of guidance, procedures, and performance data in the OM.\r\nData may be tailored for airports of intended use (e.g. runway analysis).\r\nThe specifications in items ii) and v) may necessitate the inclusion of guidance and/or patterns to be\r\nfollowed in case of engine failure during takeoff, approach and go-around.\r\nTailored data is not always available for emergency alternate airports."]
["FLT","FLT 4.1.2"," The Operator should have a process, performed by Operations Engineering, to determine and maintain\nguidance, data and procedures in the OM, applicable to each aircraft type, that enable the flight crew\nto determine and/or compute aircraft performance for all phases of flight. Such guidance and data\nshall ensure the flight crew considers all relevant factors affecting aircraft performance, to include:\n(i) Aircraft weight (mass);\n(ii) Operating procedures;\n(iii) Pressure altitude appropriate to the airport elevation;\n(iv) Temperature;\n(v) Wind; \n(vi) Runway gradient (slope);\n(vii) Runway surface condition at the expected time of use;\n(viii) Obstacle data;\n(ix) NOTAMs (including airport NOTAMs);\n(x) As applicable, MEL/CDL information;\n(xi) Aircraft configuration (wing flap setting);\n(xii) Anti-ice usage and, when applicable, ice accretion;\n(xiii) As applicable, runway length used for aircraft alignment prior to takeoff;\n(xiv) As applicable, fuel freeze considerations during extended operations.  \n               \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The specifications in this provision are related to the prevention of CFIT, runway excursions and inflight\r\nloss of control.\r\nThe intent is to ensure the operator has a process or processes to obtain or determine the specified\r\nperformance data for use by flight crew. Such process(s) also address the maintenance and\r\npublication of guidance, procedures, and performance data in the OM.\r\nThe specification in item vii) could be defined by a specific contaminant type/depth (e.g. snow, slush,\r\nwater, ice) or an equivalent braking action report.\r\nThe specifications in xiii) refers to a determination of the length of the runway available, taking into\r\naccount the loss, if any, of runway length due to alignment of the aircraft prior to takeoff.\r\nThe specifications in xiv) apply to considerations regarding the use of standard fuel freeze\r\ntemperatures, fuel temperature analysis and en route fuel temperature monitoring for the specific\r\nfuels used in operations. Such considerations allow the flight crew to determine the actual fuel freeze\r\ntemperature during extended operations (e.g. polar operations) in order to prevent in-flight freezing of\r\nfuel."]
["FLT","FLT 4.1.3"," The Operator should have a process, performed by Operations Engineering, to determine and maintain\nguidance, data and procedures in the OM, applicable to each aircraft type, that enable the flight crew\nto determine and/or compute en route aircraft engine-out performance. Such guidance, data and\nprocedures shall include, as a minimum, aircraft engine-out:\n(i) Service ceiling;\n(ii) Drift down altitudes, as well as specific guidance and procedures that assure terrain\nclearance along the route to the destination airport or to an en route alternate airport.  \n               \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator has a process or processes to obtain or\r\ndetermine the specified performance data for use by flight crew. Such process(s) also address the\r\nmaintenance and publication of guidance, procedures, and performance data in the OM.\r\nThe specification in item ii) refers to those areas were adequate terrain clearance cannot be assured\r\nat the engine-out service ceiling of the aircraft without following specific  guidance and procedures for\r\ndrift down."]
["FLT","FLT 4.3.1"," The Operator shall ensure all turbine engine aircraft in its fleet with a maximum certificated takeoff mass in excess of 5,700 kg (12,566 lb), or authorized to carry more than nine passengers, are equipped with a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) that automatically provides a warning to the flight crew when the aircraft is in close proximity to the earth's surface and there is:\n1. Excessive descent rate;\n2. Excessive altitude loss after takeoff or go-around;\n3. Unsafe terrain clearance. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS).\r\nIn addition to the above-specified warnings, it is recommended that the GPWS also provide warnings for the following conditions:\r\n- Excessive terrain closure rate;\r\n- Unsafe terrain clearance when not in the landing configuration:\r\n- Landing gear is not locked down;\r\n- Flaps are not in the landing position.\r\n                        \r\n- Excessive descent below the instrument glide path.\r\n                  "]
["FLT","FLT 4.3.2","The Operator should ensure all turbine engine aircraft in its fleet with a maximum certificated takeoff mass of 5,700 kg (12,566 lb) or less and authorized to carry more than five passengers are equipped with a GPWS which has a forward-looking terrain avoidance function. \n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)  and GPWS with a Forward-Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA) Function.\r\nDifferent systems are available and acceptable as a GPWS with a forward-looking terrain avoidance (FLTA) function, as specified in this provision. The following guidance is an overview only; it is not to be construed as technical specifications for an acceptable system.\r\nA GPWS with a FLTA function could also be known as a predictive terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS), and provides:\r\n- A forward-looking capability and terrain clearance floor;\r\n- The flight crew, by means of visual and aural signals, and a terrain awareness display, with an alerting time necessary to prevent controlled flight into terrain events.\r\n                  \r\nAn acceptable system provides a forward-looking capability and terrain clearance floor protection in areas of operations and surrounding airports of intended use. Such systems generally have:\r\n- A navigation system that provides accurate aircraft position (e.g. GPS or equivalent);\r\n- A means of displaying aircraft and terrain information;\r\n- A means of providing visual and aural signals;\r\n- A terrain database(s) for all areas of potential operations and surrounding airports of intended use;\r\n                  \r\n If an obstacle database is commercially available and obstacle detection/display functionality is installed, an obstacle database for all areas of potential operations."]
["FLT","FLT 4.3.3"," The Operator shall ensure all piston engine aircraft in its fleet with a maximum certificated takeoff mass in excess of 5,700 kg (12,566 lb), or authorized to carry more than nine passengers, are equipped with a GPWS that automatically provides a warning to the flight crew when the aircraft is in close proximity to the earth's surface and there is:\n(i) Excessive descent rate;\n(ii) Excessive terrain closure rate;\n(iii) Excessive altitude loss after takeoff or go-around.\n               ",null,"Standard"]
["FLT","FLT 4.3.4","The Operator should ensure all piston engine aircraft in its fleet with a maximum certificated takeoff mass in excess of 5,700 kg (12,566 lb), or authorized to carry more than nine passengers, are equipped with a GPWS which has a forward-looking terrain avoidance function. \n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Ground Proximity Warning System with a Forward-Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA) Function."]
["FLT","FLT 4.3.5"," The Operator shall ensure all turbine engine aircraft in its fleet with a maximum certificated takeoff mass in excess of 5,700 kg (12,566 lb), or authorized to carry more than nine passengers, are equipped with a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) which has a forward-looking terrain avoidance function.",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and GPWS with a Forward-Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA) Function.\r\nDifferent systems are available and acceptable as a GPWS with a forward-looking terrain avoidance (FLTA) function, as specified in this provision. The following guidance is an overview only; it is not to be construed as technical specifications for an acceptable system.\r\nA GPWS with a FLTA function could also be known as a predictive terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS), and provides:\r\n- A forward-looking capability and terrain clearance floor;\r\n- The flight crew, by means of visual and aural signals, and a terrain awareness display, with an alerting time necessary to prevent controlled flight into terrain events.\r\n                  \r\nAn acceptable system provides a forward-looking capability and terrain clearance floor protection in areas of operations and surrounding airports of intended use. Such systems generally have:\r\n- A navigation system that provides accurate aircraft position (e.g. GPS or equivalent);\r\n- A means of displaying aircraft and terrain information;\r\n- A means of providing visual and aural signals;\r\n- A terrain database(s) for all areas of potential operations and surrounding airports of intended use;\r\n                  \r\nIf an obstacle database is commercially available and obstacle detection/display functionality is installed, an obstacle database for all areas of potential operations."]
["FLT","FLT 4.3.6","The Operator should ensure aircraft in its fleet with a maximum certificated takeoff mass in excess of 5700 kg (12,566 lb), or authorized to carry more than nine passengers, are equipped with a forward-looking windshear warning system.",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Forward-Looking Windshear Warning System."]
["FLT","FLT 4.3.7","The Operator shall ensure all aircraft in its fleet are equipped with at least one Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) of any type, except as required in FLT 4.3.8. \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT)\r\n                  which includes the definitions for the types of ELTs.\r\nThe intent of this provision is to ensure all aircraft, regardless of configuration (passenger, cargo, combi), are equipped with an ELT. "]
["FLT","FLT 4.3.8","The Operator shall  ensure aircraft in its fleet, for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is first issued after 1 July 2008, are equipped with at least one automatic Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT).",null,"Standard"]
["FLT","FLT 4.3.9","The Operator should ensure all aircraft in its fleet are equipped with at least one automatic Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT).",null,"Recomendation"]
["DSP","DSP 1.3.4","The Operator shall delegate the authority for operational control of each flight only to the PIC in a non-shared system of operational control, or to a combination of suitably qualified individuals in a shared system of operational control, to include the PIC and either:\n(i) An FOO in a shared system of operational control that requires the use of FOO personnel, or\n(ii)  A designated member of management or Post Holder in a shared system of operational control that requires the use such management personnel. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of   Flight Monitoring.\r\nRefer to General Guidance in the beginning this section for the definition of Authority in the context of operational control.\r\nThe intent of this provision is to ensure an operator delegates the authority to initiate, continue, divert or terminate a flight in the interest of the safety and security of the aircraft and its occupants (operational control) only to appropriately qualified individuals.\r\nExamples of operational control systems are provided in the following table as a means to identify how authority is typically delegated by an operator.\r\nTable: \r\nSystem of Operational ControlLocationSystem Description\r\nShared System \r\n(General)(i), (ii)Operational control authority is shared between the PIC and a flight operations officer/flight dispatcher (FOO) or a designated member of management.\r\nFull Shared System \r\n(PIC and FOO)(i)The PIC and FOO have joint authority over the decisions functions, duties or tasks associated with the operational control of a flight. Such systems are characterized by the use of flight monitoring and a dedicated communications system (voice or electronic) separate from the ATC system in order to maintain shared authority.\r\nPartial Shared System \r\n(PIC and FOO)(i)The PIC and FOO have joint authority over all preflight decisions, functions, duties or tasks associated with the operational control of a flight, but during flight the PIC has sole authority. Such systems typically include an agreed point of transition from joint to sole responsibility (e.g. pushback or throttle advance for takeoff). This point of transition also typically coincides with the point when the MEL is no longer applicable and flight crews transition to inflight procedures. Partial Shared systems are characterized by the use of flight monitoring if required by the Authority or desired by the Operator and typically lack the dedicated communications system necessary to maintain shared authority in flight.\r\nShared System \r\n(PIC and Management)(ii)Functionally equivalent to a full-shared system except that the PIC and a designated member of management, often the Director of Flight Operations or any suitably qualified and knowledgeable member of management designated by the operator, have joint authority over the decisions, functions, duties or tasks associated with the operational control of a flight.\r\nNon-shared System \r\n(General)Main \r\nstandardOperational control authority is delegated only to the PIC who may or may not be assisted by other support personnel.\r\nNon-shared System \r\n(PIC-only)Main \r\nstandardThe PIC has sole authority over any and all decisions and completes all tasks (unassisted) related to the operational control of each flight. This does not preclude administrative personnel from providing, collecting or assembling operational documents or data related to each flight on behalf of the PIC and as defined in Table 3.1. Such systems may employ flight monitoring if required by the Authority or desired by the operator.\r\nNon-shared System \r\n(PIC-assisted)Main \r\nstandardThe PIC has sole authority over any and all decisions regarding operational control. However, the PIC is assisted by others (e.g. FOO, FOA or a member of management) that lack operational control authority, but are assigned the responsibility to carry out specific functions, duties or tasks, such as flight planning, flight support, briefing and in-flight monitoring. Such systems employ flight monitoring if required by the Authority or desired by the operator.\r\n                                 \r\n                                    Note : An FOA can be utilized in combination with FOOs or designated members of management in all systems of operational control. If such personnel are delegated authority in a shared system, however, it would be limited to their specific area of competency.\r\n                              \r\n                     Table 3.1 categorizes operational control personnel, defines their authority, identifies their responsibilities and illustrates the relationship of such responsibilities to the operation as a whole."]
["DSP","DSP 1.3.5"," The Operator shall retain the overall responsibility for operational control of each flight and assign the responsibility to carry out functions, duties or tasks related to the operational control of each flight only to the PIC, or to a combination of suitably qualified personnel as defined in Table 3.1, to include the PIC and as applicable to the system of operational control responsibility: \n(i) If the Operator has a shared system of operational control responsibility, either of the following:\n(a) An FOO, who shares overall operational control responsibility with the PIC and/or supports, briefs and/or assists the PIC in the safe conduct of each flight, or\n                           \n(b) A designated member of management or Post Holder who shares overall operational control responsibility with the PIC and/or supports, briefs and/or assists the PIC or FOO in the safe conduct of each flight.\n                        \nNote: \nFOA and/or administrative personnel can be utilized in combination with FOOs and/or designated members of management in a shared system of operational control, but neither would share operational control responsibility with the PIC, FOO or designated member of management.\n                     \n(ii) If the Operator has a non-shared system of operational control responsibility, one or more of the following:\n(a) An FOO who supports, briefs and/or assists the PIC in the safe conduct of each flight, or\n(b) A designated member of management or Post Holder who supports, briefs and/or assists the PIC or FOO in the safe conduct of each flight, or\n(c) FOA personnel who support, brief and/or assist the PIC or FOO in the safe conduct of each flight, and/or\n(d) Administrative personnel who do not support, brief and/or assist the PIC or FOO, but provide, collect or assemble operational documents or data relevant to the conduct of each flight. \n                           \n                        \nNote: \nAn operator may choose to assign limited responsibilities to fully qualified FOO personnel, or to utilize them only to carry out individual or specific operational control functions, duties or tasks. In such cases, an FOO would be functionally acting as an FOA.\n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to General Guidance in the beginning this section for the definition of Responsibility in the context of operational control.\r\nThe intent of this provision is to specify the various ways operational control responsibilities can be assigned by an operator and to ensure only suitably trained and qualified individuals, in addition to the PIC, are assigned overall responsibility for operational control or the responsibility to carry out one or more functions, duties or tasks related to the operational control of each flight.\r\nThe specifications of this provision apply irrespective of post holder titles or whether personnel positions are described in the OM. If personnel are assigned the responsibility to carry out operational control functions, duties or tasks, and act in a manner consistent with the specifications of this provision or the descriptions found in Table 3.1, the specifications of this provision are applicable, as well as the specifications of ensuing provisions that require such personnel to be trained and qualified for the operational control responsibilities, functions, duties or tasks that they are performing.\r\nExamples of operational control systems are provided in the following table as a means to identify how responsibility is typically assigned by an operator.\r\nTable: \r\nSystem of Operational ControlItemSystem Description\r\nShared Systems \r\n(General)(i) (a), \r\n(i) (b)Operational control responsibility is shared between the PIC and an FOO or designated member of management.\r\nFull Shared System \r\n(PIC and FOO)(i) (a)The PIC and FOO are jointly responsible for the decisions, functions, duties or tasks associated with the operational control of a flight. Such systems are characterized by flight monitoring and a dedicated communications system (voice or electronic) separate from the ATC system in order to maintain joint responsibility.\r\nPartial Shared System \r\n(PIC and FOO)(i) (a)The PIC and FOO are jointly responsible for all preflight decisions, functions, duties or tasks associated with the operational control of a flight, but during flight the PIC has sole responsibility. Such systems are characterized by the use of flight monitoring if required by the Authority or desired by the Operator and typically lack the dedicated communications system necessary to maintain shared responsibility in flight. \r\nShared System \r\n(PIC and Management)(i) (b)Functionally equivalent to a full-shared system except that the PIC and a designated member of management, often the Director of Flight Operations or any suitably qualified and knowledgeable member of management designated by the operator are jointly responsible for the functions, duties or tasks associated with the operational control of a flight. The responsibility to carry out actual functions, duties or tasks such as flight planning, supporting/briefing the crew or flight monitoring is typically assigned to other non-management personnel (e.g. FOOs and/or FOAs). \r\nNon-shared Systems \r\n(General)(ii) (a) - (d)Operational control responsibility is assigned only to the PIC who may or may not be assisted by other support personnel.\r\nNon-shared System \r\n(PIC-only)Parent provision and/or \r\n(ii) (d)The PIC is solely responsible for completing all tasks (unassisted) related to the operational control of each flight. This does not preclude administrative personnel from providing, collecting or assembling operational documents or data related to each flight on behalf of the PIC as defined in Table 3.1. Such systems employ flight monitoring if required by the Authority or desired by the operator.\r\nNon-shared System \r\n(PIC-assisted)(ii) (a) - (c)The PIC is solely responsible for all decisions regarding operational control. However, the PIC may be assisted by others, such as an FOA, or an FOO or member of management that functions as an FOA, who is assigned the responsibility to carry out specific functions, duties or tasks, such as flight planning, support, briefing and in-flight monitoring. Such systems employ flight monitoring if required by the Authority or desired by the operator.\r\n                                 \r\n                                    Note:\r\n                                 \r\n                                 \r\n- \r\n                                       FOOs can be present in shared or non-shared systems of operational control to support, brief and/or assist the PIC or designated member of management in all competencies of operational control.\r\n                                    \r\n- \r\n                                       FOAs can be present in any system of operational control except purely non-shared (PIC only) systems, but their responsibilities are limited to their area(s) of expertise.\r\n                                    \r\n- \r\n                                       FOAs may be assigned specific flight responsibilities depending on area of expertise or general (non-flight specific) responsibilities in support of other operational control personnel or functions.\r\n                                    \r\n- \r\n                                       The responsibilities of administrative personnel utilized in operational control functions are limited to the provision or collection of operational data.\r\n                                    \r\n                              \r\n                     Table 3.1 categorizes operational control personnel, defines their authority, identifies their responsibilities and illustrates the relationship of such responsibilities to the operation as a whole.\r\n                     Table 3.5 defines the competencies of individuals assigned the responsibility for operational control and/or the responsibility to carry out individual operational control functions, duties or tasks.\r\nWhen operational control functions are outsourced to external service providers, an operator would retain overall responsibility for operational control and would ensure such service providers are subjected to contractual and monitoring processes as specified in ORG 2.2.1. \r\nFOO and/or FOA responsibilities for operational control typically begin when assigned a flight during flight preparation and end after flight termination."]
["DSP","DSP 1.3.6"," If an FOO is used in the system of operational control, the Operator should assign responsibility to such personnel for:\n(i) Assisting the PIC in flight preparation and providing required information;\n                     \n(ii) Assisting the PIC in preparing the operational and ATS flight plans;\n(iii) When applicable, signing the operational and ATS flight plans;\n(iv) Filing the ATS flight plan with the appropriate ATS unit;\n(v) Furnishing the PIC, while in flight, with appropriate information necessary for the safe\nconduct of the flight;\n(vi) In the event of an emergency, initiating relevant procedures as specified in the OM.  \nNotes: \n1. \n1. An operator may choose to assign responsibility for one or more of the specified functions to an FOA, or the PIC may be assigned the responsibility for filing the flight plan in the case of iv) and/or for obtaining the necessary information in the case of v).\n2. \n2. Effective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Aircraft Tracking.\r\nThe specifications of this provision apply to each FOO qualified in all applicable competencies of\r\noperational control, whether licensed or not, who participates in an approved or accepted system of\r\noperational control and:\r\n- Is delegated authority in accordance with DSP 1.3.4, and/or\r\n- Is assigned the responsibility in accordance with DSP 1.3.5 to carry out operational control\r\nfunctions, duties or tasks related to all applicable competencies specified in Table 3.5.\r\n- The authority and responsibilities of an FOO are defined in Table 3.1.\r\nThe specification in item v) may be satisfied by the PIC if such information is available from other\r\nsources that can be accessed while in flight."]
["DSP","DSP 1.3.7"," The Operator should have a process to be used in the event of an emergency situation that endangers\nthe safety of the aircraft or persons, including those situations that become known first to the\nOperator. Such process shall ensure the FOO, FOA or other delegated person:\n(i) Initiates emergency procedures, as outlined in the OM, while avoiding taking any action that\nwould conflict with ATC procedures;\n                     \n(ii) Notifies the appropriate authorities, without delay, of the nature of the situation;\n                     \n(iii) Requests assistance, if required;\n(iv) Conveys, by any available means, safety-related information to the PIC that may be\nnecessary for the safe conduct of the flight, including information related to any necessary\namendments to the flight plan.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Standard","The specification in item ii) refers to notification to the appropriate authorities without delay and/or\r\nwithin a period(s) specified by each applicable authority.\r\nApplicable authorities include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations\r\nconducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of\r\nthe Operator.\r\nProcesses used for operational control of flights in the event of an emergency would typically be\r\ncompatible with any operating procedures that have been established by the agencies providing\r\nsystem services for air traffic control. Such compatibility is necessary to avoid conflict and ensure an\r\neffective exchange of information between the operator and any of the service agencies.\r\nDuring an operational emergency, the procedures specified in item i) would normally be designed to\r\nnot conflict with ATC procedures, such as separation standards, controller instructions, minimum\r\nflight altitude assignments or any other restrictions imposed by ATC. During an emergency, however,\r\nthe PIC may exercise emergency authority and take any action necessary in the interest of the safety\r\nof the passengers and aircraft."]
["DSP","DSP 1.7.1"," The Operator shall have an Operations Manual (OM) for the use of operational control personnel, which may be issued in separate parts, and which contains or references the policies, procedures and other guidance or information necessary for compliance with applicable regulations, laws, rules and Operator standards. As a minimum, the OM shall:\n(i) Be managed and controlled in accordance with ORG 2.5.1;\n(ii) Have all parts relevant to operational control personnel clearly identified and defined;\n(iii) Be in accordance with the specifications in Table 3.2. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure operational control personnel are able to find all information necessary to perform their functions either within the OM or within another document that is referenced in the OM. The OM is normally identified as a source of operational information approved or accepted for the purpose by the operator or the State.\r\nHuman factors are considered in the design of the OM to achieve the following:\r\n- Preparation of documentation in a useable format for information presentation, at the appropriate reading level and with the required degree of technical sophistication and clarity.\r\n- Improving user performance through the use of effective and consistent labels, symbols, colors, terms, acronyms, abbreviations, formats and data fields.\r\n- Ensuring the availability and usability of information to the user for specific tasks, when needed, and in a form that is directly usable.\r\n- Designing operational procedures for simplicity, consistency and ease of use.\r\n- Enabling operators to perceive and understand elements of the current situation and project them to future operational situations.\r\n- Minimizing the need for special or unique operator skills, abilities, tools or characteristics.\r\n- Assessing the net demands or impacts upon the physical, cognitive and decision-making resources of the operator, using objective and subjective performance measures.\r\n                  "]
["DSP","DSP 1.7.2","The Operator should have a description of the Operational Flight Plan (OFP) or equivalent document\nthat is published in the OM and includes:\n(i) Guidance for use by operational control personnel;\n                     \n(ii) An outline of the content in accordance with specifications in Table 3.3.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Items readily available in other documentation, obtained from another acceptable source or irrelevant\r\nto the type of operation may be omitted from the OFP."]
["DSP","DSP 1.8.4","The Operator should have a process or procedures to record and retain operational information,\ncommunications and data for each flight. As a minimum, such retained flight information and data\nshall be in accordance with the specifications in Table 3.4 and retained for a period of time\ndetermined by the Operator or the Authority.   \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Operational information and data may be retained by different means (e.g. ACARS logs, paper logs,\r\nmanually, computer systems).\r\nFuel and oil consumption records are typically maintained in accordance with MNT 3.1.1.\r\nThe communications typically subject to the record keeping specifications of this provision include\r\noperational voice, text, or data communications to/from:\r\n- Flights from the period beginning at the originating station when flight crew begins their\r\nduties on the flight deck until the flight crew finishes their duties on the flight deck at the\r\nterminating station;\r\n- If applicable, the operations control center.\r\nAircraft tracking data is typically retained only for the purposes of determining an aircraft's position in\r\nthe event of an accident."]
["DSP","DSP 2.1.1","The Operator shall have a training program, approved or accepted by the Authority, to ensure the operational control personnel specified in Table 3.1, as applicable, are competent to perform any assigned duties relevant to operational control in accordance with the applicable specifications of Table 3.5. Such program shall, as a minimum, address:\n(i) Initial qualification;\n(ii)  Continuing qualification.  \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Continuing Qualification, State Acceptance and State Approval.\r\nNot all states require the approval or acceptance of a training program for operational control personnel. In such cases, state acceptance is considered implicit.\r\nA training program for operational control personnel typically addresses:\r\n- For FOO and FOA personnel, initial and recurrent training in accordance with the specifications of Table 3.1 and Table 3.5;\r\n- For FOO and FOA personnel, a method of qualification through written, oral and/or practical evaluation;\r\n- For administrative support personnel as defined in Table 3.1, on-the-job training (OJT), job descriptions, task cards, guidelines, checklists, training materials or other written means to establish competence.\r\n                  \r\nThe training curriculum normally specifies minimum training hours for each subject area and also indicates whether it has been mandated by the Authority or operator.\r\nThe specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority and/or assigned responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5, respectively.\r\nFOO personnel who have completed training programs conducted in accordance with ICAO Doc 7192-AN/857, Part D, Training Manual-Flight Operations Officers/Flight Dispatchers, Second Edition, meet the specifications of this provision.\r\nFOO initial training programs contain all of the competencies in Table 3.5 that are relevant to the operations of the operator.\r\nFOA initial training programs contain the competencies in Table 3.5 that are relevant to their job function as determined by the operator.\r\nDifferent methods of conducting recurrent training are acceptable, including formal classroom study, home study, computer-based training, seminars and meetings. All recurrent training, regardless of method, is documented and retained in accordance with ORG 2.6.1."]
["DSP","DSP 3.1.2"," The Operator shall have a process or procedures to ensure the PIC is provided with all documents, information and data necessary for the safe conduct of the flight. \n               ",null,"Standard","The OM typically specifies the documents required by the PIC for the safe conduct of each flight. This list of required documents may also be replicated on the folder/envelope containing such documents or displayed in the operational control/flight dispatch center/office for reference purposes. Additionally, the process or procedures associated with the provision of flight documents typically includes safeguards to ensure all of the required documents are provided to the PIC prior to each flight."]
["DSP","DSP 3.2.5"," The Operator  should   have guidance and procedures that ensure the original OFP or equivalent\ndocument is accepted and signed by the following personnel, using either manuscript or an approved\nelectronic method:\n- The PIC for all systems of operational control;\n- The FOO for a shared system of operational control;\n- Designated member of management or post holder in a shared system of operational\ncontrol that requires the use of such management personnel.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","In a shared system of operational control, the signatures (manuscript or electronic) of both the PIC\r\nand the FOO or, if applicable, the designated member of management, are required on the OFP or\r\nequivalent document (e.g. dispatch release).\r\nThe specification in item iii) refers to a designated member of management in a shared system of\r\noperational control (e.g. director of flight operations or other designated post holder). Refer to Table 3.1  for the definitions of authorities and responsibilities associated with operational\r\ncontrol personnel."]
["DSP","DSP 3.2.7","If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator  should have a process or\nprocedures to ensure Operator changes in an ATS flight plan are, when practicable, coordinated with\nthe appropriate ATS unit before transmission to the aircraft by the FOO, FOA or other delegated\nperson.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority\r\nand/or assigned responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5 respectively.\r\nThe intent of this provision is to ensure ATS flight plan changes that occur prior to departure and/or\r\nen route are, when practicable, coordinated with the appropriate ATS unit prior to transmission to the\r\naircraft. When such coordination is not possible, the flight crew remains responsible for obtaining an\r\nappropriate clearance from an ATS unit, if applicable, before making a change in flight plan."]
["DSP","DSP 3.2.9A","If the Operator is authorized to conduct certain portions of a commercial flight under visual flight rules\n(VFR), the Operator should have guidance and procedures that:\n(i) Specify the type of flight plan to be filed with the appropriate ATS unit;\n(ii) Require current meteorological reports, or a combination of current reports and forecasts, to\nindicate that meteorological conditions along the portion of the flight to be flown under VFR\nwill, at the appropriate time, be such as to make compliance with VFR possible.   \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is to ensure:\r\n- Operations that require compliance with VFR are practicable under the anticipated\r\nmeteorological conditions;\r\n- The operator has guidance and procedures for determining expected times when\r\nmeteorological conditions will permit compliance with VFR.\r\nThe specification in item i) refers to the type of flight plan to be filed in instances where certain\r\nportions of a flight will be conducted under VFR. In some cases, it may be possible to identify VFR\r\nportions in a predominantly instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan (e.g. Y and Z designation on an\r\nICAO flight plan).\r\nGuidance related to the filing of a composite ICAO flight plan, and the use of the Y designation for\r\nflights initially operated under IFR and Z designation for flights initially operated under VFR, is\r\ncontained in Amendment 1 to the Procedures for Air Navigation Services-Air Traffic Management\r\n(PANS-ATM, Doc 4444)."]
["DSP","DSP 3.2.9B","The Operator should  have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight to be conducted in accordance\nwith IFR does not:\n(i) Take off from the departure airport unless the meteorological conditions are at or above the\noperator's established airport takeoff operating minima for that operation; and\n(ii) Take off, or continue beyond the point of in-flight re-planning, unless at the airport of\nintended landing or at each required alternate airport, current meteorological reports or a\ncombination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions will\nbe, at the estimated time of use (ETU), at or above the operator's established airport\noperating minima for that operation.   \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Alternate Airport, In-flight Re-planning Point and Estimated\r\nTime of Use (ETU).\r\nThe intent of this provision is to ensure:\r\n- Flights do not take off or continue beyond the point of in-flight re-planning unless the\r\nmeteorological conditions at each airport specified in i) or ii), are or will be at or above the\r\noperator's established airport operating minima for the operation at the ETU;\r\n- The operator has guidance and procedures for determining the ETU.\r\nThe ETU specified in (ii) is typically the estimated time of arrival derived from the OFP. However,\r\nsome operators may apply a time margin as required by the State.\r\nThe specification in item ii) would require the definition and application of alternate airport planning\r\nminima in accordance with DSP 3.2.9C."]
["DSP","DSP 3.2.9C","The Operator should  have guidance and procedures, approved or accepted by the State, for\ndetermining whether an approach and landing can be safely conducted at each required alternate\nairport at the ETU. Such guidance and procedures shall specify the appropriate incremental values\nfor visibility (and ceiling, if required), to be added to the Operator's established airport operating\nminima.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is for the operator to have a means to ensure, with a reasonable degree of\r\ncertainty, that at the ETU of an alternate airport, the meteorological conditions will be at or above the\r\noperator's established operating minima for an instrument approach. This is practically accomplished\r\nthrough guidance and procedures for the definition and application of alternate planning minima and\r\nthe determination of an ETU.\r\nThe specified visibility (and, if required, ceiling) additives are typically dependent on the approach\r\nfacility configuration and State requirements for a ceiling to be taken into account.\r\nThe ETU for alternate airports is normally determined in accordance with the type of operational\r\ncontrol system and requirements of the State:\r\n- In a non-shared system of operational control, the ETU is typically expressed as a time\r\nmargin (e.g. one hour before to one hour after the ETA at the alternate airport);\r\n- In a shared system of operational control, the ETU is typically considered to be a specific\r\npoint in time coupled with a requirement to ensure the alternate airport remains at or above\r\nappropriate minima for the duration of the flight.\r\nWhen determining an ETU, the operator might use a variable time margin based on specific flight\r\nparameters that can be monitored after departure by an FOO or FOA and communicated to the PIC.\r\nAn operator, in accordance with the requirements of the Authority, typically uses technical guidance\r\nfor the development or application of alternate airport planning minima. Such guidance might be\r\nderived from one or more of the following source references, as applicable:\r\n- ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).\r\n- Commission Regulation EC No. 965/2012.\r\n- FAR 121.625-Alternate Airport Weather Minima.\r\n- FAR 121.631(b)-Original Dispatch or Flight Release, Redispatch or Amendment of Dispatch\r\nor Flight Release.\r\n- FAA OPSPEC C055 Table.\r\n- Any equivalent reference document approved or accepted by the Authority for the\r\ndevelopment or application of alternate planning minima designed to conform to the\r\nspecifications of the provision."]
["DSP","DSP 3.3.1","The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a planned flight does not exceed:\n(i) The maximum performance takeoff, en route and landing weight limits, based upon environmental conditions expected at the times of departure, along the route of flight and at arrival; \n(ii) The aircraft structural ramp, takeoff and landing weight limits. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure the presence of guidance and procedures for the calculation of maximum takeoff and landing weights, based on takeoff, en route, landing performance, structural limitations as well as any applicable MEL restrictions. Additionally, such guidance and procedures address the means used to prevent an aircraft from being loaded in a manner that precludes a flight from being operated overweight (e.g. notification of weight restrictions to a Load Control Center/office or equivalent)."]
["DSP","DSP 3.4.1","The Operator should have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight to be operated in known or\nexpected icing conditions shall not be commenced unless the aircraft is certificated and equipped to\nbe operated in such conditions.\n               \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure flights planned to operate in known icing conductions are only\r\nconducted using appropriately certificated and equipped aircraft, which includes consideration of\r\ninoperative items on the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). Additionally, if the operator uses a mixed\r\nfleet including aircraft that are and are not suitably equipped for operations in icing conditions, the\r\noperator would have a means to preclude unequipped aircraft from being used on flights in known\r\nicing conditions."]
["DSP","DSP 3.7.3"," If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator  should ensure FOO, FOA and/or\nother designated operational control personnel:\n(i) Have access to the same information pertaining to dangerous goods carried as cargo on\nboard the aircraft that is provided to the PIC;\n(ii) Are assigned the responsibility to provide detailed information without delay about\ndangerous goods carried as cargo to emergency services responding to an accident or\nserious incident involving the Operator's aircraft.   \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is to ensure flights planned to operate in known icing conductions are only\r\nconducted using appropriately certificated and equipped aircraft, which includes consideration of\r\ninoperative items on the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). Additionally, if the operator uses a mixed\r\nfleet including aircraft that are and are not suitably equipped for operations in icing conditions, the\r\noperator would have a means to preclude unequipped aircraft from being used on flights in known\r\nicing conditions."]
["DSP","DSP 4.1.1","The Operator should have a system, process and/or procedures for alternate airport selection to\nensure an appropriate takeoff alternate airport is selected and specified on the OFP whenever:\n(i) The meteorological conditions at the airport of departure are below the applicable airport\noperating landing minima, and/or;\n(ii) Other operational conditions exist, as defined by the State or the Operator, that would\npreclude a return to the departure airport.   \nNotes: \n1. \n1. The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other variations to takeoff alternate airport selection criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator's SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.\n2. \n2. Effective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Operational Variations.\r\nThe intent of this provision is to ensure a methodology exists for the selection and specification of\r\ntakeoff alternate airports when required. The selection of such airports is typically intended to\r\naddress an operational condition (e.g. an emergency during or immediately after takeoff) that would\r\nrequire the flight crew to land the aircraft as soon as practicable. Accordingly, the applicable\r\noperating landing minima specified in the provision would typically refer to the minimum ceiling\r\nand/or visibility/runway visual range for landing with an engine inoperative as established by the\r\noperator.\r\nTakeoff alternates are typically selected during the planning stage but may be selected after flight\r\ncommencement when necessary via radio, ACARS, or any other communication means acceptable\r\nto the operator and the State.\r\nAn operator may use a system, a process or procedures alone or in any combination in order to fulfill\r\noperational requirements related to the selection of takeoff alternate airports. In all cases, however,\r\nthe robustness of any methodologies used for takeoff alternate airport selection is commensurate\r\nwith the breadth and complexity of the operation.\r\nA description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of\r\nvariations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General\r\nGuidance at the beginning of this subsection.\r\nVariations to alternate airport selection are typically approved or accepted by the State.\r\nThe subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to\r\nensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at\r\nleast the following:\r\n- Capabilities of the operator;\r\n- Overall capability of the aircraft and its systems;\r\n- Available airport technologies, capabilities and infrastructure;\r\n- Quality and reliability of meteorological information;\r\n- Identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and\r\n- Specific mitigation measures.\r\nGuidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the\r\nICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).\r\nExamples of variations related to the selection of alternate airports are contained in the ICAO Flight\r\nPlanning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976)."]
["DSP","DSP 4.1.5","The Operator should have a system, process and/or procedures for alternate airport selection that\ntakes into account meteorological conditions and relevant operational information to ensure a second\ndestination alternate airport is specified on the OFP and the ATS flight plan under one or more of the\nfollowing conditions (as approved or accepted by the Authority based on the operations of the\nOperator):\n(i) When, for the destination airport, meteorological conditions at the ETU will be below the\nOperator's established airport operating minima.\n(ii) When, for the destination airport, meteorological information is not available (unless the\nAuthority will not permit the initiation of a flight in the absence of such information).  \n(iii) If the Operator conducts operations to airports with \"marginal\" meteorological conditions as\ndefined in the OM, when, for such operations, the meteorological conditions at the ETU of\nthe destination and first alternate airports will be marginal.\n(iv) If the Operator conducts extended over-water operations as defined in the OM, when, for\nsuch operations, the meteorological conditions at the ETU of the destination airport will be\nbelow the Operator's established operating minima for that operation, unless there is a\nreasonable certainty that the first alternate airport will be at or above the Operator's\nestablished operating minima at the ETU.   \nNotes: \n1. \n1. The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other variations to destination alternate airport selection criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator's SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained\n2. \n2. Effective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The principal intent of this provision is to address the safety risks associated with lack of weather\r\nreporting for the destination airport or its unavailability at the ETU due to the prevailing\r\nmeteorological conditions. As a practical matter this may be accomplished by the selection and\r\nspecification of a second alternate in accordance with the technical specifications of the provision\r\nand/or to otherwise ensure, to the extent reasonably practicable, that an airport of intended landing\r\nwill be available to a flight at the ETU.\r\nAn operator may conform to a minimum of one of the numbered specifications of the provision and be\r\nin overall conformity with the intent of the entire provision. Individual conformity with items i) through\r\niv) is \"as applicable to the operator\" and dependent on many factors including the regulatory\r\nenvironment and the type of operations conducted.\r\nThe specifications in ii) define a condition that triggers the selection and specification of a second\r\ndestination alternate except in cases when the operator is not authorized to depart in the absence of\r\nany destination weather information. In such cases, the Authority may authorize departures without\r\nnominating a second destination alternate if, for example:\r\n- The FOO and flight crew obtain and consider those weather reports and forecasts which are\r\navailable;\r\n- The FOO and flight crew ensure adequate contingency plans (such as extra fuel) are\r\navailable to deal with an unfavorable change in conditions.\r\nThe term \"marginal\" as used in item (iii) is typically not defined by regulation. This, to some extent, is\r\nbecause the definition of what constitutes \"marginal\" depends on the nature of the meteorological\r\nconditions present, the type of operation being conducted and the capabilities of the airborne and\r\nground-based equipment available. In any case, an operator, in order to conform to item iii) must\r\nclearly define the term including the conditions under which a second alternate is required.\r\nThe specifications in item iii) are typically applicable to flights conducted between airports within the\r\nterritories of one nation or country, or between nearby countries as approved or accepted by the\r\napplicable authorities.\r\nThe specification in item iv) is applicable if the term \"extended overwater operations\" is defined by\r\nregulation of the State and by the operator. Such term is typically defined as an operation over water\r\nat a horizontal distance of more than 50 nautical miles from the nearest shoreline.\r\nAn operator may use a system, process and/or procedures alone or in any combination in order to\r\nfulfill operational requirements related to the selection of alternate airports. In all cases, however, the\r\nrobustness of any methodologies for destination alternate airport selection is commensurate with the\r\nbreadth and complexity of the operation.\r\nA description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of\r\nvariations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General\r\nGuidance at the beginning of this subsection.\r\nVariations to alternate airport selection are typically approved or accepted by the State.\r\nThe subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to\r\nensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at\r\nleast the following:\r\n- Capabilities of the operator;\r\n- Overall capability of the aircraft and its systems;\r\n- Available airport technologies, capabilities and infrastructure;\r\n- Quality and reliability of meteorological information;\r\n- Identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and\r\n- Specific mitigation measures.\r\nGuidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the\r\nICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).\r\nExamples of variations related to the selection of alternate airports are contained in the ICAO Flight\r\nPlanning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976)."]
["DSP","DSP 4.2.1","The Operator should have guidance and procedures to ensure planned minimum flight altitudes are not\nless than those established by the applicable authorities. \n \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","Operational flight planning includes a review of the route of flight, in conjunction with published\r\naeronautical information, to ensure compliance with minimum flight altitudes. Such review could\r\ninclude:\r\n- Minimum Safety Altitude (MSA);\r\n- Minimum Descent Altitude/Height (MDA/H);\r\n- Minimum En route Altitude (MEA);\r\n- Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude (MOCA);\r\n- Minimum Off-Route Altitude (MORA);\r\n- Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA);\r\n- Any other minimum altitudes prescribed by the Authority.\r\nApplicable authorities include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations\r\nconducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of\r\nthe Operator."]
["DSP","DSP 4.3.1","The Operator shall have a system, process and/or procedures to ensure an aircraft carries a sufficient amount of usable fuel to complete each planned flight safely and allow for deviations from the planned operation. \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to define the foundation necessary to support the practical implementation of an operator's fuel policy. It also addresses the baseline criteria to be considered in any methodology used in the determination of total usable fuel required to complete each planned flight safely. Simply put, it requires an operator to use system, process and/or procedures alone or in any combination in order to fulfill operational requirements related to the implementation of its fuel policy. In all cases the robustness of any such methodologies is commensurate with the breadth and complexity of the operation and takes into account:\r\n- The aircraft-specific data and operating conditions for the planned operation.\r\n- The following components of usable fuel required in accordance with the respective provisions of this sub-section:\r\n- Taxi fuel; \r\n- Trip fuel in;\r\n- Contingency fuel;\r\n                        \r\n- If required (as applicable to each flight):\r\n- Destination alternate fuel, or\r\n- No-alternate fuel or\r\n- Isolated airport fuel \r\n                        \r\n- Final reserve fuel;\r\n- If required, additional fuel;\r\n- If requested by the PIC, or the PIC and FOO in a shared system of operational control, discretionary fuel. \r\n                  \r\nSome regulatory authorities or operators may classify destination alternate fuel, no alternate fuel and Isolated airport fuel under the common heading of \"Alternate Fuel\" in regulations and/or flight planning systems.\r\nIt is important for operational control personnel and the flight crew to have a clear and common understanding of the terms used in the operator's fuel policy, as such understanding is the key to successful flight planning and completion. Equally important is the notion that differences in terminology may exist from operator to operator. Regardless of the terms used, however, an operator can conform to the provisions of this sub-section if the pre-flight computation of usable fuel is substantially equivalent, allocates fuel in a similar fashion, and has the components that, when combined, result in an equivalent or greater amount of fuel.\r\nFuel calculations are typically made by a flight crew member, a Flight Operations Officer/Flight Dispatcher (FOO), or both. \r\nGuidance on the organizational and operational systems and processes related to the implementation of fuel policy is contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual\r\n(Doc 9976)."]
["DSP","DSP 4.3.2","The Operator should have a system, process and/or procedures to ensure the amount of usable fuel to be carried on an aircraft in accordance with DSP 4.3.1 is, as a minimum, based on the following data and operating conditions for each planned flight:\n(i) Current aircraft-specific data derived from a fuel consumption monitoring program, if\navailable, or if current aircraft-specific data is not available, data provided by the aircraft\nmanufacturer;\n(ii) The anticipated aircraft mass;\n(iii) Notices to Airmen (NOTAM);\n(iv) Current meteorological reports, or a combination of current reports and forecasts;\n(v) Applicable air traffic services procedures, restrictions and anticipated delays;\n(vi) The effects of deferred maintenance items and/or configuration deviations;\n(vii) Any other conditions that might cause increased fuel consumption.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of NOTAM (Notice to Airmen).\r\nThe intent of this provision is to define the aircraft-specific data, manufacturer data, operating\r\nconditions and other factors that would be considered by an Operator during the pre-flight\r\ncomputation of the total usable fuel required for a planned flight. When considered in combination\r\nwith DSP 4.3.1, this provision helps to form the basic foundation for the means to complete the preflight\r\ncalculation of usable fuel.\r\nThe specification in item i) refers to the process for ensuring actual aircraft fuel use approximates\r\nplanned fuel use within an acceptable margin of error. This is practically accomplished by comparing\r\nthe achieved in-flight performance of an aircraft to its predicted performance. Variations between the\r\nachieved performance and the predicted performance will result in a variation of the rate of fuel\r\nconsumption which is typically accounted for by the operator during flight planning and in flight.\r\nAn operator may use a system, process and/or procedures alone or in any combination in order to\r\nfulfill operational requirements related to the implementation of fuel policy. In all cases, however, the\r\nrobustness of any such methodologies is commensurate with the breadth and complexity of the\r\noperation.\r\nGuidance on fuel planning including guidance related to the creation and maintenance of fuel\r\nconsumption monitoring programs is contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management\r\nManual (Doc 9976)."]
["DSP","DSP 4.3.12","The Operator should  have a process and/or procedures to ensure the final reserve fuel calculated in\naccordance with its fuel policy is not less than the amount of fuel required to fly for 30 minutes under speed and altitude conditions specified by the Operator and as approved or accepted by the\nAuthority.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is to ensure the allocation of an amount of fuel to be protected in flight and\r\npreserved upon landing at any airport. As such, it represents the last line of defense in a multilayered\r\nstrategy to ensure safe flight completion.\r\nAn operator may define the 30-minute final fuel reserve requirements using speed, altitude and/or\r\nother conditions that are in accordance with requirements of the Authority (e.g. 30 minutes at holding\r\nspeed at 450m/1,500 ft above airport elevation in standard conditions)."]
["MNT","MNT 1.1.2","The Operator should have a staff of management personnel suitably matched to the scale and scope of maintenance operations to ensure:\n(i) Maintenance of all aircraft is performed in accordance with the Maintenance Program;\n(ii) All maintenance is carried out in accordance with policies and procedures contained in the\nMaintenance Management Manual (MMM). \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of ETOPS, Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO),\r\nMaintenance Management Manual (MMM) and Maintenance Program.\r\nThe management personnel represent the maintenance management structure of the operator and\r\nare responsible for all maintenance functions. Dependent on the size of the operation and the\r\norganizational set up, the maintenance functions may be divided among individual managers or\r\ncombined, as applicable to the airline structure\r\nThe actual number of persons employed, and their qualifications, are dependent upon the tasks to be\r\nperformed and thus dependent on the size and complexity of the operation (e.g. route network, line\r\nand/or charter operations, ETOPS/EDTO, fleet composition, aircraft complexity and age), number\r\nand locations of maintenance facilities and the amount and complexity of maintenance contracts.\r\nConsequently, the number of persons needed, and their qualifications, may differ greatly from one\r\noperator to another and a simple formula covering the whole range of possibilities is not feasible."]
["MNT","MNT 1.3.1","The Operator shall provide, for the use and guidance of relevant maintenance and operational personnel, a Maintenance Program that is, approved by the relevant Authority and contains information and data for each aircraft type/model and configuration in the Operator's fleet in accordance with specifications in Table 4.1. The Maintenance Program shall satisfy:\n(i) Requirements of the State of Registry;\n(ii) Requirements of the State of Design;\n(iii) Requirements of the Operator;\n(iv) Maintenance specifications provided by the aircraft, engine and component OEMs. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO), State of Design and State of Registry.\r\nAn aircraft maintenance program is usually approved by the authority of the State of the Operator. However, when an operator utilizes an aircraft registered in a different state, it is possible that the maintenance program could be approved by the authority of the State of Registry.\r\nAn operator's authority typically holds the operator responsible for the definition, the control and the provision of Maintenance Data and an Approved Maintenance Program for use by the operator and its maintenance organization.\r\nThe aircraft is maintained under one approved operator's aircraft maintenance program. When an operator wishes to change from one approved operator's aircraft maintenance program to another approved program, a transfer check/inspection may need to be performed, as agreed with the Authority, in order to implement the change.\r\nThe operator's aircraft maintenance program contains a preface that defines the maintenance program contents, the inspection standards to be applied, permitted variations to task frequencies and, where applicable, any procedure to escalate established check/inspection intervals.\r\nA reliability program provides an appropriate means of monitoring the effectiveness of the maintenance program. Maintenance program optimization relies on implementation of the reliability program.\r\nSome approved operators' aircraft maintenance programs, not developed from the MRB Process, use reliability programs as the basis of the approval. The purpose of a reliability program is to ensure that the aircraft maintenance program tasks are effective and carried out at appropriate time intervals. Actions resulting from the reliability program may result in the escalation, addition or deletion of maintenance tasks, as deemed necessary.\r\nThe maintenance program typically contains the following information:\r\n- The type/model and registration number of the aircraft, engines and, where applicable, auxiliary power units (APUs) and propellers;\r\n- The name and address of the operator;\r\n- The operator's reference identification of the program document, the date of issue and issue number;\r\n- A statement signed by the operator to the effect the specified aircraft is maintained in accordance with the program and that the program is reviewed and updated as required;\r\n- Contents/list of effective pages of the document;\r\n- Check periods that reflect the anticipated utilization of the aircraft and where utilization cannot be anticipated, calendar time limits are included;\r\n- Procedures for the escalation of established check periods, where applicable, and acceptable to the Authority;\r\n- Provision to record date and reference to approved amendments incorporated in the program;\r\n- Details of preflight maintenance tasks accomplished by maintenance personnel and not included in the Operations Manual for action by flight crew;\r\n- The tasks and the periods (intervals/frequencies) at which each part of the aircraft, engines, APUs, propellers, components, accessories, equipment, instruments, electrical and radio apparatus and associated systems and installations are to be inspected, together with the type and degree of inspection;\r\n- The periods when items are checked, cleaned, lubricated, replenished, adjusted and tested;\r\n- Details of specific structural inspections or sampling programs;\r\n- Details of the corrosion control program, when applicable;\r\n- The periods and procedures for the collection of engine health monitoring data;\r\n- The periods when overhauls and/or replacements by new or overhauled parts are to be made;\r\n- A cross-reference to other documents approved by the Authority that contain the details of maintenance tasks related to mandatory life-limitations, Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) and Airworthiness Directives (ADs);\r\nNote: \r\nTo prevent inadvertent variations to such tasks or intervals, these items would not be included in the main portion of the maintenance program document, or any planning control system, without specific identification of their mandatory status.\r\n                        \r\n- Details of, or cross-reference to, any required Reliability Program or statistical methods of continuous surveillance;\r\n- A statement that practices and procedures to satisfy the program are to the standards specified in the Type Certificate Holder's Maintenance Instructions. When practices and procedures are included in a customized operator's maintenance manual approved by the Authority, the statement refers to this manual;\r\n- Each maintenance task quoted is defined in the definitions section of the program;\r\n- Statements that indicate the maintenance program meets all applicable instructions for continuing airworthiness developed by the Type Certificate Holder as issued or amended by the operator's reliability program, STC holders, DERs, ODAs and/or DOA;\r\n- Statements that indicate changes or deviations from the Type Certificate Holder's Maintenance Instructions or OEM maintenance specifications are made in accordance with the operator's approved procedures.\r\n                  \r\nAn operator's approved aircraft maintenance programs are subject to periodic review to ensure they reflect current Type Certificate Holder's recommendations, revisions to the Maintenance Review Board Report and the mandatory requirements and maintenance needs of the aircraft. The operator reviews the detailed requirements at least annually for continued validity in light of the operating experience."]
["MNT","MNT 1.3.3","The Operator shall ensure amendments to the Maintenance Program:\n(i) Are approved by the Authority unless the Operator has been approved to amend the Maintenance Program without requiring approval of the Authority;\n(ii) Are furnished to all organizations and/or persons to whom the Maintenance Program has been issued.\n               ",null,"Standard"]
["MNT","MNT 1.3.4","If the Operator utilise single-engine turbine-powered aircrafts, the Operator should establish a system to monitor the engine trends of all single-engine turbine-powered aeroplanes operated at night and/or in IMC.\nNotes: \n1. \n1. Aeroplanes for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is first issued on or after January 1, 2005, should have an automatic trend monitoring system.\n2. \n2. Effective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation"]
["MNT","MNT 1.7.1","The Operator shall have, for the use and guidance of relevant maintenance and operational personnel, a Maintenance Management Manual that is accepted or approved by the Authority. The MMM may be issued in separate parts and shall contain maintenance policies, procedures and information as specified in Table 4.3. The design of the manual shall observe Human Factors principles. \n               ",null,"Standard","An MMM is a document that defines how an operator, through its AMO and all contracted AMOs, accomplishes and controls its aircraft maintenance activities. This document sets out:\r\n- The description of the maintenance management system and its senior personnel;\r\n- Each location where maintenance is carried out;\r\n- The Approved Data for accomplishing aircraft maintenance;\r\n- The procedures by which Engineering and Maintenance is managed.\r\n                  \r\nThe MMM provides all Engineering and Maintenance personnel with the necessary information to enable them to accomplish their duties and allow the Authority to understand and approve how the operator and its AMO comply with the applicable Airworthiness Requirements.\r\nThe MMM can comprise one manual or a suite of manuals. The MMM may have specific sections extracted to form a customized manual for distribution to maintenance contractors, line stations and others, as applicable.\r\nThe MMM can be a generic term for the MCM, QPM, MOM, QM, IPM, MME and others. The purpose of the MMM is to set forth the procedures, means and methods of the operator in fulfilling its maintenance responsibilities. Compliance with its contents assures fulfillment of the operator's maintenance responsibilities.\r\nThe management section in the MMM may be produced as a stand-alone document and made available to the key personnel required to be familiar with its contents.\r\nWorking procedures between the operator and AMO are established and may be produced as any number of separate procedures manuals and cross-referenced from the management part of the MMM. The list of AMO Certifying Personnel may be produced as a separate document.\r\nPersonnel from both the operator and the AMO are expected to be familiar with sections of the manuals that are relevant to the work they carry out.\r\nResponsibilities and procedures for revisions to the management part of the MMM and any associated manuals are to be specified.\r\nThe Quality Manager of the operator is responsible for monitoring revisions to the MMM unless otherwise agreed by the Authority.\r\nUnless the Authority has agreed via a procedure stated in the amendment section of the MMM that certain defined classes of amendments may be incorporated without prior Authority approval, this process includes monitoring revisions to the associated procedures manuals.\r\nThe MMM normally has at least the following four main parts to cover the items in Table 4.3:\r\n- Organization and management;\r\n- Maintenance procedures;\r\n- Quality system procedures;\r\n- Contracted maintenance procedures and paperwork.\r\n                  \r\nThe MMM also typically contains:\r\n- An organization chart;\r\n- Procedures to ensure:\r\n- Each aircraft operated is maintained in an airworthy condition;\r\n- The operational and emergency equipment necessary for an intended flight is serviceable;\r\n- The Certificate of Airworthiness of each aircraft operated remains valid.\r\n                        \r\n- A description of the quality system;\r\n- A description of the procedure for receiving, amending and distributing all necessary airworthiness data from the type certificate holder or type design organization;\r\n- A statement signed by the operator confirming the MMM and any incorporated documents identified therein reflect the operator's means of compliance with the Authority requirements;\r\n- A description of the MMM amendment control procedure;\r\n- A means of identifying each page of the MMM. This can be in the form of a list of effective pages with each page numbered and either dated or marked with a revision number;\r\n- A description of the system used to distribute the MMM, including a distribution list; for non-scheduled work, temporary copies of the relevant portions of the MMM, or any incorporated reference, may be sent via facsimile transmission;\r\n- A detailed description of the procedures used to ensure that any maintenance tasks required by the maintenance schedule, airworthiness directives or any task required for the rectification of a defect are completed within the required time constraints;\r\n- A description of the evaluation program required by these standards;\r\n- A description of the defect rectification and control procedures, including details of:\r\n- The methods used to detect and report recurring defects;\r\n- The procedures for scheduling the rectification of defects whose repair has been deferred, if these procedures have not been incorporated into the MEL preamble.\r\n                        \r\n- The procedures used to report service difficulties in accordance with these standards;\r\n- A description of the technical dispatch procedures, including procedures for ferry-flight authorizations EDTO (equivalent terms ETOPS, EROPS, LROPS), all weather operation or any other special operation;\r\n- A description of personnel records to be retained;\r\n- A description of the procedure used to ensure the empty weight and balance of each aircraft is recorded in accordance with the applicable State of Registry/Authority requirements;\r\n- Maintenance arrangements and a list of all such arrangements, including the procedure used to communicate to an approved maintenance organization the maintenance requirements for planned and unforeseen maintenance activities, as well as those mandated by airworthiness directives;\r\n- Procedure for revising and maintaining the MMM up to date and current;\r\n- Approval of the Authority through approval of the list of effective pages or, in the case of manuals containing a small number of pages, approval can be identified on each page.\r\n                  "]
["MNT","MNT 1.7.3","The Operator should ensure the MMM is amended as necessary to keep information contained therein up to date and to address:\n(i) Changes to maintenance or airworthiness requirements;\n(ii) Changes in the organization or activities;\n(iii) Inadequacies identified through internal or external audit;\n(iv) Conformity with applicable requirements.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation"]
["MNT","MNT 1.7.6"," The Operator shall ensure a copy of the current version of the MMM, or relevant portions thereof, is promptly made available to:\n(i) Applicable authorities;\n(ii) Each organization or person that performs or certifies maintenance for the Operator;\n(iii) All other organizations or persons to whom the MMM has been issued.\n               ",null,"Standard"]
["MNT","MNT 2.1.1","The Operator shall have a maintenance control system that is in accordance with procedures acceptable to the Authority and ensures:\n(i) Each aircraft is maintained in an airworthy condition;\n(ii) Operational and emergency equipment necessary for flight is serviceable;\n(iii) The Certificate of Airworthiness of each aircraft remains valid.\n               ",null,"Standard"]
["MNT","MNT 2.1.2","The Operator should have guidance and procedures to ascertain if trends for oil consumption are such that an aircraft has sufficient oil to complete each flight.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","The designation of a minimum oil quantity is typically provided by the manufacturer, while the\r\ndetermination, monitoring and replenishment of oil supply are the responsibilities of engineering and\r\nmaintenance and/or the flight crew in accordance with ISSM Section 2 (FLT), Table 2.2, item v)."]
["MNT","MNT 2.2.1","The Operator shall have a system for forecasting and tracking required maintenance activities.",null,"Standard"]
["MNT","MNT 2.3.1","The Operator shall have a process to ensure that no new part is installed on an aeronautical product unless such part meets the standards of airworthiness applicable to the installation of new parts and in addition, meets a minimum any of the following:\n(i) The new part has marking identifying it as a part specified in the type design conforming to a recognized national or international standard, or\n(ii) The new part has been approved for use on an aeronautical product, in accordance with the type certificate/STC, if the part was originally designed and manufactured for non-aeronautical use, or\n(iii) The new part was manufactured under a Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), or\n(iv) The new part was produced by the Operator using approved procedures for the purpose of maintaining or alerting its own aeronautical product. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The operator is responsible for providing an external AMO with approved documentation that contains information about parts allowed to be installed on its aircraft. Such documentation enables the external AMO to validate the airworthy condition of the part and its certification for installation on the aeronautical product being maintained. The \"approved documentation\" category typically includes as necessary, without being limited to, any of the following: MMM, IPC (including Supplements), AD, SB, Work Order, Repair Order, Form 8130-3/EASA Form 1/or equivalent.\r\nThe production of parts by an operator for its own use, as specified in item (iv), is acceptable provided there are approved procedures identified in the MMM."]
["MNT","MNT 2.3.2","The Operator shall have a process to ensure that no used part is installed on an aeronautical product unless such part meets the standards of airworthiness applicable to the installation of used parts and any of the following:\n(i) An airworthy part that has been removed from an aircraft for immediate installation on another aircraft, or\n                     \n(ii) An airworthy part that has undergone maintenance for which a maintenance release has been signed by an appropriately rated Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO),or\n                     \n(iii) An airworthy part that has undergone an approved repair or alteration that restored the certificated level of airworthiness to a used part. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The operator is responsible for providing an external AMO with approved documentation that contains information about parts allowed to be installed on its aircraft. Such documentation enables the external AMO to validate the airworthy condition of the part and its certification for installation on the aeronautical product being maintained. The \"approved documentation\" category typically includes as necessary, without being limited to, any of the following: MMM, IPC (including Supplements), AD, SB, Work Order, Repair Order, Form 8130-3/EASA Form 1/or equivalent."]
["MNT","MNT 2.3.3"," The Operator shall have a process to ensure that no used life-limited part is installed on an aeronautical product unless such part meets the standards of airworthiness applicable to the installation of life-limited parts and:\n(i) The technical history of the part is available to demonstrate the time in service, as authorized for that part in the type certificate governing the installation, has not been exceeded;\n(ii) The technical history referred to in sub-paragraph (i) is incorporated into the technical record for the aeronautical product on which the part is installed. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The operator is responsible for providing an external AMO with approved documentation that contains information about parts allowed to be installed on its aircraft.\r\nIn general, it is best for an operator to have a fully traceable history for all life-limited parts. Not all parts have a fixed life. The life of some parts might be variable depending on the way the part has been used in the past. For example, load-bearing parts (e.g. landing gear components) that can be installed on different aircraft types (e.g. A319, A320, A321) will have a shorter life if installed on the heavier aircraft (as opposed to the same part installed on a lighter aircraft). Therefore, a complete history of these types of components is critical in knowing exactly when the life of the part will expire.\r\nFor parts that have a fixed life (e.g. batteries, slides), traceability to birth is not a requirement. However, in such cases, it is very important that the operator has documentation that shows clearly that the used part has not exceeded its airworthiness life limit."]
["MNT","MNT 2.4.1"," The Operator shall have a maintenance control function that is responsible for approving, controlling, monitoring and scheduling non-routine and deferred maintenance activities, including MEL/CDL requirements.",null,"Standard"]
["MNT","MNT 2.4.2","The Operator shall have a process to ensure deferred maintenance items (defects) are tracked and corrected within the required intervals prescribed by the MEL, CDL or the appropriate maintenance data.   \n               ",null,"Standard","The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator has a process to rectify all defects affecting the safe operation of the aircraft within the limits prescribed by the approved MEL or CDL. Postponement of any defect rectification cannot typically be permitted without the operator's agreement and in accordance with a procedure approved by the State of Registry/Authority."]
["MNT","MNT 2.5.1"," The Operator shall have processes to: \n(i) Obtain and assess continuing airworthiness information, including Airworthiness Directives (ADs), Alert Service Bulletins and recommendations from the organizations responsible for aircraft type design, and \n(ii) \tImplement the resulting actions that are mandatory or considered necessary in accordance with procedures acceptable to the Authority. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Authority, Service Bulletin (which includes the definition of Alert Service Bulletin) and Design Approval Holder (DAH). \r\nContinuing airworthiness information and recommendations typically include: \r\n- \tAirworthiness Directives that are developed by the Authority;\r\n- Alert Service Bulletins, Airworthiness Limitations, maintenance planning and accomplishment instructions that are developed by the Type Design Organization(s) in accordance with their obligations as Design Approval Holder (DAH) for the respective product. \r\n                  \r\nIf improvements identified in the assessment process are considered by the operator as necessary to meet its safety and reliability needs, the current planning, accomplishment instructions, and/or airworthiness limitations may need to be adjusted through the implementation process. "]
["MNT","MNT 2.5.2","The Operator shall have a process to monitor and assess maintenance and operational experience with respect to continuing airworthiness of aircraft of over 5,700 kg (12,566 lb) maximum certificated takeoff mass, as prescribed by the Authority. \n               ",null,"Standard","Aircraft continuing airworthiness is usually prescribed by the authority of the State of Registry. However, it is possible that continuing airworthiness instructions could be affected by the authority of the State of the Operator and/or the State of Design."]
["MNT","MNT 2.5.3","The Operator should have a program for the management of the minimum equipment lists (MELs) used\nin its fleet operations. Such program shall ensure MELs:\n(i) Are approved by the State of the Operator and/or State of Registry if applicable;\n(ii) Include the latest applicable MMEL provisions released by the Type Certificate Holder(s);\n(iii) Are relevant to and customized for the type/model of aircraft in the Operator's fleet;\n(iv) Identify applicable maintenance procedures called upon by the MEL items and such\nprocedures are readily available for implementation by the appropriate maintenance\npersonnel;\n(v) Include, as applicable, aircraft systems and equipment required for operations in conformity\nwith special authorizations.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and Master Minimum\r\nEquipment List (MMEL).\r\nThe relevance and customization of the MEL is performed by the operator to reflect the configuration\r\nparticular to each aircraft type in its fleet (e.g. the long-range or extended-range version, the engine\r\ntype/model, the optional equipment installed etc.). The MEL typically does not include MMEL\r\nprovisions that are not relevant to the actual configuration of the operated aircraft.\r\nThe timeframe in which the applicable MMEL revisions released by the type certificate holder (TCH)\r\nare incorporated into the MEL is acceptable to the Authority.\r\nThe maintenance procedures as specified in (iv) are identified by an (M) symbol in the MEL.\r\nThe intent is that all maintenance procedures are developed to a sufficient level."]
["MNT","MNT 2.6.1","The Operator shall have a process to ensure all modifications and repairs:\n(i) Are carried out using approved data;\n(ii) Comply with airworthiness requirements of the Authority and State of Registry.\n               ",null,"Standard"]
["MNT","MNT 2.7.1"," The Operator shall have processes for defect recording and control, including the management of recurring defects, to address: \n(i) Tracking chronic or repetitive unserviceable items;\n(ii) Documenting troubleshooting history;\n(iii) Implementing instructions for corrective action;\n(iv) Ensuring rectification takes into account the methodology used in previous repair attempts.\n               ",null,"Standard"]
["MNT","MNT 3.1.1","The Operator shall have a program to ensure the following maintenance records are maintained:\n(i) Total time in service (hours, calendar time and cycles, as appropriate,) of the aircraft, engines and all life-limited components;\n(ii) Current status of compliance with all mandatory continuing airworthiness information;\n(iii) Appropriate details of modifications and repairs;\n(iv) Time in service (hours, calendar time and cycles, as appropriate,) since last overhaul of the aircraft, engines or its components subject to a mandatory overhaul life;\n(v) Current aircraft status of compliance with the Maintenance Program;\n(vi) Detailed maintenance records to show that all requirements for signing of a maintenance release have been met.                      \n               \nNotes: \n1. Records in sub-paragraphs i) to v) are retained for a minimum period of 90 days after the aircraft, engine and component, to which they refer, has been permanently withdrawn from service;\n2. Records in sub-paragraph vi) are retained for a minimum period of one year after the signing of the maintenance release.",null,"Standard","Contracted maintenance organizations are required to maintain detailed records, to include certification documents that support the issuance of a maintenance release. Such requirement is typically specified in contractual arrangements, and implementation verified through oversight by the operator."]
["MNT","MNT 3.1.4"," The Operator should have processes to ensure applicable aircraft maintenance records for aircraft\ncurrently listed on the AOC:\n(i) In the event of a temporary change of operator, are made available to the new operator;\n(ii) In the event of a permanent change of operator, transferred to the new operator.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation"]
["MNT","MNT 3.2.1"," The Operator shall have a process to ensure all aircraft have an aircraft technical log (ATL) or approved equivalent that comprises elements specified in Table 4.6.",null,"Standard"]
["MNT","MNT 3.2.2","The Operator shall have processes for the management of the ATL or approved equivalent as specified in MNT 3.2.1 to ensure, with respect to the ATL or approved equivalent:\n(i) Entries are current and cannot be erased or deleted;\n(ii) Descriptions of errors or discrepancies that have been corrected remain readable and identifiable;\n(iii) \tEntries are retained to provide a continuous record of the last six months of operations.\n\t\t\t\t                 ",null,"Standard"]
["MNT","MNT 3.4.1"," The Operator shall maintain records of Airworthiness Directives (ADs) and Service Bulletins (SBs) or equivalents accomplished in accordance with the MMM.",null,"Standard"]
["MNT","MNT 4.1.1","The Operator shall ensure an aircraft is not operated unless it is maintained and released to service by an Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO) that:\n(i) Is acceptable to the Authority;\n(ii) Has established procedures acceptable to the Authority to ensure maintenance practices are in compliance with all relevant requirements;\n(iii) Maintains the validity of its approval through compliance with the requirements for an approved maintenance organization acceptable to the Authority. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO)."]
["MNT","MNT 4.1.3"," The Operator shall ensure each maintenance organization that performs maintenance for the Operator has an approval document that contains, as a minimum:\n(i) Name and location of the AMO;\n(ii) Date of issue and period of validity of the approval;\n(iii) Scope of the approval. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The specification in item (iii) of this provision is satisfied by the operator ensuring that the AMO approval document contains the type and level of work required by the operator.\r\nA repair station or Approved Maintenance Organization certificate is usually delivered with ratings in one or more of the following categories or their equivalents:\r\n- Aircraft;\r\n- Avionics;\r\n- Engine;\r\n- Propeller;\r\n- Structure and Corrosion Protection Control Program;\r\n- Component;\r\n- Welding;\r\n- NDT.\r\n                  "]
["MNT","MNT 4.1.5","If the Operator has maintenance performed outside the State of the Operator by a maintenance\norganization that does not hold an approval  document issued by the Authority, the Operator should  have a process to ensure such maintenance organization has been recognized by the Authority.  \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","It is possible for an operator to enter into an arrangement for primary maintenance with an\r\norganization that is not an approved/accepted Maintenance Organization within the State of Registry\r\nwhen the arrangement is in the interest of the operator by simplifying the management of its\r\nmaintenance. In such a situation, the maintenance organization is normally approved under the laws\r\nof a State that has an agreement with the State of Registry of the operator, and the operator applies\r\nits own control processes that ensure the existence of and compliance with the provisions MNT sub-section 4."]
["MNT","MNT 4.3.1","The Operator shall ensure each maintenance organization that performs maintenance for the Operator has an independent quality assurance program that:\n(i) Meets the specifications and control processes contained in Table 4.7;\n(ii) Monitors compliance with applicable regulations, requirements and the Maintenance Procedures Manual (MPM) of the AMO;\n(iii) Addresses the specific requirements of the Operator as specified in the maintenance agreement;\n(iv) Is under the sole control of the Quality Manager or the person assigned managerial responsibility for the program. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Maintenance Procedures Manual (MPM).\r\nThe primary objectives of the quality system are to enable the AMO to ensure it can deliver a safe product and remain in compliance with all requirements.\r\nAn essential element of the quality system is the independent audit. The independent audit is an objective process of routine sample checks of all aspects of the approved maintenance organization's ability to carry out all maintenance to the required standards. This process includes:\r\n- Product sampling, as this is the end result of the maintenance process, which represents an objective overview of the complete maintenance-related activities; product sampling is intended to complement the requirement for certifying personnel to be satisfied that all required maintenance has been properly carried out before the issue of the certificate of release to service;\r\n- A percentage of random audits carried out on a sample basis when maintenance is being carried out; random audits include audits done during the night for those organizations that work at night.\r\n                  \r\nAnother essential element of the quality system is the quality feedback system. The principal function of the quality feedback system is to ensure all findings resulting from the independent quality audits of the organization are properly investigated and corrected in a timely manner:\r\n- Independent quality audit reports are sent to the relevant department(s) for rectification action proposing target rectification dates;\r\n- Rectification dates are discussed with such department(s) before the quality department or nominated quality auditor confirms dates in the report;\r\n- The relevant department(s) rectifies findings within agreed rectification dates and informs the quality department or nominated quality auditor of the completion of such rectifications.\r\n                  \r\nThe accountable executive is kept informed of any safety issues and the extent of compliance with authority requirements. The accountable executive also holds regular meetings with personnel to check progress on rectification. In large organizations such meetings may be delegated on a day-to-day basis to the quality manager, subject to the accountable executive meeting at least twice per year with the senior personnel involved to review the overall performance and receiving at least a half yearly summary report on findings of non-compliance.\r\nAll records pertaining to the independent quality audit and the quality feedback system are retained for at least two evaluation cycles after the date of closure of the finding to which they refer, or for such period as to support changes to the audit time periods, whichever is the longer.\r\nNote: \r\nThe quality feedback system may not be contracted to outside persons.\r\nIt is not intended that this QA Program be based on a system of end product inspection, but rather upon periodic verifications of all aspects of the systems and practices used for the control of maintenance to ensure compliance with regulations and with the operator's approved procedures.\r\nThe aim of the program is to provide an unbiased picture of the AMO's performance to verify that activities comply with the MPM and confirm that the systems and procedures described in the MPM remain effective and are achieving the AMO's requirements."]
["MNT","MNT 4.4.1","The Operator should have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs\nmaintenance for the Operator uses maintenance personnel:\n(i) That are appropriately licensed and/or authorized to sign the maintenance release;\n(ii) Whose competence has been established in accordance with a procedure and to a level\nacceptable to the authority granting approval for the maintenance organization.   \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Licensing typically ensures maintenance personnel have met the basic requirements of an applicable\r\nauthority in terms of age, knowledge, experience and, if required, medical fitness and skill, and have\r\ndemonstrated the required knowledge and skill in a manner specified by the authority.\r\nPlanners, mechanics, specialized services personnel, supervisors and certifying personnel are\r\ntypically assessed for competence by an on-the-job evaluation and/or examination relevant to their\r\nparticular job or role within the organization before unsupervised work is permitted.\r\nTo assist in the assessment of competence, job descriptions are recommended for each job role in\r\nthe organization. Basically, the assessment establishes that:\r\n- Planners are able to interpret maintenance requirements into maintenance tasks and have\r\nan appreciation that they have no authority to deviate from the maintenance data;\r\n- Mechanics are able to carry out maintenance tasks to any standard specified in the\r\nmaintenance data and notify supervisors of mistakes requiring rectification to meet required\r\nmaintenance standards;\r\n- Specialized services personnel are able to carry out specialized maintenance tasks to the\r\nstandard specified in the maintenance data and will both inform and await instructions from\r\ntheir supervisor in any case where it is impossible to complete the specialized maintenance\r\nin accordance with the maintenance data;\r\n- Supervisors are able to ensure that all required maintenance tasks are carried out and where\r\nnot completed or where it is evident that a particular maintenance task cannot be carried out\r\nin accordance with the maintenance data, it is to be reported to the responsible person for\r\nappropriate action. In addition, for those supervisors who also carry out maintenance tasks,\r\nthat they understand such tasks are not to be undertaken when incompatible with their\r\nmanagement responsibilities;\r\n- Certifying personnel are able to determine when the aircraft is or is not ready to be released\r\nto service.\r\nKnowledge of organizational procedures relevant to each individual's particular role in the\r\norganization is important, particularly in the case of planners, specialized services personnel,\r\nsupervisors and certifying personnel."]
["MNT","MNT 4.5.1","The Operator shall ensure each maintenance organization that performs maintenance for the Operator has a training program that requires all maintenance personnel to receive initial and recurrent training that is appropriate to individually assigned tasks and responsibilities, and provides maintenance personnel with:\n(i) Knowledge of regulations, standards and procedures in accordance with requirements in the MMM.\n(ii) Knowledge and skills related to human performance, including coordination with other maintenance personnel and/or flight crew. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Human Factors Principles and Human Performance.\r\nThe intent of this provision is for the operator to ensure appropriate initial and recurrent training for maintenance personnel and to ensure such training takes into account the knowledge and skills specified.\r\nMaintenance personnel receive training in human performance to promote an understanding of the human factors (e.g. human capabilities, limitations, and the interface(s) between human and system components) involved in performing maintenance duties and coordinating with other maintenance personnel and/or flight crew. These human factors are taken into account during training to reduce human error in maintenance activities, including activities performed by an external AMO."]
["MNT","MNT 4.5.7","If the Operator uses a maintenance organization that has maintenance personnel taxi the Operator's\naircraft on the movement area of an airport, the Operator should have a process to ensure such\nmaintenance personnel are authorized, competent and qualified to conduct aircraft taxi operations.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation"]
["MNT","MNT 4.8.1","The Operator should   ensure all aircraft in its fleet are equipped with: \n(i) accessible and adequate medical supplies;\n(ii) portable fire extinguishers of a type which, when discharged, will not cause dangerous contamination of the air\nwithin the aeroplane and  at least one shall be located in the pilot's compartment and each passenger compartment that is separate from the pilot's compartment and that is not readily accessible to\nthe flight crew; \n(iii) a seat belt for each seat and a safety harness for each flight crew seat.\nNotes: \n1. \n1. The specifications of this provisions are also applicable for flights such as ferry, maintenance check/test and training.\n2. \n2. Effective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to Annex 6, 6.2.2\r\n Compliance with aviation regulations necessitates the provision of a fully stocked and accessible adequate medical supplies on all flights.\r\nThe first aid kit should include essential medical supplies and equipment according to\r\nRegular inspection and replenishment of the adequate medical supplies are essential to ensure its readiness for use at all times. Ensure that all items are within their expiration dates and replace any items that show signs of wear or deterioration.\r\nThe adequate medical supplies should be easily accessible to crew members and passengers in case of an emergency. Consider storing it in a designated and clearly marked location within the aircraft cabin, such as an overhead bin or a dedicated compartment.\r\nBy adhering to these guidelines, aircraft operators may ensure that they are adequately prepared to handle medical emergencies that may arise during flights, thereby promoting the safety and security of all onboard personnel."]
["MNT","MNT 4.9.1","The Operator shall ensure each maintenance organization that performs maintenance for the Operator provides for the use and guidance of relevant maintenance personnel a Maintenance Procedures Manual (MPM), which may be issued in separate parts, that contains information, as specified in Table 4.9. \n               ",null,"Standard","The MPM is a document that defines how an Approved Maintenance Organization accomplishes and controls its aircraft maintenance activities.\r\nThe MPM provides all personnel of the AMO with the necessary information to enable them to accomplish their duties and allows the Authority to understand and approve how the AMO complies with the applicable Airworthiness Requirements.\r\nThe MPM can comprise one manual or a suite of manuals. The MPM may have specific sections extracted to form a customized manual for distribution to maintenance contractors, line stations and others as applicable.\r\nThe purpose of the MPM is to set forth the procedures, means and methods for the AMO to accomplish maintenance. Compliance with its contents assures fulfillment of the AMO's responsibilities.\r\nThe management section in the MPM may be produced as a stand-alone document and made available to the key personnel who need to be familiar with its contents. The list of AMO Certifying Personnel may be produced as a separate document.\r\nResponsibilities and procedures for revisions to the management part of the MPM and any associated manuals are to be specified.\r\nThe Quality Manager of the AMO is responsible for monitoring revisions of the MPM, unless otherwise agreed by the Authority.\r\nUnless the Authority has agreed via a procedure stated in the amendment section of the MPM that certain defined classes of amendments may be incorporated without prior Authority approval, this process includes monitoring revisions to the associated procedures manuals.\r\nThe MPM also normally contains the following information:\r\n- A brief description of the organization that includes:\r\n- The approximate size of the organization;\r\n- The geographic location of the office facilities and/or the base of operations, when not co-located;\r\n- Where necessary to ensure comprehension, a chart depicting the distribution of the functions.\r\n                        \r\n- A statement signed by the maintenance organization confirming the MPM and any incorporated documents identified therein reflect the Organization's means of compliance with the Authority requirements;\r\n- A description of the maintenance procedures and the procedures for completing and signing a maintenance release when maintenance is based on a system other than that of an approved maintenance organization;\r\n- A description of the procedures for monitoring, assessing and reporting maintenance and operational experience;\r\n- A description of procedures for assessing continuing airworthiness information and implementing any resulting actions;\r\n- A description of the procedures for implementing action resulting from mandatory continuing airworthiness information;\r\n- A description of procedures for ensuring that unserviceable items affecting airworthiness are recorded and rectified;\r\n- A description of the procedures for advising the State of Registry/Authority/operator of significant in-service occurrences;\r\n- A table of contents;\r\n- A description of the MPM amendment control procedure;\r\n- A means of identifying each page of the MPM. This can be in the form of a list of effective pages, with each page numbered and either dated or marked with a revision number;\r\n- A description of the system used to distribute the MPM, including a distribution list; for non-scheduled work, temporary copies of the relevant portions of the MPM or any incorporated reference;\r\n- Where the organization uses standards for the performance of elementary work or servicing different from those recommended by the manufacturer, the identification of those standards;\r\n- Procedures to ensure regulatory information and technical data appropriate to the work performed are used in respect of elementary work and servicing;\r\n- Details of the methods used to record the maintenance, elementary work or servicing performed, including the method of recording of defects in the technical record required by these standards;\r\n- A detailed description of the procedures used to ensure that any maintenance tasks required by the maintenance schedule, airworthiness directives or any task required for the rectification of a defect are completed within the required time constraints;\r\n- A description of the evaluation program required by these standards;\r\n- A description of the defect rectification and control procedures, including details of:\r\n- The methods used to detect and report recurring defects;\r\n- The procedures for scheduling the rectification of defects whose repair has been deferred.\r\n                        \r\n- The procedures used to report service difficulties in accordance with these standards;\r\n- A description of the technical dispatch procedures, including procedures for ferry-flight authorizations, extended range operations (EDTO, ETOPS, EROPS, LROPS), all weather operation or any other special operation;\r\n- Procedures to ensure that only parts and materials that meet the requirements of the State of Registry/Authority/operator are used in the performance of elementary work or servicing, including details of any spare part pool arrangements that have been entered into;\r\n- A description of the methods used to ensure that the personnel authorized to perform elementary work or servicing are trained as required by the Authority and qualified in accordance with these requirements, as applicable;\r\n- A description of personnel records to be retained;\r\n- Details of the procedures applicable to maintenance arrangements and a list of all such arrangements, including the procedure used to communicate to an approved maintenance organization the maintenance requirements for planned and unforeseen maintenance activities, as well as those mandated by airworthiness directives;\r\n- Procedure for revising and maintaining the MPM up to date and current;\r\n- Approval of the Authority through approval of the list of effective pages or, in the case of manuals containing a small number of pages, approval can be identified on each page;\r\n- Procedures used for the storage and control of petroleum, oil and other lubricants, as required by national regulations.\r\n                  "]
["MNT","MNT 4.9.2"," The Operator should ensure: \n(i) each maintenance organization that performs\nmaintenance for the Operator has a process to amend the MPM as necessary to keep the\ninformation contained therein up to date and \n(ii) copies of all amendments to the MPM  are furnished promptly to all organizations or persons to whom the manual has been issued.\nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation"]
["MNT","MNT 4.10.1"," The Operator shall ensure each maintenance organization that performs maintenance for the Operator produces a completed and signed maintenance release that certifies all maintenance work performed has been completed satisfactorily and in accordance with the approved data and procedures described in the MPM of the maintenance organization. Such maintenance release shall include:\n(i) Basic details of the maintenance performed;\n(ii) A reference of the approved data used and, if required, the revision status;\n(iii) Maintenance tasks that were not accomplished;\n(iv) The date maintenance was completed;\n(v) When applicable, identity of the approved maintenance organization;\n(vi) Identity of the person(s) that sign the release. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Maintenance Organization Exposition.\r\nAn operator has the option of defining when the revision status of approved data (that was used during the performance of maintenance) must be included in the maintenance release. The process that defines such requirement is typically documented in the operator's MMM.\r\nA requirement for the documented revision status to be part of the maintenance release might depend on the particular approved data that is referenced. For example, if the Aircraft Maintenance Manual that was used for maintenance is distributed online, there would be an online record of the revision that was available at the time of maintenance, which might obviate the need for that information to be documented in the maintenance release. Conversely, the revision status of certain engineering documents and/or drawings might not be found online or be otherwise available, in which case the operator could opt to require the revision status to be included in the maintenance release for the purpose of ensuring traceability.\r\n                     Aircraft CRS\r\n                  \r\nA Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) is required before flight:\r\n- At the completion of any maintenance package specified by the aircraft operator;\r\n- At the completion of any defect rectification, while the aircraft operates flight services between scheduled maintenance.\r\n                  \r\nThe maintenance package may include any one or a combination of the following elements: a check or inspection from the operator's aircraft maintenance program, Airworthiness Directives, overhauls, repairs, modifications, aircraft component replacements and defect rectification.\r\nNew defects or incomplete maintenance work orders identified during maintenance are brought to the attention of the operator for the specific purpose of obtaining agreement to rectify such defects or complete the missing elements of the maintenance work order. In the case where the aircraft operator declines to have such maintenance carried out and provided this missing element/defect does not affect the airworthiness of the aircraft, this fact is entered in the aircraft CRS before issue of such certificate.\r\n                     Component CRS\r\n                  \r\nA CRS is necessary at the completion of any maintenance on an aircraft component while off the aircraft.\r\nThe authorized release certificate/airworthiness approval tag constitutes the aircraft component certificate of release to service when one AMO maintains an aircraft component for another AMO.\r\nWhen an AMO maintains an aircraft component for use by the organization, an authorized release certificate/airworthiness approval tag may or may not be necessary, depending upon the organization's internal release procedures defined in the maintenance organization exposition and approved by the Authority."]
["MNT","MNT 4.11.1","The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs maintenance for the Operator has procedures to control and document the calibration and records of all tools, including personnel-owned tools, and preventing out-of-service and due-for-calibration tools and equipment from being used, in accordance with specifications in Table 4.10. \n               ",null,"Standard","The control of these tools and equipment requires that the organization has a procedure to inspect/service and, where appropriate, calibrate such items on a regular basis and indicate to users that the item is within any inspection or service or calibration time limit. A clear system of labeling of all tooling, equipment and test equipment is therefore necessary, providing information on:\r\n- \tWhen the next inspection or service or calibration is due;\r\n- \tWhether the item is serviceable or unserviceable and the reason for its unserviceability.\r\n                  \r\nA register is maintained for all precision tooling and equipment together with a record of calibrations and standards used.\r\nInspection, service or calibration of tools and equipment on a regular basis is in accordance with the equipment manufacturer's instructions except where the maintenance organization can justify by means of results that a different time period is appropriate in a particular case. \r\nThe procedural approach complies with the applicable standards of the authority (e.g. US Bureau of Standards or a country's approved standards certificate from the testing facility). "]
["CAB","CAB 1.6.1"," If the Operator conducts passenger flights with cabin crew, the Operator shall have an Operations Manual (OM), which may be issued in separate parts, that contains the policies, procedures and other guidance or information necessary for cabin crew members to perform their duties and be in compliance with applicable regulations, laws, rules and Operator standards. The content of the OM shall be in accordance with specifications in Table 5.1. \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Practical Manual.\r\nThe complete content of the OM for cabin operations may be issued in more than one document or manual. For example, an operator might choose to issue a practical manual, which would be a controlled document and considered part of the OM. A practical manual, which might be referred to as a quick reference handbook (QRH), typically comprises checklists and other selected information and material taken directly from the OM, and is utilized by cabin crew members in performing onboard duties and procedures during normal, abnormal and/or emergency operations.\r\nLikewise, whereas the operational and training areas of cabin operations specified in Table 5.1 are all included in the OM, they are typically issued in separate documents. For example, the cabin crew training program (item vii) might be outlined in a training document, while policies, procedures, checklists are specified in operational documents."]
["CAB","CAB 2.1.1","If the Operator conducts passenger flights with cabin crew, the Operator shall have a cabin crew training program, approved or accepted by the Authority that ensures cabin crew members understand their responsibilities and are competent to perform the duties and functions associated with cabin operations. The cabin crew training program shall also, as minimum, address:\n(i) \tInitial qualification;\n(ii) \tContinuing qualification;\n(iii) \tRe-qualification;\n(iv) If applicable, aircraft transition or conversion;\n(v) \tIf applicable, other specialized training requirements;\n               ",null,"Standard"]
["CAB","CAB 2.1.2"," If the Operator conducts passenger flights with cabin crew, the Operator shall ensure all cabin crew members complete an initial training course:\n(i) As part of the cabin crew qualification process for individuals who have not previously been qualified as a cabin crew member for the Operator;\n(ii)  Prior to being assigned duties as a cabin crew member.\n               ",null,"Standard"]
["CAB","CAB 2.1.3","If the Operator conducts passenger flights with cabin crew, the Operator shall ensure all cabin crew members complete a recurrent training course once every 12 months in order to remain qualified to perform duties as a cabin crew member. \n               ",null,"Standard","An operator typically has a process that tracks qualification requirements to ensure cabin crew members complete recurrent training in a timely manner to remain qualified.\r\nThe nominal cycle for the completion of the recurrent training course by each cabin crew member is 12 months and, during that period, each cabin crew member receives training in the subject areas applicable to the course for that 12-month period.\r\nAs a means of ensuring flexibility in the scheduling process, in some regulatory jurisdictions an operator may be permitted to increase the maximum cycle for the completion of recurrent training by cabin crew members up to 15 months with no change to the original training anniversary date of each cabin crew member. Such flexibility, however, would not alter the requirement for a basic 12-month recurrent training cycle for cabin crew members.\r\nIn the event a cabin crew member becomes unqualified for any reason (e.g., extended leave of absence), completion of re-qualification training would establish a new anniversary date (superseding the original anniversary date) upon which recurrent training would be based."]
["CAB","CAB 2.1.5","If the Operator conducts passenger flights with cabin crew, the Operator shall have aircraft type training, which shall be completed by cabin crew members as part of the process to qualify and remain qualified to perform cabin crew duties on each type of aircraft to which they may be assigned. As a minimum, subjects covered under aircraft type training shall include:\n(i) Aircraft systems;\n(ii) Exit locations and operation;\n(iii) Emergency equipment locations and operation;\n(iv) Emergency assignments;\n(v) Unique features of the aircraft cabin (as applicable for variants of a common aircraft type). \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","An aircraft type training course for cabin crew members would include the description, locations and operation of an aircraft and its equipment.\r\nInstruction in aircraft systems typically includes:\r\n- Aircraft interior, passenger seats and restraints;\r\n- Crew member seats and restraints;\r\n- Aircraft-specific duties and responsibilities;\r\n- Galley systems;\r\n- Communication systems;\r\n- Lighting systems;\r\n- Oxygen systems.\r\n                  \r\nInstruction on exit locations and operation addresses the types of exits on an aircraft.\r\nInstruction on emergency equipment locations and operation addresses slides, rafts, slide/rafts, ramp slide/rafts, life jackets and other flotation devices.\r\nSub-specification (iv): The term \"emergency assignments\" refers to specific duties assigned to cabin crew members during emergency situations.\r\nA process, in accordance with requirements of the Authority, would be utilized to qualify cabin crew members that concurrently operate aircraft of different types or operate variants within one aircraft type. The qualification process would typically address the differences between variants or types."]
["CAB","CAB 2.2.12","The Operator should ensure cabin crew members complete initial and recurrent security training as\napproved or accepted by the State, and in accordance with the Operator's security training program\nas specified in SEC 2.1.1. Cabin crew security training shall address the following subject areas:  \n(i) Determination of the seriousness of any occurrence;\n(ii) Causes of disruptive behavior on board and management of such types of incidents;\n(iii) Crew communication and coordination;\n(iv) Policy and procedures associated with flight deck access;\n(v) Appropriate self-defense responses;\n(vi) Use of non-lethal protective devices assigned to crew members for use as authorized by the\nState;\n(vii) Understanding the behavior of terrorists so as to facilitate the ability to cope with hijacker\nbehavior and passenger responses;\n(viii) Situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions;\n(ix) Flight deck procedures to protect the aircraft;\n(x) Aircraft search procedures;\n(xi) As practicable, guidance on least-risk bomb locations. \nTable: \nConformance Applicability\nSpecific to Aircraft  TypeIncluded in Initial/Requalification TrainingIncluded in Recurrent TrainingConformance  through AQP\nNoYes Yes (every 36 months)Yes\nNotes: \n1. \n1. Cabin crew members shall complete initial security training prior to being assigned to operational duties.\n2. \n2. Effective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Security Program.\r\nCabin crew members are directly involved in the implementation of security measures and thereby\r\nrequire an awareness of obligations to the Security Program of the operator.\r\nCrew security training would normally be in accordance with applicable regulations and/or the civil\r\naviation security program of the State, and where no regulatory guidance exists, in accordance with\r\nthe policy of the operator.\r\nSpecific subject areas included in recurrent security training are typically identified and derived from\r\nan analysis of actual or likely situations or trends experienced during line operations.\r\nFight deck access as specified in item (iv) would typically include persons authorized for flight deck\r\naccess as well as flight deck entry/exit procedures.\r\nNon-lethal devices as specified in item (vi) typically include handcuffs or restraints.\r\nTraining as specified in item (vii) typically addresses topics or tactics as appropriate for the operator\r\nthat might be associated with or could be used to facilitate crew-passenger reaction to or interaction\r\nwith hijackers (e.g. conflict management, use of passive or non-passive cooperation, understanding\r\nStockholm Syndrome, identification of and response to hijacker types/motives).\r\nTraining exercises as specified in item (viii) are typically interactive in nature, and scenarios or\r\nsituations (e.g. bomb threat, hijacking, unruly passenger) may be presented using various accepted\r\ntraining methods (e.g. live role playing, table top, computer-based training).\r\nTraining as specified in item (xi) is applicable to aircraft types that have designated least-risk bomb\r\nlocations."]
["CAB","CAB 3.2.2","If the Operator conducts passenger flights with cabin crew, the Operator shall have procedures to ensure a coordinated and expeditious cabin evacuation during aircraft fueling operations with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking. As a minimum, procedures shall require:\n(i) Cabin exits are designated for rapid deplaning or emergency evacuation, and routes to such exits are unobstructed;\n(ii) The area outside designated emergency evacuation exits is unobstructed;\n(iii) One cabin crew member or other qualified person is positioned by the boarding door(s);\n(iv) Means of communication are established among cabin crew members and with passengers;\n(v) A suitable method of communication is established between qualified persons in a position to monitor passenger safety and personnel that have responsibility for fueling operations. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","During fueling operations with passengers on board the aircraft, the designation of exits for rapid deplaning or evacuation takes into account various factors, which would typically include:\r\n- Aircraft type (e.g. some aircraft types might require the designation of over-wing exits for evacuation);\r\n- Number of cabin crew members on board;\r\n- The method being utilized for passenger boarding and/or deplaning (e.g. boarding bridge, air stairs);\r\n- Exterior obstructions (e.g. catering vehicle) that might render an exit unusable for an emergency evacuation;\r\n- Interior obstructions (e.g. catering trolley) that might block the route to one or more emergency evacuation exits.\r\n                  \r\nCabin crew procedures ensure a method of communication is established.\r\n- Among cabin crew members positioned throughout the cabin for the purpose of coordination should a passenger evacuation be required (when more than one cabin crew member is required to be onboard);\r\n- Between the cabin crew and passengers (one way) for the purpose of providing instructions should a passenger evacuation be required;\r\n- Between the cabin crew and the flight crew (when the flight crew is onboard) for the purpose of ensuring notification when fueling operations are in progress and when a passenger evacuation is required;\r\n- Between the cabin crew and the flight crew and/or ground handling personnel for the purpose of ensuring notification when fueling operations must be discontinued for any reason.\r\n                  "]
["CAB","CAB 3.2.3","The Operator should have a procedure to ensure the cabin crew verifies that:\n(i) Passenger and crew baggage in the passenger cabin is securely stowed;\n(ii) If applicable, cargo packages and/or passenger items being transported in passenger seats\nare properly secured. \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard\n               ",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is for an operator to have a procedure for verification by the cabin crew\r\nthat all baggage and, if applicable, cargo packages and/or passenger items being transported in\r\npassenger seats are stowed or properly secured.\r\nSome operators might transport smaller cargo packages (e.g. mail, COMAT items) secured in cabin\r\npassenger seats.\r\nSome operators might transport certain passenger items secured in cabin passenger seats. These\r\ntypes of items are typically large, valuable or fragile articles belonging to passengers that are not\r\nconducive to transport as checked baggage or appropriate for stowage in overhead bins/lockers (e.g.\r\nlarge musical instruments, certain electronic equipment, prominent trophies, works of art). Such\r\nitems might thus be secured and carried in a dedicated cabin passenger seat (which might be\r\npurchased by the passenger-owner for the purpose of transporting the item)."]
["CAB","CAB 3.2.5","The Operator should require cabin crew members to be seated with their safety harness fastened:\n(i) During the takeoff and landing phases of flight;\n(ii) Whenever the pilot-in-command (PIC) so directs. \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard\n               ",null,"Recomendation","The safety harness consists of the seat belt and shoulder straps."]
["CAB","CAB 3.2.8","If the Operator conducts passenger flights with or without cabin crew, the Operator shall have procedures for providing passengers with instructions for appropriate action in the case of an in-flight emergency situation.",null,"Standard"]
["CAB","CAB 3.4.4","The Operator should have cabin crew procedures that require all passengers to be seated with their\nseat belts (or harness or other restraint provided) fastened:\n(i) For the taxi, takeoff and landing phases of a flight;\n(ii) Prior to and/or during turbulence;\n(iii) When the PIC considers it necessary for the safety of the flight. \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Procedures for turbulence normally require at least one briefing to passengers.\r\nBriefings may be delivered using a variety of methods including passenger announcement,\r\ndiscussion, demonstration, audio/visual media or automated seat messages where such systems\r\nexist. Briefings may be directed to individual passengers, small groups or all passengers\r\nsimultaneously.\r\nOn longer flights where multiple periods of turbulence might occur, operators typically determine a\r\nrequired number and frequency of briefings and/or visual checks by the cabin crew."]
["CAB","CAB 3.4.12","The Operator should  have cabin crew procedures and guidance to ensure passengers are familiar with\nlocation and use of:\n(i) Seat belts;\n(ii) Emergency exits;\n(iii) Life jackets (individual flotation devices), if required;\n(iv) Oxygen masks, where applicable;\n(v) Other emergency equipment provided for individual use, including safety information cards. \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard\n               ",null,"Recomendation","A demonstration video or an announcement on the cabin public address system are methods that\r\nensure passengers are familiar with locations and the use of the specified items.\r\nA safety information card, which is made available to each passenger, is typically used to supplement\r\na demonstration or announcement.\r\nSeat cushions that are designed to float are considered individual flotation devices."]
["CAB","CAB 3.4.15","The Operator should  ensure the immediate availability of procedures and associated checklist(s),\napplicable to each aircraft type, to be used for an in-flight search or inspection to discover concealed\nweapons, explosives, or other dangerous devices when sabotage or other type of unlawful\ninterference is suspected. Such procedures shall contain:\n(i) Guidance for the course of action to be taken if a bomb or suspicious object is found;\n(ii) Least risk location(s) for a bomb or explosives specific to each aircraft type, if so designated\nby the manufacturer. \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard\n               ",null,"Standard","In order to address the need to conduct a timely search or inspection of an aircraft, a checklist or\r\nother form of guidance (e.g. Bomb Threat Search Checklist, Aircraft Search Instructions) applicable\r\nto each aircraft type is immediately available, either located on board the aircraft or readily accessible\r\nthrough other means, for use by the cabin crew or other qualified personnel. Such checklist or\r\ninstructions assist qualified personnel in carrying out a systematic search of the flight deck and/or\r\ncabin during flight to identify suspected or potentially dangerous devices or explosives. Instructions,\r\nwhich are specific to the aircraft type, specify predetermined structurally safe locations to move, if\r\ndeemed appropriate, dangerous or potentially explosive articles. (Note: some aircraft types may not\r\nhave designated least risk locations.)\r\nThe capability to undertake a systematic search for such items on board a cargo aircraft may be\r\ndifficult due to limited access to many parts of the aircraft in flight. Opening containers and accessing\r\npallets of cargo in flight also may not be possible and the availability of flight crew or other trained\r\npersonnel to undertake such a search may be limited."]
["GRH","GRH 1.6.1"," The Operator shall have an Operations Manual, which may be issued in separate parts, that contains the operational policies, processes, procedures and other information necessary for ground handling personnel to perform their duties and be in compliance with applicable regulations, laws, rules and standards of the Operator. \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Operations Manual (OM).\r\nAn OM typically includes guidance that addresses areas generic to all functions within the scope of ground handling operations, as well as parts of the manual that are specific to individual operational functions.\r\nBecause the scope of ground handling operations is broad and varies by operator, rather than publishing one OM just for ground handling, a smaller operator might choose to incorporate the relevant information into a larger, comprehensive OM.\r\nAn operator could also choose to issue the information in separate documents that are each specific to the various ground handling operational functions (e.g. passenger handling, baggage handling, aircraft handling). Each individual document would typically contain generic guidance that is applicable to all ground handling operational functions (e.g., organizational policies, general definitions), as well as guidance that is specific to the particular ground handling function or office location (e.g., process descriptions, standard operating procedures, references to the appropriate regulations and IATA manuals).\r\nThe IGOM contains a core set of operations procedures that may be used by operators in the conduct of ground handling operations.\r\nIf an operator has external organizations conduct ground handling operations functions, such operator would then be expected to have a monitoring and control process to ensure each external organization either uses the OM of the operator or has its own published OM that fulfills operational safety, security and quality requirements of the operator."]
["GRH","GRH 2.1.1","The Operator shall have a process to ensure personnel who perform operational duties in functions within the scope of ground handling operations for the Operator, to include personnel of external service providers, complete:\n(i \n                        Initial training prior to being assigned to perform such operational duties;\n(ii) \n                        Recurrent training on a frequency in accordance with requirements of the regulatory authority but not less than once during every 36-month period except recurrent training in dangerous goods as specified in GRH 2.2.1 or GRH 2.2.2;\n(iii) Re-qualification training applicable to personnel that become unqualified for any reason, prior to being reassigned to perform operational duties.  \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the Applicability box at the beginning of this section for the functions within the scope of ground handling operations.\r\nRequirements for initial and recurrent training apply to all operational ground handling personnel who perform duties within the scope of ground handling operations."]
["GRH","GRH 2.2.1"," If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall have a process to ensure ground handling personnel complete dangerous goods training, to include initial training and recurrent training within 24 months of previous training in dangerous goods. Such training shall be completed by personnel that perform operational duties in the following functions within the scope of ground handling operations:\n(i) Passenger handling;\n(ii) Baggage handling;\n(iii) Aircraft loading;\n(iv) Load control. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","The curriculum for dangerous goods training is determined by the operator and may vary depending on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).\r\nRecurrent training in dangerous goods is completed within a validity period that expires 24 months from the previous training to ensure knowledge is current, unless a shorter period is defined by a competent authority. However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final 3 months of the 24-month validity period, the new validity period may extend from the month on which the recurrent training was completed until 24 months from the expiry month of the current validity period. If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months of the validity period, the new validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent training was completed\r\n                  \r\nRefer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job functions."]
["GRH","GRH 2.2.2","If the Operator does not transport dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall have a process to ensure ground handling personnel receive dangerous goods training, to include initial training and recurrent training within 24 months of previous training in dangerous goods. Such training shall be completed by personnel that perform operational duties in the following functions within the scope of ground handling operations:\n(i) Passenger handling;\n(ii) Baggage handling;\n(iii) Aircraft loading;\n(iv) Load control. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","When an operator does not transport dangerous goods as cargo (i.e. a \"no-carry\" operator), dangerous goods training is still required for ground handling personnel to ensure prohibited dangerous goods are recognized and are not loaded onto an aircraft.\r\nDangerous goods training would be structured to provide the requisite knowledge to permit ground handling personnel to recognize prohibited dangerous goods (whether labeled or not labeled), ensure such dangerous goods are not inadvertently loaded on an aircraft and apply emergency action in the event of contamination or a spill. \r\nThe curriculum for dangerous goods training is determined by the operator and may vary depending on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).\r\n                  \r\nRefer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job functions."]
["GRH","GRH 2.2.3","GRH 2.2.3 The Operator should have a process to ensure initial and recurrent training or recurrent assessment\r\ncompleted by applicable ground handling personnel in accordance with GRH 2.1.1 addresses the\r\nfollowing areas of operations, as applicable to ground handling duties or function(s) performed:\r\n(i) Passenger services;\r\n                     \r\n(ii) Ramp services;\r\n(iii) Load control;\r\n(iv) Aircraft fueling;\r\n(v) Aircraft ground de-/anti-icing. \r\nNote: \r\nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\r\n               ",null,"Recomendation","For additional guidance refer to AHM 1110, Ground Operations Training Program."]
["GRH","GRH 2.2.5","GRH 2.2.5 The Operator should have a process to ensure training for ground handling personnel assigned to\r\nperform aircraft fueling as specified in GRH 2.2.3 includes the following training elements: \r\n(i) Safe operation of equipment;\r\n                     \r\n(ii) Emergency procedures;\r\n(iii) Fuel spillage avoidance response;\r\n(iv) Aircraft fueling and defueling procedures;\r\n(v) Aircraft-specific training. \r\nNote: \r\nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\r\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IATA Guidance Material on Standard Into-Plane Fuelling Procedures as applicable to\r\nfunctions directly involved in aircraft fuelling operations."]
["GRH","GRH 3.2.2","GRH 3.2.2 The Operator shall ensure aircraft arrival procedures are in place that are completed prior to aircraft arrival at the assigned parking gate or stand. Such procedures shall ensure: \r\n(i) The ramp area surface is inspected and is free of:\r\n\t\t\t   \r\n\t\t\t                     \r\n\t\t\t                  \r\n(ii) The aircraft movement path is clear of objects and obstacles;\r\n(iii) Personnel not involved in the aircraft arrival are positioned outside the equipment restraint area (ERA);\r\n(iv) Required GSE is available and positioned clear of the ERA;\r\n(v) The aircraft docking guidance system is operational or, if applicable, marshalling personnel are in place;\r\n(vi) If applicable, wing walkers and/or other applicable personnel are present. \r\n                     \r\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Equipment Restraint Area (ERA) and Foreign Object Debris/Damage (FOD).\r\n                  \r\nAs specified in item (i) (b), snow and ice are ramp surface contaminants that can be hazardous to aircraft ground movement.\r\nDocumented procedures in accordance with IGOM 4.1.1, 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.3.1 will typically demonstrate documental conformity with the specifications in this provision."]
["GRH","GRH 3.3.1","GRH 3.3.1 The Operator shall ensure a Load Control system is in place that provides for:\r\n(i) Aircraft weight and balance conditions that are correct and within limits;\r\n(ii) Aircraft loaded in accordance with applicable regulations and specific loading instructions for the flight;\r\n(iii) Dissemination of dangerous goods and other special load information applicable to each flight;\r\n(iv) Information, to include last minute changes, that is in agreement with the actual load on the aircraft and presented on a final load sheet. \r\n                     \r\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Load, Load Control, Special Load and Weight and Balance Manual (W&BM).\r\nA load planning system typically entails, as a minimum:\r\n- Assemblage of all data relating to the aircraft load (originating and en route stations);\r\n- Planning of the load for ready accessibility;\r\n- Planning of special loads according to restrictions, maximum quantities, separation and segregation requirements;\r\n- Consideration of center of gravity parameters affecting aircraft fuel consumption.\r\n                  \r\nGuidance may be found in AHM 551 and 590."]
["GRH","GRH 3.3.4","GRH 3.3.4 If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator should ensure a process is in place\r\nto provide the pilot-in-command (PIC), as soon as practicable prior to departure of the aircraft, with\r\naccurate and legible written information pertaining to dangerous goods on board the aircraft to be\r\ntransported as cargo. Such notification shall include the following:\r\n(i) If applicable, Air Waybill number;\r\n                     \r\n(ii) Proper shipping name and/or UN/ID number;\r\n(iii) Class or division, and subsidiary hazard(s) corresponding to the label(s) applied, and for\r\nClass 1, the compatibility group;\r\n(iv) If applicable, packing group;\r\n(v) For non-radioactive material, number of packages, exact loading location and, as required,\r\nnet quantity or, if applicable, gross weight of each package, except:\r\n(a) For UN 1845: carbon dioxide, solid (dry ice), UN number, proper shipping name,\r\nclassification, total quantity in each aircraft hold and offload airport;\r\n(b) For UN 3480 (Lithium-ion batteries) and UN 3090 (lithium-metal batteries), only the\r\nUN number, proper shipping name, class, total quantity at each loading location,\r\nand whether the package must be carried on a cargo only aircraft need be provided.\r\nUN 3480 (Lithium-ion batteries) and UN 3090 (lithium-metal batteries) carried under\r\na State exemption must meet all of the requirements of iv) and v).\r\n(vi) For radioactive material, number and category of packages, overpacks or freight containers,\r\nexact loading location and, as applicable, transport index for each package;\r\n(vii) Any restriction for transport on cargo aircraft only;\r\n(viii) Offload airport;\r\n(ix) If applicable, dangerous goods transported under a state exemption;\r\n(x) An indication that aircraft loading personnel observed no evidence of damage to or leakage\r\nfrom packages, or leakage from ULDs, loaded onto the aircraft. \r\nNote: \r\nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\r\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of NOTOC (Notification to Captain) and State.\r\nInformation pertaining to dangerous goods on board the aircraft is typically presented to the PIC in a\r\nnotification called the NOTOC (notification to the captain). The NOTOC contains the detailed\r\ninformation (as specified in this provision) relative to all dangerous goods loaded on the aircraft as\r\ncargo.\r\nInformation contained in the NOTOC may also be used:\r\n- For emergency response to an accident or incident involving dangerous goods on board;\r\n- To provide to air traffic services in the event of an in-flight emergency.\r\nIn the event the NOTOC is of such a size as to make in-flight radiotelephony transmission\r\nimpracticable in an emergency situation, a summary of the information is typically provided to the PIC\r\n(NOTOC Summary), which contains at least the quantities and classes or division of dangerous\r\ngoods in each cargo compartment."]
["GRH","GRH 3.4.1","GRH 3.4.1 The Operator shall have aircraft loading procedures in the OM that ensure: \r\n(i) The cargo hold is inspected before loading to: \r\n                        \r\n                     \r\n(ii) The aircraft is loaded: \r\n                        \r\n                     \r\n(iii) The load is secure and will not move during the flight;\r\n(iv) If applicable, ULD locks are extended and locked. \r\n                     \r\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to IGOM 4.5.9, 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, as well as AHM 514 and 590 for additional guidance."]
["GRH","GRH 3.4.3","GRH 3.4.3 If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure procedures are in place for the transportation of dangerous goods to/from an aircraft and the loading and securing of dangerous goods on an aircraft in a manner that:\r\n(i) Prevents damage to packages and containers during aircraft loading and unloading;\r\n(ii) \tProvides for separation and segregation in accordance with applicable requirements;\r\n(iii) \tPrevents any movement in the aircraft. \r\n                     \r\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to DGR 9.3 for guidance that addresses the the transportation, loading and securing of dangerous goods, and to DGR 10.9 for guidance that addresses securing and separation of radioactive material.\r\nRefer to IGOM 4.5.7.7 for guidance that addresses securing of dangerous goods"]
["GRH","GRH 3.4.4","GRH 3.4.4 If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator should ensure procedures are in\r\nplace that assure, when a dangerous goods package or shipment appears to be damaged or leaking:\r\n(i) The package or shipment is prevented from being loaded into an aircraft;\r\n(ii) If already loaded, the package or shipment is removed from an aircraft;\r\n(iii) In the case of leakage, an evaluation is conducted to identify and prevent from transport any\r\nbaggage, cargo, transport devices or other items that may have become\r\ncontaminated. \r\nNote: \r\nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\r\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to DGR 9.3, 9.4 and 10.9, which contain guidance that addresses apparent damage to\r\ndangerous goods shipments."]
["GRH","GRH 3.4.5","GRH 3.4.5 If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator should ensure procedures are in\r\nplace that require, when an aircraft has been contaminated by dangerous goods leakage:\r\n(i) Hazardous contamination is removed from the aircraft without delay;\r\n(ii) In the case of radioactive contamination, arrangements are made to take the aircraft out of\r\nservice for evaluation by appropriately qualified personnel.\r\nNote: \r\nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\r\n               ",null,"Recomendation"]
["GRH","GRH 3.4.10","GRH 3.4.10 If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator should ensure procedures are in place that prevent dangerous goods from being carried in an aircraft\r\ncabin occupied by passengers, except as permitted by the Authority or the DGR. \r\nNote: \r\nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\r\n               ",null,"Recomendation","In general, dangerous goods are prohibited from being transported in an aircraft cabin occupied by\r\npassengers. Limitations and exceptions are specified in DGR Sections 2 and 9."]
["GRH","GRH 3.4.11","GRH 3.4.11 If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator should ensure procedures are in\r\nplace that prevent dangerous goods from being carried on the aircraft flight deck, except as permitted\r\nby the Authority or the DGR. \r\nNote: \r\nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\r\n               ",null,"Recomendation","In general, dangerous goods are prohibited from being transported on the flight deck of an aircraft.\r\nLimitations and exceptions are specified in DGR Sections 2 and 9."]
["GRH","GRH 4.1.1","GRH 4.1.1 The Operator shall have a process to ensure fuel suppliers are maintaining standards of fuel safety and quality acceptable to the Operator and fuel delivered and loaded onto aircraft is:\r\n(i) Of the correct grade and specification for each aircraft type;\r\n(ii) Free from contamination. \r\n                     \r\n               ",null,"Standard","The intend of this standard is to ensures fuel is stored, handled and serviced in accordance with accepted standards.\r\nApproved fuel specifications are contained in each aircraft manual.\r\nTo ensure fuel corresponds to the specifications and grade of product necessary for the applicable aircraft type(s), a control process is typically in place at each location where the operator has aircraft fueling operations. Such process ensures the existence of periodic inspections of critical aspects of the fuel supply system at each applicable location, to include, as a minimum:\r\n- Fuel facilities;\r\n- Safety and quality procedures;\r\n- Performance levels of personnel.\r\n                  \r\nProcesses for ensuring fuel is of the correct grade and free of contamination may be documented in maintenance, ground operations or flight operations manuals, or in a combination thereof. If the Operator uses biofuels, additional procedures would typically address the related specific requirements (i.e. dedicated infrastructures and blending requirements).\r\nAdditional guidance may be found in the IFQP (IATA Fuel Quality Pool) Quality and Safety Procedures, and in the AEA Recommendations for De-icing/Anti-icing of Aircraft on the Ground."]
["GRH","GRH 4.1.2","GRH 4.1.2 The Operator should ensure, during fuelling operations with passengers embarking, on board or\r\ndisembarking the aircraft, procedures are in place that provide for the designation of a person with\r\nresponsibility for fueling operations and specify the method(s) by which that responsible person:\r\n(i) Communicates with the flight crew or other qualified personnel on board the aircraft;\r\n(ii) Provides notification to the flight crew or other qualified personnel on board the aircraft when\r\na hazardous condition or situation has been determined to exist;\r\n(iii) Provides notification to the flight crew or other qualified personnel on board the aircraft and\r\nother appropriate personnel engaged in aircraft ground handling activities when fueling is\r\nabout to begin and has been completed. \r\nNotes: \r\n1. \r\n1. Notification when fueling is about to begin and has been completed as in iii. maybe replaced by an equivalent procedural means which ensure the flight crew or other qualified personnel on board the aircraft are aware of fueling operations and are in a position to, if necessary, perform an expeditious evacuation of the aircraft.\r\n2. \r\n2. Effective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\r\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Ground handling personnel would typically need to have a clear understanding of all required\r\ncommunication procedures and have the ability to execute such procedures in an expeditious\r\nmanner should a dangerous situation develop.\r\nThe specification in item ii) may be satisfied by either:\r\n- Equivalent procedural means, acceptable to the State and applicable authorities, that would\r\npermit the flight crew or other qualified persons to be aware of the start and completion of\r\nfuelling operations, or\r\n- Procedures established by the operator that would ensure qualified personnel on board the\r\naircraft are continuously in a position to perform an expeditious evacuation of the aircraft for\r\nany reason, including a fuel spill or fire.\r\nSuitable methods of communication with the flight crew or other qualified personnel on board the\r\naircraft include use of the aircraft inter-communication system, direct person-to-person contact or\r\nother methods that ensure direct and timely communication. Use of the aircraft inter-communication\r\nsystem to maintain continuous two-way communication during fuelling operations is not a\r\nrequirement.\r\nThe following roles and main responsibilities of participating personnel typically involve the following:\r\n- Other qualified personnel on board the aircraft remain at a specified location during fuelling\r\noperations and are capable of handling emergency procedures associated with fire\r\nprotection and fire-fighting, and communicating, initiating and directing an evacuation as\r\nspecified by the operator. Such personnel are qualified by the operator to assume and\r\nperform flight crew and/or cabin crew responsibilities and duties during fuelling operations\r\nwith passengers on board the aircraft.\r\n- Flight crew or other qualified personnel on board the aircraft (e.g. cabin crew) are in a\r\nposition to perform an expeditious evacuation of the aircraft and are aware of the state of\r\nfuelling operations. Such qualified personnel are responsible for two-way communication\r\nbeing established and maintained with personnel that are responsible for fuelling operations.\r\n- A person is responsible for supervising fueling operations and maintaining two-way\r\ncommunication with the flight crew or other qualified personnel on board the aircraft (via the\r\naircraft interphone communication system or other suitable means). Such person ensures an\r\nappropriate notification to qualified personnel on board the aircraft when fueling is about to\r\nbegin, has been completed and when a hazardous condition or situation has been\r\ndetermined to exist. Such person also is responsible for communication with other\r\nappropriate personnel engaged in aircraft ground handling activities to ensure safe ramp\r\nconditions are maintained during fueling operations with passengers on board.\r\n- Other appropriate personnel engaged in aircraft ground handling activities are responsible\r\nfor maintaining safe ramp conditions during fueling operations, which includes, but is not\r\nlimited to:\r\n- Embarkation or disembarkation path is not obstructed by GSE;\r\n- Aircraft handling operations do not create a hazard or obstruct emergency exits;\r\n- Ground areas beneath nominated exit doors are kept clear of any obstructions that\r\nwould impede an emergency evaluation.\r\nCriteria that identify the commencement of aircraft fueling typically include conditions such as the\r\nfueling vehicle being in position and bonded to the aircraft and the fueling hose-end nozzle being\r\nconnected to the aircraft fuel adapter. Criteria that identify completion of aircraft fueling typically\r\ninclude conditions such as the hose-end nozzle disconnected from the aircraft fuel adapter, the\r\nhydrant pit/inlet hose is disconnected (if applicable), bonding cables are detached, the fuel receipt\r\n(slip) is processed, there are no leaks or spills identified and the fueling vehicle is ready to leave its\r\nposition (as applicable based on fueling vehicle operator's walk-around check performed).\r\nAdditional guidance may be found in AHM 462 Item 9.5, as well as the ICAO Airport Services\r\nManual, Document 9137 (ASM), Part 1."]
["GRH","GRH 4.1.5","GRH 4.1.5 The Operator should ensure safety procedures associated with aircraft fueling operations are in place\r\nthat assure, during fueling operations with passengers on board the aircraft:\r\n(i) The ground area beneath aircraft exit doors that have been designated for rapid deplaning\r\nor emergency evacuation is kept clear of obstructions;\r\n(ii) Where a boarding bridge is in use, an interior access path is maintained from the aircraft to\r\nthe terminal;\r\n(iii) Where a passenger boarding bridge is not in use, aircraft passenger steps or an alternate\r\nmeans of emergency evacuation is in place. \r\nNote: \r\nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\r\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Integral Airstairs.\r\nWhen deployed, integral airstairs are acceptable as an alternate means of emergency evacuation.\r\nRefer to IGOM 3.2.3 for GSE positioning for aircraft refueling operations. Additional guidance may be\r\nfound in AHM 462, as well as the ICAO ASM, Part 1."]
["GRH","GRH 4.2.1","GRH 4.2.1 If the Operator conducts flights from any airport when conditions are conducive to ground aircraft icing, the Operator shall have a De-/Anti-icing Program, which, if applicable, is approved by the Authority and, as a minimum:\r\n(i) Ensures adherence to the Clean Aircraft Concept;\r\n(ii) Defines responsibilities within the Program;\r\n(iii) Addresses applicable locations within the route network;\r\n(iv) Defines areas of responsibility;\r\n(v) Specifies technical and operational requirements;\r\n(vi) Specifies training and qualification requirements;\r\n(vii) Is applicable to external service providers that perform de-/anti-icing functions for the Operator. \r\n                     \r\n                  \r\nNote: \r\nThe specifications of this provision are also applicable for flights such as ferry, maintenance check/test and training.\r\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of De-/Anti-icing Program and Clean Aircraft Concept.\r\nA de-/anti-icing program would address not only commercial and non-commercial operations at an applicable airport but,  operations such as positioning flights, test flights, training flights and etc. \r\nThe scope and details of a de-/anti-icing program would typically be commensurate with the frequency and complexity of operations at airports with the potential for ground icing conditions.\r\nAdditional guidance may be found in ICAO Doc 9640-AN/940, Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations, Chapter 3, and in SAE AS6285, Aircraft Ground Deicing/Anti-Icing Program. The latter two are used as the basis for inspections conducted under the IATA De-Icing/Anti-Icing Quality Control Pool (DAQCP).\r\n"]
["CGO","CGO 1.6.1","CGO 1.6.1 If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have an Operations Manual (OM), which may be issued in separate parts, that contains the operational policies, processes, procedures and other information necessary to ensure compliance with applicable regulations, laws, rules and standards of the Operator. The content of the OM shall contain standards and guidance that addresses the acceptance, handling, loading, securing and transporting of cargo as specified in Table 7.1. \r\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of High-risk Cargo.\r\nThis provision is applicable to an operator that transports non-revenue cargo. COMAT is non-revenue cargo.\r\nAn OM may include guidance that addresses areas generic to all functions within the scope of cargo operations; other parts of the manual may be specific to individual operational functions.\r\nBecause the scope of cargo operations is broad and varies by operator, rather than publishing a separate OM dedicated to cargo operations (e.g. a Cargo Operations Manual), an operator might choose to publish all guidance for cargo operations in a section of an OM that addresses other types of operations (e.g. maintenance management manual for an operator that transports only COMAT).\r\nAn operator could also choose to issue the information in separate documents that are each specific to the various cargo operations functions (e.g., safety and security, acceptance, physical handling, documentation, identification, storage and stowage, preparation for flight). Each individual document would typically contain generic guidance that is applicable to all cargo operations functions (e.g., organizational policies, general definitions), as well as guidance that is specific to the particular function or office location (e.g., process descriptions, standard operating procedures, references to the appropriate regulations and IATA manuals).\r\nIf an operator has external organizations conduct cargo operations functions, such an operator would then be expected to have a monitoring and control process to ensure each external organization either uses the OM of the operator or has its own published operations manual that fulfills operational safety, security and quality requirements of the operator."]
["CGO","CGO 2.1.1","CGO 2.1.1 If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo and/or mail, the Operator shall have a process to ensure personnel that perform operational duties in functions within the scope of cargo (revenue or non-revenue) operations for the Operator, to include personnel of external service providers, complete:\r\n(i) \r\n                        Initial training\r\n                      prior to being assigned to perform such operational duties;\r\n(ii) \r\n                        Recurrent training on a frequency in accordance with requirements of the regulatory authority but not less than once during every 36-month period, except for recurrent training in dangerous goods as specified in CGO 2.2.1, CGO 2.2.2.\r\n(iii) Re-qualification training applicable to personnel that become unqualified for any reason,\r\nprior to being reassigned to perform operational duties. \r\n                     \r\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the Applicability box at the beginning of this section for the functions within the scope of cargo operations.\r\nRequirements for initial and recurrent training apply to all personnel that perform duties within the scope of cargo handling operations for an operator, both at the main base and all other locations."]
["CGO","CGO 2.2.1","CGO 2.2.1 If the Operator transports dangerous goods as revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a process to ensure personnel assigned the responsibility for accepting dangerous goods complete dangerous goods training, to include initial training and recurrent training, within 24 months of previous training in dangerous goods.\r\n               ",null,"Standard","The curriculum for dangerous goods training for cargo operations personnel is determined by the operator and may vary depending on specific responsibilities and duty function(s). \r\nRecurrent training in dangerous goods is completed within a validity period that expires 24 months from the previous training to ensure knowledge is current, unless a shorter period is defined by a competent authority. However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final 3 months of the 24-month validity period, the new validity period may extend from the month on which the recurrent training was completed until 24 months from the expiry month of the current validity period. If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months of the validity period, the new validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent training was completed.\r\n                  \r\nRefer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job functions."]
["CGO","CGO 2.2.2","CGO 2.2.2 If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, but does not transport dangerous goods, the Operator shall have a process to ensure cargo operations personnel assigned the responsibility for accepting or handling any cargo complete dangerous goods training, to include initial training and recurrent training within 24 months of previous training in dangerous goods. \r\n               ",null,"Standard","When an operator does not transport dangerous goods (i.e. a \"no-carry\" operator), dangerous goods training is still required for cargo operations personnel to ensure declared and undeclared dangerous goods are recognized and prohibited from being carried or loaded onto an aircraft.\r\nDangerous goods training is structured to provide the requisite knowledge to permit cargo operations personnel to recognize dangerous goods, whether labeled or not labeled, and to prevent such dangerous goods from being inadvertently accepted and/or planned for loading into an aircraft.\r\nThe curriculum for dangerous goods training for cargo handling personnel is determined by the operator and may vary depending on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).\r\n                  \r\nRefer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job functions."]
["CGO","CGO 3.1.1","CGO 3.1.1 If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a process to ensure such shipments accepted for transport:\r\n(i) If revenue cargo, are in compliance with standards in the OM as specified in CGO 1.6.1;\r\n(ii) If interline cargo, are in compliance with IATA interline cargo requirements;\r\n(iii) If non-revenue cargo, are in compliance with the OM or equivalent document as specified in CGO 1.6.1. \r\n                     \r\n               ",null,"Standard","Cargo is accepted under the terms of the OM, which typically specifies procedures to ensure acceptance personnel verify the cargo (revenue or non-revenue) has been packed in a manner:\r\n- For safe transport with ordinary care in handling;\r\n- To preclude injury or damage to any person, cargo or property.\r\n                  \r\nAlso, interline cargo typically complies with the applicable requirements of the receiving operator(s).\r\nRefer to the IATA Cargo Services Conference Resolution 660 for guidance pertaining to interline cargo."]
["CGO","CGO 3.2.1","CGO 3.2.1 If the Operator transports dangerous goods as revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a Dangerous Goods Acceptance Checklist that:\r\n(i) Reflects applicable requirements contained in the current dangerous goods regulations.\r\n(ii) Once completed, contains information that identifies the person(s) that performed the acceptance check. \r\n                     \r\n               ",null,"Standard","Sample checklists for non-radioactive shipments, radioactive shipments and dry ice (carbon dioxide, solid) are found in the back of the DGR.\r\nRefer to DGR 9.1.3 for guidance that addresses the Dangerous Goods Acceptance Checklist."]
["CGO","CGO 3.2.2","CGO 3.2.2 If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator should have procedures to ensure\r\nthe use of a Dangerous Goods Acceptance Checklist as specified in CGO 3.2.1 to verify:\r\n(i) Package(s), overpack(s) or freight containers, as applicable, are correctly marked and\r\nlabeled;\r\n(ii) The Shipper's Declaration for Dangerous Goods, if required, or other documentation\r\ncomplies with the requirements of the current edition of the DGR. \r\nNote: \r\nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\r\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Detailed instructions for acceptance and handling of dangerous goods are contained in DGR\r\nSection 9 and Subsection 10.9 for radioactive materials. This information is not to be interpreted as\r\nrequiring an operator to accept or transport a particular article or substance, or as preventing an\r\noperator from imposing special requirements on the transport of a particular article or substance."]
["CGO","CGO 3.2.4","CGO 3.2.4 If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator should have procedures to ensure\nany package, overpack, freight container, or ULD containing dangerous goods is inspected and is not\naccepted, unless:                  \n(i) Properly marked and labeled;\n(ii) There is no leakage;\n(iii) Its integrity has not been compromised. \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","Detailed instructions for acceptance and handling of dangerous goods are contained in DGR\r\nSection 9 and Subsection 10.9 for radioactive materials. This information is not to be interpreted as\r\nrequiring an operator to accept or transport a particular article or substance, or as preventing an\r\noperator from imposing special requirements on the transport of a particular article or substance."]
["SEC","SEC 1.2.1","SEC 1.2.1 The Operator shall have a formal Air Operator Security Program (AOSP) that includes:\n(i) The requirements of the civil aviation security program of the State of the Operator (hereinafter, the State);\n(ii) Applicable requirements of other states where operations are conducted;\n(iii) The security standards of the Operator. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Act of Unlawful Interference, State, State Acceptance and State Approval.\r\nAn operator is required to have an AOSP in order to:\r\n- Protect customers, personnel and assets from any act of unlawful interference;\r\n- Comply with regulatory requirements.\r\n                  \r\nThe name of an operator's security program may vary based on the regulatory jurisdiction. Examples of typical alternative names to AOSP include ACSP (Air Carrier Security Program) and ASP (Airline Security Program).\r\nThe Security Program may be structured in accordance with the template provided by the State of the Operator or other relevant state (where operations are conducted).\r\nThe State may issue a standard security program with which all operators must comply (operators may apply for exemptions or amendments, as applicable). In such cases, the standard security program of the State is typically recognized as the AOSP of the operator. The AOSP typically also includes other company manuals and procedures that provide carrier-specific details.\r\nA standard security program may be acceptable in meeting security requirements of other states, or the operator may be required to submit individual security programs tailored to meet requirements of other states. An operator must satisfy the security requirements of all applicable states for the purpose of meeting the intent of this standard.\r\nThe AOSP may be approved or accepted (i.e. no notice of deficiency or equivalent is issued) by the relevant state.\r\nThe AOSP may include security sensitive information as required by the State. In such case, the AOSP would normally include a description of dissemination of security sensitive information in a way that ensures the required level of data protection. "]
["SEC","SEC 1.5.3","If permitted by the State, the Operator shall ensure a process has been established that requires operational security personnel in the organization of the Operator and, if applicable, service providers selected by the Operator to conduct operational security functions, to be subjected to pre-employment and recurring background checks in accordance with requirements of applicable aviation security authorities. The requirement for a background check shall be applicable to personnel who: \n(i) Engage in the implementation of security controls;\n(ii) Have unescorted access to the security restricted area of an airport;\n(iii) Have unescorted access to other security areas and searched aircraft;\n(iv) Have access to sensitive aviation security information. \n                     \n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Security Control and Security Restricted Area. \r\nA background check might include: \r\n- Criminal record check;\r\n- Previous employment history;\r\n- \tPersonal references;\r\n- Education and training.\r\n                  \r\nNational legislation on civil liberties and protection of personal information will greatly influence the limits placed on an employer when performing pre-employment background checks. An employer is not permitted to deviate from the laws of the country where the hiring process is taking place. \r\nEscorted access may be provided to an individual that has yet to complete all aspects of the background checking process.\r\nAn individual currently permitted unescorted access to a security restricted area, but who subsequently fails to satisfy the criteria to continue to hold an airport identification card or for unescorted access to a security restricted area, will typically have access to security restricted areas, as well as access to sensitive aviation security information, revoked immediately. \r\nThe operator's role in the background check process will be determined by the State. In some cases, the entire process will be managed and/or conducted by the State. "]
["SEC","SEC 1.7.1","The Operator shall have a Security Manual or equivalent document that provides guidance for the implementation of the AOSP to ensure applicable personnel have the direction necessary to implement security measures. \n               ",null,"Standard","An operator may have more than one security manual (e.g. where security responsibilities are delegated to various departments or by geographic locations, each with distinct security requirements). All documents comprising an operator's security manual (or equivalent document) are considered controlled documents.\r\nThe content of the security manual (or equivalent document) typically addresses the following subject areas, as applicable to the operator's type(s) of operations conducted and specific security requirements:\r\n- Definitions of technical terms associated with the AOSP;\r\n- Authority and applicability of the AOSP;\r\n- Recruitment and training of operational security personnel;\r\n- Security threat assessment;\r\n- Movement of aircraft and evacuation of passengers following bomb alerts;\r\n- Security crisis management plans at airports served;\r\n- Scrutiny of electronic items in the aircraft cabin and in checked baggage (based on threat level);\r\n- Segregation of departing passengers in airport facilities;\r\n- Public awareness of security;\r\n- Detection equipment and technology;\r\n- Passenger risk assessment and enhanced screening;\r\n- Security of checked baggage;\r\n- Screening of checked baggage;\r\n- Security of cargo, express parcels and mail;\r\n- One-stop security;\r\n- Measures for addressing unruly passengers.\r\n                  "]
["SEC","SEC 2.1.1","The Operator shall have a security training program that includes initial and recurrent training, and is in accordance with requirements of all applicable state(s). The security training program shall have a balanced curriculum of theoretical and practical training to ensure:\n(i) Personnel, employed by or under the control of the Operator who implement security controls, have the competence to perform their duties;\n(ii) Flight and cabin crew members and frontline aircraft ground handling and cargo handling personnel are able to act in the most appropriate manner to minimize the consequences of acts of unlawful interference and/or disruptive passenger behavior. \n                     \n                 \nNotes: \n1. If permitted by the State, the program shall ensure applicable personnel have completed appropriate security background checks in accordance with SEC 1.5.3 prior to attending any training that contains sensitive or restricted security information.\n2. Applicable personnel shall complete initial security training prior to being assigned to operational duties\n               ",null,"Standard","Training may be sub-divided for line managers/supervisors, aircrew, ramp workers, cargo personnel and other personnel who are directly involved in the implementation of security measures and thereby require an awareness of obligations to the AOSP.\r\nThe security training program is typically integrated into the normal training curriculum for operational personnel, and need not be stand-alone training.\r\nThe proportion of theoretical and practical training is typically based on requirements of the State. For certain functions or duties there may not be a practical component.\r\nThe scope of recurrent security training, as well as the specific subject matter included, may vary in accordance with requirements of the applicable authorities and the security policy of the operator.\r\nAn existing background check from a previous employer may be acceptable if still time valid. \r\nDifferent training tools for security awareness and security incident reporting have been developed by states and the Industry. The use of IATA's \"See it Report it\" training and certification tool is one method for the operator to demonstrate conformity with the relevant specification in this provision. (https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/security/Pages/security-management-system-sems.aspx) "]
["SEC","SEC 3.4.1"," If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure originating passengers and their cabin baggage are subjected to screening prior to boarding a passenger aircraft for;\n(i) An international flight;\n(ii) As required by the applicable aviation security authority, a domestic flight. \n                     \n                 \nNote: \nSupernumeraries that require a flight reservation or passenger name record for transport on the aircraft shall be subjected to the requirements of this provision unless exempted by the State.\n               ",null,"Standard","Refer to the IRM for the definition of Domestic Flight.\r\nThe effective screening of all passengers and their cabin baggage is recognized as an essential element in achieving a safe and secure operation, and forms part of the passenger handling procedures contained in the AOSP.\r\nTechnical equipment used for the screening of persons and baggage has certain limitations. Archway metal detectors and hand-held metal detectors, for example, cannot detect non-metallic weapons and explosives. Even conventional X-ray equipment does not always image or define explosive material effectively. To compensate for such limitations, or to introduce a random element into the selection process, it may be advisable to conduct an additional search of passengers and cabin baggage after they have been screened. The additional screening can be performed by hand or by technical means, such as explosive trace detection (ETD), full-body X-ray, explosive particle or vapor detection portals and/or other approved advanced technological methods.\r\nIt is recommended that screening equipment used to assist screening personnel is capable of detecting explosive materials and/or explosive devices that might be carried by passengers either on their person or in cabin baggage.\r\nIf the use of explosive detection screening equipment is not continuous, then it is recommended that such equipment be used on a random basis to ensure non-predictability by passengers and others. \r\nSpecific guidelines and procedures are developed and training given to personnel, for addressing persons with special needs."]
["SEC","SEC 3.7.1"," If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a process to ensure cargo shipments for transport on all flights have been subjected to the appropriate security controls, including screening where required, as established by the applicable state(s) prior to being loaded onto an aircraft.",null,"Standard"]
["SEC","SEC 4.3.2","The Operator should have a process that ensures notification to the applicable aviation security authorities when an act of unlawful interference against the Operator, a reportable security incident and/or a reportable security occurrence has been identified. \nNote: \nEffective 1 April 2025, this Recomendation will be upgraded to a standard.\n               ",null,"Recomendation","The intent of this provision is for an operator to have procedures in place to immediately notify local\r\nsecurity and civil aviation authorities and to provide information relevant to credible threats and acts\r\nof unlawful interference. An operator would typically have contact information and checklists readily\r\navailable for this purpose.\r\nProcedures typically specify an initial verbal notification followed by a written notification.\r\nProcedures typically specify an initial verbal notification followed by a written notification."]

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["List of Document References"]
["Please provide a list of all controlled manuals/ documents which have been used as reference in this form  and choose the ISSA discpline in which the manuals/ documents are used."]
[]
["Manuals/ Documents Reviewed","Acronyms","Version/ Revision","Documentation Type\n(see \"Electronic Documentation\" in IRM)","Date","ORG","FLT","DSP","MNT","CAB","GRH","CGO","SEC"]
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[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Type 2"]
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[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Type 1"]

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["Select Yes or No"]
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["Select Yes or No"]
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