Cyber Aircraft Incident – Part 1

Co-Chairs:

- Reid Sawyer (Marsh USA) and Steve Lloyd (JLT)

Panelists:

- John Bayley (McLarens)
- Elmarie Marais (Go Crisis)
- Jette Varnals (AXA/XL)
- Theresa Gallagher (Global aerospace)
- Peng Lim (Kennedys)
- Rob Lawson (Clyde and Co.)
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Scenario Part 1

INCIDENT TAKES PLACE

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International flight/strict and (effectively) unlimited pax liability.

Passenger manifest multinational including multiple US citizens and therefore various jurisdictions.

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Scenario Part 2

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- PR – how this is all managed especially as the narrative develops and changes in terms of the cause of loss and the wider implications . (What the airline has to do next to limit the damage (alert all authorities, airlines, manufactures etc.)

- PR and interaction with the authorities/intelligence services etc.

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Update ISAGO/IOSA

Catalin Cotrut
Director Audit Programs
Safety & Flight Operations

IATA SAFETY AUDIT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS

IATA

IATA Integrated Solution for Ground Operat



Risk management is the key to connecting the critical components in ground operations

Management of Safety

- 2016-2019 ISAGO strategy to implement full SMS
- All SMS provisions now standards
- Compliant with ICAO SMS for air & aerodrome operators
- ISAGO audits assess SMS implementation
- ISAGO assessment in airline risk management

Management Systems

- ISAGO Headquarters audits assess corporate management & oversight of ground operations at all stations
- Includes corporate management of development and implementation of processes & procedures
- ISAGO Station audits assess implementation and compliance with corporate processes & procedures

Standardization

- ISAGO standards founded on industry best practices
  - IGOM, AHM and IATA cargo best practices/regulations incorporated
  - Updated annually
- Complementary to IOSA standards for ground & cargo operations

ISAGO – New Model first year facts and figures



47 CoPA members
56 Candidate Auditors

CHARTER OF PROFESSIONAL AUDITORS MEMBER
IATA
ISAGO

IATA

ISAGO Registration – Current Status

- 184 GSPs ISAGO Registered
  - operating at 311 stations at
  - 212 airports worldwide

New ISAGO Registry



ISAGO 2019

- Similar expectations to 2018
- About 300 audits (over 50 new locations)
- Board of Governors request to explore potential mandate of ISAGO for IATA member airlines

ISAGO – next steps

- ISAGO Strategy
  - Program promotion and growth
  - Standardization, auditing consistency and focus on Auditor performance
  - Program's success measure
- Digital transformation
- Move towards assessing SMS effectiveness

ISAGO – GSP Insurance Cover

- Review completed
  - Aviation third party risks
  - ISAGO liabilities
- Incorporation of insurance pro forma in Audit Agreement

IATA OPERATIONAL SAFETY AUDIT

Statistics - IOSA Registered Airlines

13 May 2019

IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA)

430

Total IOSA Registered Airlines

0.98

Global Accident Rate in 2018 for IOSA Operators

Accidents per million sectors



32%

Non-IATA Members on IOSA Registry

0.09

Global Fatal Accident Rate in 2018 for IOSA Operators

Accidents per million sectors

2018


Accidents per Million Sectors
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
3.5
1.5
1.7
2.2
9.1
2.4
1.1
0.7
5.9
0.8
1.4
0.6
1.6
0.7
0.0
0.4
2.2
1.0
AFI
ASPAC
CIS
EUR
LATAM
MENA
NAM
NASIA
WORLD
Non-IOSA
IOSA
Sector Distribution


Jet and Turboprop | All Accidents
Accidents per Million Sectors
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
-
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Industry
IATA
Non-IATA
IOSA
Non-IOSA

IOSA Audit and Avr. Number of Findings



IATA

IOSA reducing redundant industry audits



IOSA 2019

- Continue Digital Transformation – Focus on Data Analytics
- Implementation of “Auditing the Effectiveness”
  - Flight Data Analysis
  - Risk Assessment and Mitigation
  - Monitoring of Wet-Lease, Code-share, etc.



Thank you

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Keynote Speaker:
Robert Webb QC, Chairman of Darktrace Ltd.

Terrorism Panel

Chair:

- Yann Bissuel, Reunion Aerienne & Spatiale

Additional Expertise: Jette Varnals (AXA/XL), Bruce Carman (Hive Aero), Tarquin Follis (Othrys Ltd.)

Panelists:

- Lucy Bradshaw (JLT Speciality)
- Lottie Catto (Hiscox)
- Danny Spender (Control Risks)
- Joseph Smith (Control Risks)
- Nick Powis (World Aware)

Cyber Risks - Looking Forward - Panel of experts discussion on what the future may hold

Chair:

- Elizabeth Holton (IATA)

Panelists:

- Mike Beck (Darktrace)
- Robert Webb
- Pascal Buchner (IATA)
- Nick Humphrey (Kennedys)
- Tarquin Follis (Othrys Ltd.)
- Joseph Smith (Control Risks)

Thank you to our Sponsors

IATA