## Table 3.2.1—Categories of Aviation Security Occurrences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed security descriptors</th>
<th>Proposed explanation of the descriptor</th>
<th>Operational descriptors</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 1 Landside protection          | Any actual or potential threat situation against passengers, crew or infrastructure occurring in a public area at an airport terminal or in the public area adjacent to the terminal. This includes the airport terminal, parking lots, adjacent hotels and airport access roads. | • Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (IED)  
• Person-borne IED  
• Armed attack  
• Unattended/suspicious baggage  
• Chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) attack |
<p>| 2 Landside–perimeter          | Any actual or potential threat situation against passengers, crew or airport infrastructure occurring around an airport or in relation to critical infrastructure located adjacent to the airport perimeter. Notes: Catering and other in-flight supplies are covered in the category “In-flight supplies protection”. Fuel supplies are covered in the category “Airport supplies protection”. | • Other perimeter airside boundary areas |</p>
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| **3** General environment     | Any actual or potential threat situation occurring in the city or within a State’s territory, including—but not limited to-hotels and public transport infrastructure (i.e., terrorist and lone wolf/active shooter attacks, protests, civil unrest, armed conflicts, availability of surface-to-air missiles and firearms). | • General threat—City  
• General threat—Hotel  
• General Threat—State |
| **4** Crew protection         | Any actual or potential threat situation occurring in the city or within a State’s territory that may impact carrier crew and/or local aviation industry employees (e.g., at hotels, restaurants, shuttles). This includes transport and accommodation insecurity. | • Crew (layover) unsecure accommodation and/or transportation |
| **5** Controlled areas        | Unauthorized person in the airside (other than security-restricted area) or aircraft maintenance area. Unauthorized access to air carrier materials or check-in system, including falsified boarding card (or equivalent). Violation or vulnerability related to the perimeter, including breach or attempted breach of the perimeter, or malfunctioning or improperly functioning equipment used for perimeter protection. | • Perimeter protection  
• Unauthorized access  
• Air carrier materials or check-in systems |
| **6** Security-restricted areas | Any actual or potential incident or vulnerability with authorized access to the security-restricted area, including not following the airport identification (badge system) rules (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision) as well as access control and airport badge system issues. | • No/Not-valid/Not-visible identification card  
• Airport badge issues  
• Access control system issues |
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| **7** Passenger and cabin baggage screening | Any actual or potential situation where screening rules where not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision) or a credible threat (e.g., weapons, ammunition, explosives) has been detected during the passenger screening. This includes malfunctioning or improperly functioning equipment. Additionally, any actual or potential situation of contact between screened and unscreened passengers, including infrastructure-related issues as well as situations where procedures were not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision). | • Prohibited articles  
• Screening deficiencies  
• Passengers mixing |
| **8** Staff and crew screening | Any actual or potential situation where screening rules where not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision) or a credible threat (e.g., weapons, ammunition, explosives) has been detected during staff (including crew) screening. This includes malfunctioning or improperly functioning equipment as well as issues related to background check/vetting procedures. | • Prohibited articles  
• Screening deficiencies  
• Failure of vetting/ background checks |
| **9** Aircraft access control | Any actual or potential uncontrolled or unauthorized access to the aircraft cabin or hold, including failure to execute required aircraft safeguarding measures (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision). | • Aircraft not secured  
• Unauthorized aircraft access  
• No/Not-valid/Not-visible identification card |
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| 10 Aircraft security search/check | Any actual or potential situation where a credible threat (e.g., weapons, ammunition, explosives) has been found on the aircraft (including in the holds) during or after the security search/check has been completed. Also, situations where procedures were not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision) as well as malfunctioning or improperly functioning equipment. | • Suspicious object found  
• Deficient aircraft security search/check |
| 11 Hold baggage reconciliation | Any actual or potential situation where unauthorized unaccompanied hold baggage may have been transported, including situations where procedures were not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision). | • Hold baggage acceptance (on/off airport)  
• No-show or withdrawn passenger bag processing  
• Bags loaded onto an incorrect aircraft |
| 12 Hold baggage screening | Any actual or potential situation where screening rules were not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision) or a credible threat (e.g., weapons, ammunition, explosives) has been detected during the hold baggage screening. This includes malfunctioning or improperly functioning equipment. | • Prohibited articles  
• Screening deficiencies |
| 13 Hold baggage protection | Any actual or potential situation where unauthorized access to hold baggage may have occurred, including situations where procedures were not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision). | • Hold baggage protection |
| 14 Cargo and mail acceptance | Any actual or potential violation of acceptance procedures, especially the verification of the secure supply chain of custody, including situations where procedures were not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision). | • Cargo security documentation |
## CATEGORIES OF AVIATION SECURITY OCCURRENCES

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| 15 Cargo and mail screening   | Any actual or potential situation where screening rules were not followed or a credible threat has been detected during the cargo or mail screening. This includes a malfunctioning or improperly functioning of equipment as well as situations where procedures were not followed, e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision (e.g., sealing discrepancies or deficient security during the transport). | • Prohibited articles  
• Screening procedures not followed |
| 16 Cargo and mail protection | Any actual or potential situation where unauthorized access to secured cargo or mail may have occurred. This includes warehouse access, malfunctioning or improperly functioning of equipment as well as situations where procedures were not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision). | • Secure cargo/mail protection  
• Unauthorized cargo/mail warehouse access |
| 17 In-flight supplies security controls | Deficiencies and threats reported regarding catering and other in-flight suppliers’ security procedures, including facility access control, supplies identification and screening (where applicable). This includes malfunctioning or improperly functioning equipment as well as situations where procedures were not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision). | • In-flight supplies facility access control violation  
• Prohibited articles  
• Security controls deficient or violation |
<p>| 18 In-flight supplies protection | Any actual or potential situation of tampering with in-flight supplies (including catering). This includes malfunctioning or improperly functioning safeguarding equipment (e.g., seals) as well as situations where procedures were not followed, for example due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision (e.g., sealing discrepancies or deficient security during the transport). | • Protection procedures deficient or violation |</p>
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| 19 Airport supplies security controls | Deficiencies or threats reported regarding security procedures for airport supplies, including facility access control, supplies identification and screening (where applicable). This includes malfunctioning or improperly functioning equipment as well as situations where procedures were not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision). | • Airport supplies facility access control violation  
• Prohibited articles  
• Security controls deficient or violation |
| 20 Airport supplies protection       | Any actual or potential situation of tampering with airport supplies. This includes malfunctioning or improperly functioning safeguarding equipment (e.g., seals) as well as situations where procedures were not followed, for example due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision (e.g., sealing discrepancies or deficient security during the transport). | • Protection procedures deficient or violation |
| 21 Insider threats                   | Suspicious or illegal activity executed by an individual who is a direct employee or subcontractor. | • Active insider  
• Passive insider |
| 22 Unruly/intoxicated passenger     | Any situation where a person fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on board an aircraft, including not following the instructions of airport staff or crewmembers, or disturbing the good order and discipline at an airport or on board an aircraft. This includes situations both on the ground and in flight. | Separate classification based on IATA/ICAO unruly passenger classification. See the IATA Cabin Operations Safety Best Practices Guide. |
| 23 Sabotage or damage on the ground | Any actual or suspected situation where a hijack, bomb, device or substance threat has been received when the affected aircraft was still on the ground (e.g., CBR agents, surface-to-surface missiles, falsified signoff). This includes sabotage activities. | • Bomb threat on the ground against aircraft  
• Other substance or object  
• Falsified/corrupted sign off |
### CATEGORIES OF AVIATION SECURITY OCCURRENCES

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| 24 In-flight measures         | Any actual or suspected situation where a hijack, bomb, device, or substance threat has been received when the affected aircraft was airborne/in flight, (e.g., CBR agents or surface-to-air missiles, flight deck door issues, military activity affecting airspace). | - Bomb threat in flight  
- Hijack in flight  
- Other substance or object (CBR) in flight  
- Surface-to-air-missiles  
- Military activity  
- In flight security officers (IFSO or sky marshals)  
- Breaches of flight deck access policy |
| 25 Weapons and armed individuals transportation | Any actual or potential situation of unauthorized transport of weapons or armed individuals. This includes where procedures were not followed (e.g., regarding incorrect packaging or documentation due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision). | - Weapon/ammunition in cabin  
- Weapon/ammunition in hold (unauthorized or procedure violation) |
| 26 Unmanned aerial vehicles   | Threat posed by a drone or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) being used to endanger the safety of aircraft, passengers or airport infrastructure. | - Near miss/encounter  
- Strike/collision  
- UAV-caused threat against airport infrastructure,  
- UAV caused threat against aircraft  
- UAV caused threat against passengers  
- Sighting |
| 27 Other criminal acts         | For example: narcotics/money smuggling, human trafficking, theft on the ground and/or in flight. Additionally, any actual or potential illicit access to security information, which may result in an act of unlawful interference. | - Security Information  
- Illegal substance (drugs)  
- Money laundering/transmitting  
- In-flight theft  
- Airline property theft |
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| 28 Passenger acceptance       | Any actual or potential violation of acceptance security procedures (e.g., watch list matching, not submitting required passenger data, violation of deportee/escorts (DEPA), unescorted deportees (DEPU), and inadmissible passenger (INAD) transportation procedures, unmanifested passengers, incorrect passenger data). This includes improper functioning of equipment as well as situations where procedures were not followed (e.g., due to insufficient or lack of training or supervision). | • Failure to check documentation  
• Passenger accepted under wrong PNR  
• Boarding pass discrepancy  
• Travel document discrepancy  
• Deportee/Escorts (DEPA)  
• Unescorted deportee (DEPU)  
• Inadmissible (INAD)  
• Person in custody |
| 29 Cyber security             | Any actual or potentially illicit access to the network of security equipment or primary operational systems. This includes hardware and software access control regarding aircraft, airport and air traffic management (ATM) safety or security-critical systems (e.g., flight planning, preparation, communication). | Under development |

Source: IATA

Collecting data from reports is a valid starting point and an essential contributor to an ongoing security risk assessment (IOSA SEC 1.12.1 and 1.12.2). The risk assessment process described in Section 5 of this manual could be adapted and used by individual entities for purposes of security report analysis. The figure below illustrates the process of report analysis: