

The Possibilities with Good Data

Nancy Rockbrune Head, Safety Management



ICAO SMM











Data Sources

- ↗ Mandatory reporting systems
- ↗ Voluntary reporting systems




Data Sources

Note 1.— SDCPS refers to processing and reporting systems, safety databases, schemes for exchange of information, and recorded information including but not limited to:

- a) data and information pertaining to accident and incident investigations;
- b) data and information related to safety investigations by State authorities or aviation service providers;
- c) mandatory safety reporting systems as indicated in 5.1.2;
- d) voluntary safety reporting systems as indicated in 5.1.3; and
- e) self-disclosure reporting systems, including automatic data capture systems, as described in Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 3, as well as manual data capture systems.

Annex 19, 2nd Ed.







Use of Data

- Conduct analysis on clean defensible data / information
 - Identify hazards and risks
 - Prioritize risks and subsequent actions to mitigate
 - Measures process performance
 - Identify and prioritize contributing factors to process performance
 - Measure and predict process performance improvements
- ↗ Communicate findings as appropriate



Data Management Principles

- Managing by averages leads to flawed decision making not accounting for process variation
- ↗ If measurement system variation is too large there is an increased risk of:
 - Rejecting good data
 - Accepting bad data
- Important to know how much of the observed variation of a process is due to the actual process itself



Data Management Principles

- Operational definitions (includes taxonomies) help reduce subjectivity and variance in a measurement system (data)
- ↗ Operational definitions can be:
 - A written statement
 - Templates
 - Display of comparisons (colour chart)
- ↗ Operational definitions should be:
 - Something people can really use
 - Enables different people to reach the same conclusion (repeatability)
 - Enables the same person to reach the same correct conclusion at different times (reproducibility)



Taxonomy / Operational Definitions

- ↗ Controls data inputs
- → Reduce subjectivity
- ↗ Reduce variation
- ↗ Means for integration (internal and external)

5.1.5 **Recommendation**.— The safety database should use standardized taxonomy to facilitate safety information sharing and exchange.

Annex 19, 2nd Ed.



Measuring Safety Performance ~ SPIs

- ↗ Set measureable (SMART) safety objectives
 - Verify safety performance
 - Validate effectiveness of safety risk controls
- ↗ Track performance
- ↗ Compare against targets
- ↗ Achievement of a target consequently represents an improvement in performance



Metrics

- Typically focused on number of serious accidents / incidents
- ↗ High profile
- ↗ Reactive
 - Does not expose systemic issues or hazards










System Approach

- ↗ Managing at the process level is the basis of a "System" approach
- Considers all processes, their interrelationships and interactions



System Approach

- ↗ Direct relationship between inputs and outputs
- Therefore to improve the output, changes or improvements to the inputs are required






Control Charts

- ↗ Displays the control of a process
 - In control process shows random variation
 - Out of control process shows unusual variation due to special causes
- Help to determine where to focus problem-solving efforts by distinguishing between common and special-cause variation



Sample ~ Control Chart



Upper Control Limit (UCL)


Centre Line

Lower Control Limit (LCL)



Sample ~ Probability Chart

- ↗ Measure process improvements
- If distributions are normal can estimate the performance if new procedures are put in place






Why is Process Control Important?


- ↗ Higher quality
- ↗ Increased efficiency


- ↗ Leaner organization
- ↗ Performance goals tied to business priorities
- ↗ Performance competencies ~ tools used to achieve goals





Process Control Example ~ ELC














Process Control ~ Example

Xbar/R Chart for ELC_Diff by B/A





Other Examples


- ↗ Unstable approach criteria
 - Studies being made to evaluate the FSF initiative to reduce the height to 300ft before Go-Arounds
 - Data will identify if feasible or not
- ↗ RNAV vs Visual Approach
 - Comparing the approach tracks and monitor how many flights flying visual app vs RNAV results in Go-Arounds
 - Airline can then quantify the cost, review their processes

WHAT DATA AND INFORMATION



Proactive Shift

- ↗ SPIs measure performance of safety controls
 - Preventative
 - Recovery
- ↗ Shift focus to precursors





Sample SPI

IATA SPI GROUP: Draft SPI Candidate


SPI / Safety Objective (SO)	Long Landing
Area of Safety Concern	Organizational
Safety Aim	Zero instances of long landings
Definition(s)	Threshold \sim touchdown >x m from runway threshold
	Distribution ~ distance from runway threshold at landing
Possible	FDM (High)
Data/Information Source(s) & (Expected	Touchdown point
Reliability for Source)	Length of Runway
SPI Data Source(s)	Distance from runway threshold at landing
Reporting Period and Interval	As determined by operator
Output format	As determined by operator
Alert Level	Each operator to determine their own alert level
Safety Performance Target	Each operator to determine their own target
Safety Action Plan(s)	Each operator to determine their own safety action plan.
Notes	Can do comparisons if carriers have same threshold limits



Sample SPI ~ Long Landing

↗ Identify touchdown points of ALL flights








Example ~ Long Landing

Identify touchdown points of ALL flights








Sample FDM Parameters

SPIs	FDM PARAMET	ERS					1														2
	Speed over the threshold	Speed on ground	Autopilot disengage	Attitude	AoA	Pitch	Bank angle	G forces	Flap settings	Landing gear	Spoller position	Aircraft weight	Center of gravity	Touch-down point	Breaking, action	General landing configuration (flap/gear/alt imeter etc. settings)		Course deviation/cor rection	Proximity to another aircraft	EGT (exhaust gas temperature) or RPM	Application (reverse thrust
Long Landing	X		(2	X		X			X			X	X	X		X	Х	3		Č.	
Runway End Zone Ground Speed	X	Х	Х	Х		Х			X			X	Х	X	X		Х				Х
Runway Turn-Off Speed		Х					1				X				X			X	2	<u>.</u>	X
Sink Rate Before Touch Down	X	A.000			Х	Х			X		X	X	Х		<u> </u>		Х				
Tail Clearance at Take-Off		X	in marana a	aacoomi		X		basasasticaen	X	an menonono re	0000022702	X	X	Sasanana (Americana and	e Nacima na mai	Innana.	Same	I
Tail Clearance on Landing	X			X	Х	X	1		X	1	X	X	X		1		Х		ALL		
Bank Angle During Landing				X		1	X	0000000			X			1	0.000000			Х			
EGPWS ~ Pull-Up	X			X			1		X	X	X						Х	9 ⁰⁰			
Rejected Take Off (RTO)	1	X							X	X	X		X				6	Х		X	Х
a. Environmental Risk											1 100							8		2	
b. Runway Side Excursion	1						1			1											1
c. Runway Over-Run													1								
Taxi Speed Exceedance TCAS RA	X	Х									X	X		X	X		X	S		X	X
TCAS RA			χ	X		X	1			1									X	X	1
Unstable Approach Continued	X			X	Х	X	X	X	X	X	X	1		X		X	X	Х		X	
Height that Stabilization Achieved	As above						1			1								8			
Proximity to Alpha Max	X		3		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Х				Х				2
Unusual Attitude ~ Pitch			()			X	1		X									0			
Unusual Attitude ~ Bank Angle			1				X									-		Х			
In-Flight Shut-Down (IFSD)																				X	
In-Flight Shut-Down (IFSD) Landing Below Final Reserve Fuel																					



Sample SPI ~ Long Landing






This multi-vari chart shows condition of runway surface is a contributing factor



Sample SPI ~ Long Landing





Outlier (750') at night with a wet runway surface ~ only 1 instance




Event Glideslope deviation above the glideslope 500-200ff Event count 39,649

Flight count 1,005,224 Event rate: 39.44

Analysis GADM Misconfigured Takeoff | TCAS | LOC-I | TAWS | Runway Approach & Landing IATA

> Runway Approach & Landing

The Approach and Landing Accident Reduction page contains metrics on go-around, long landing, tailwind, stopping distance events and other KPVs. Currently displaying all event levels.





ADS Flight Operations and Safety Track

- How data and information can be used to increase operational efficiency and improve safety performance
- ↗ Role of technology
 - "Intelligent Engines" and "Connected Aircraft"
- Dark Data
- ↗ Real-life examples of data and information usage



Thank you!



IATA ADS 2018

Big Data and Safety Indicators

Manoosh Valipour Management Systems Analysis Officer Air Navigation Bureau International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) IATA ADS Berlin

19-20 June 2018



Safety Performance Indicator (SPI)

• A data-based parameter [metric] used for monitoring and assessing safety performance.

Annex 19 – Safety Management



IATA ADS 2018






IATA ADS 2018

Gaining Insight


- Level 1
 - <u>Reactive analysis and investigation of high consequence</u> events (accidents, serious incidents)
- Level 2
 - <u>Real-time monitoring of everyday operations and hazards in</u> a <u>proactive</u> manner
 - Define separate and track <u>normal</u> vs <u>abnormal</u> operations



Level 2 Data Analysis Process


















Runway Remaining











Winterforder and



Reduced Separation with Runway End






Runway Crossings










One day at Airport A RWY 1 per no. of operations every 15 min

Monitoring Separation







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Horizontal Flight Efficiency

Ramp Inspection

Hazard Registry

Runway Event Monitoring


This application monitors landings with a tailwind exceeding 5 knots and landings where remaining runway distance at 60 knots is less than 3000 feet.

Runway safety events were identified as one of the main high-risk accident categories, and ICAO is coordinating a global effort to improve runway safety.



What is SIMS?

- A web-based information system
- Generates indicator analysis through various applications
- Supports implementation of State Safety Programmes (SSP) and Safety Management Systems (SMS)









Aviation Data Symposium The Data4Safety Programme

Erick Ferrandez EASA Safety Intelligence and Performance 20 June 2018 Berlin

Your safety is our mission.

An agency of the European Union










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21/06/2018





AESA, Airbus, Boeing, British Airways, DGAC France, EASA, easyJet, ECA (European Cockpit Association), IAA (Irish Aviation Authority), Iberia, Lufthansa, Ryanair, UK CAA



What do we want to deliver with D4S?

A set of outputs to produce **actionable safety intelligence**





Key elements of D4S



A voluntary and collaborative partnership amongst all stakeholders



Independent governance to reflect the partnership and collaborative approach (dual management authorities/industry)



Data Processing Organisation to manage the Big Data solution



Outcome shared for the benefit of the whole community

(Risk identification and analysis)



Linked with other international initiatives (ASIAS, FDX, ...)



Thank you

Your safety is our mission.

An agency of the European Union






Advancing Safety Through Information Sharing

COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY TEAM (CAST) AVIATION SAFETY ANALYSIS AND SHARING (ASIAS)

Michael Quiello, Industry Co-Chair CAST Vice President, Corporate Safety United Airlines In the United States, our focus was set by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety, and The National Civil Aviation Review Commission (NCARC)



- 1.1 ... Reduce Fatal Accident Rate ...
 - <text><text><text><section-header><section-header><section-header>
- •... Strategic Plan to Improve Safety . . .
- •... Improve Safety Worldwide ...

CAST brings together key stakeholders to cooperatively develop and implement a prioritized safety agenda.



CAST Goal




Voluntary commitments, Consensus decision-making, Data-driven risk management, Implementation-focused.


► Goal:

Original Reduce the US commercial aviation fatal accident rate 83% by 2007.
 New Reduce the U.S. commercial aviation fatality risk by at least 50 percent from 2010 to 2025.

CAST Safety Strategy



Study Prioritization (Fleet Risk)



What is **ASIAS**?

- A collaborative Government-Industry initiative on safety data analysis & sharing
- A risk-based approach to aviation safety, identifying & understanding risks before accidents or incidents occur
- Timely mitigation & prevention





ASIAS Is Governed by Formal Principles

Data used solely for advancement of safety

Voluntary submission of safety-sensitive data

Carrier/OEM/MRO data are de-identified



Transparency – knowledge of how data are used

Procedures & policies established through collaborative governance

Analyses approved by an ASIAS Executive Board

CAST Recent Safety Studies

Go-Around (underway)

Takeoff Misconfiguration

Runway Excursions (RE)

RNAV Departures and STAR Operations

Airplane State Awareness (ASA)

Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS)

data


types

Proprietary Data











sources

LEVERAGING DATA FROM ACROSS THE INDUSTRY PROVIDES VALUABLE INSIGHTS



Impacts of Data Sharing

- Safety insight gained from ASIAS is invaluable, as it is not possible through other means and gives us the ability to—
 - Identify systemic risks
 - Detect the degradation of safety barriers
 - Monitor the effectiveness of deployed mitigation strategies
 - Understand the impact of changes in the aviation system
- CAST has adopted 22 safety enhancements to address systemic risks based on <u>non-accident</u> data from ASIAS



Unprecedented partnership and positive impact

Long-term industry and government commitment

Committed to continue to drive future safety improvements through information sharing

Skywise The beating heart of aviation

Stephen Roebuck Airbus Digital Transformation Office

> Yuanbo Liu Palantir Technologies

Community

Community

noun

 a group of people living in the same place or having a particular characteristic in common
 the condition of sharing or having certain attitudes and interests in common

* E

4700 IT systems

4700 IT systems

> 40 nonconformity databases

4700 IT systems

> 40 nonconformity databases

30 days to gather data required for 30 minute decision

Exponential User Growth

Our journey to date



Accelerating business transformation

3,000+ aircraft









Connecting our industry

SUPPLIERS

ENGINEERING & DESIGN COMPONENT MANUFACTURING & ASSEMBLY

Connecting our industry

Demand forecasting and reduce missing parts

SUPPLIERS ••••••

ENGINEERING & DESIGN

Improving future aircraft design

Accelerating root cause analysis from months to days

Resource management and burndown rate monitoring Improving logistics coordination and planning Accelerating repair speed from weeks to hours

COMPONENT MANUFACTURING SERVICES ······ OPERATORS & ASSEMBLY

> Preventative maintenance models Reliability reporting

New route development Component reliability

Maintenance optimization

Connecting our industry

OPEN

Other OEM data is being hosted on Skywise

Operators are driving cross fleet workflows using Skywise

SECURE

Best in class technology from Palantir ensures secure handling of data

Robust permissions and access controls can be configured to operator requirements

COLLABORATIVE

Multi stakeholder workflows to connect operators, suppliers and major OEMs

Group collaboration and data sharing are possible

Over 2 trillion rows of sensor data for one national carrier alone Enriched with faults and maintenance information 500+ users in the design office conducting root cause analysis and partnering with airline engineers Unprecedented speed to investigate and resolve issues: from years to weeks

Over 2 trillion rows of sensor data for one national carrier alone Enriched with faults and maintenance information 500+ users in the design office conducting root cause analysis and partnering with airline engineers Unprecedented speed to investigate and resolve issues: from years to weeks

> Identified root cause of fuel pump issues in 3 weeks

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> Identified root cause of fuel pump issues in 3 weeks

Reduced NFF events from 13 per month to 3 per month

Over 2 trillion rows of sensor data for one national carrier alone Enriched with faults and maintenance information 500+ users in the design office conducting root cause analysis and partnering with airline engineers Unprecedented speed to investigate and resolve issues: from years to weeks

> Identified root cause of fuel pump issues in 3 weeks


Reduced NFF events from 13 per month to 3 per month Diagnosed root cause of fuel pump that had been replaced 15+ times



Beyond Sensors & Big Data

How AI Drives Prediction and Optimization on Less Connected Aircraft

Mark Roboff *Vice President, Aerospace & Automotive*





Process Information



Draw Conclusions



Codify Instincts and Experience Into Learning

Al systems

Significant benefits for the industrial world



Improved Accuracy

Scalability



External Factors

Adaptability

Security

In-Context Remediation

Al system for maintenance optimization



Prediction

Aircraft Sensor Data (ACARS, DAR, QAR)



Diagnostic

Content from Hangers (Maintenance logs)

Optimization

Content from Flight Ops (Scheduling)




Advisory

Content from Hangers (Service Manuals)

What is going to fail? How do I fix it? Where are the parts? Where is the labor? What are the right instructions?

Addressing the maintenance life cycle



Today's big data sensor platforms



This plane generates 1TB of data per flight



This plane generates over 24,000 parameters of data per flight

Problem: Only the newest aircraft have sensor platforms on the scale of big data

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Prognostics and Health Management from MX Logs

Benefits of cognitive diagnostics

Compared to Traditional ACARS-Driven Aircraft Health Management, Cognitive Diagnostics Covers...

The Whole Fleet

- Covers all types in a mixed fleet with one deployment
- Provides the same high level of analytics for all aircraft types, regardless of age

The Whole Aircraft

- Provides rich analytics and recommendations across all ATA chapters
- Identifies long term trends and patterns for quality in non-ACARs-reporting components, i.e. seats


Tribal Knowledge

- Delivers corrective actions across all ATA chapters from an airline's own maintenance history
- Embeds tribal knowledge for when reality differs from "by the book"



Example

Seat health management





Maintenance Advisor Leverages Maintenance Manuals to Deliver the Right Instructions, to the Right Person, at the Right Time

Advisor – Aiding the technician

Guides the technician step-by-step on what to do to fix problems

Trusted solution with confidence ratings to provide a path toward resolution

3

Quick search allows natural language

questions to find relevant tasks and information from anywhere in the manuals

•••••• Verizon LTE 8:40 AM All Sessions	18 ∎0	Verizon LTE 8:40 AM All Sessions Work Session
5 Session 1 N72345 Falcon 7x 5 Session 2 N72345 Falcon 7x	Edit 23 Aug 2 3 Sep 2017	23 Aug 2017 N72345 Fault Codes Corrective Actions 3240BCU1108 RH INBD BRAKE TEMP DATA FAIL 3230LGC1001 2311HF10003 HF1 POWER AMPLIFIER FAULT 2311HF20003 HF2 POWER AMPLIFIER FAULT 4900CMC0066 CMC APU/GI03A MAINT FAULT
Quick Search Sessions	eturile Prurile	P Quidos Saarch Sessons Protos

Case inbox is split into sessions. Each session represents a chunk of work to be done for a given aircraft tail number

Technician selects a session and finds the faults or work that needs to be done for that aircraft


•••••• Verizon LTE 8:41 AM 🕈 🛊 🚍 -	
RH INBD BRAKE TEMP DATA FAIL	
POSSIBLE LRUS AT FAULT:	
 RH inboard brake temperature sensor R407GC 	
• EBCM L301GC (90003532-3)	
POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: %	
 Replace the failed equipment identified by the troubleshooting 	
• - EBCM 1 21%	
- RH inboard brake temperature 43%	
TROUBLESHOOTING: Start	
Check for continuity between pins A and C of the RH inboard brake temperature sensor	
If the continuity is not correct, replace the RH inboard brake temperature	
Dutck Search Sessione Profile	

Technician selects a fault and finds historical information on which corrective actions have been successful most often in the past

9:45 AM 4 < Back **Quick Search** How do I replace the RH inboard temp sensor? Suggested Documents REMOVAL / INSTALLATION OF THE BRAKE TEMPERATURE SENSORS ADJUSTMENT OF THE FLAP SYSTEM ELECTRICAL SYNCHRONIZATION REMOVAL / INSTALLATION OF THE BRAKE HEATING VALVE REMOVAL / INSTALLATION OF THE MANIFOLD BLEED AIR TEMPERATURE SENSORS REMOVAL / INSTALLATION OF THE ELECTRONIC BRAKE CONTROL MODULES REMOVAL / INSTALLATION OF THE CABIN ZONE 1 AND ZONE 2 TEMPERATURE SENSORS p

A quick search using natural language returns the relevant AMM tasks for the top corrective action

Advisor – Aiding the technician




Trusted solution with confidence ratings to provide a path toward resolution

3

Quick search allows natural language questions to find relevant tasks and information from anywhere in the manuals

K Work Session		K Back
2311HF10003 HF1 POWER AMPLIFIER FAULT	~	TASKS:
TROUBLESHOOTING: Start		Job Set-Up Obey the
Do an operational check of the HF Communications System OPERATIONAL TEST OF THE HF COMMUNICATION SYSTEM TSK	>	Safety pro- Connect PU), Vergige
If the operational check fails, replace the HF1 power amplifier	Q	Add a note fo
If the operational check passes, get access to the "ACTIVE MAINTENANCE MESSAGES" page in Chapter23 "COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS" USE OF THE CENTRAL MAINTENANCE COMPUTER (CMC) - QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK TSK	>	
Make sure that the "HF1 POWER AMPLIFIER FAULT" message does not show	0	
Make sure that no CAS messages show that are related to this	Q	Question?
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Starting a repair send the technician into a step by step process



Next steps are delivered in appropriate sections to the technician and feedback is collected

9:45 AM

Step 1

Connected devices become a powerful data collection and stakeholder communication device. Store notes to share learnings.

9:45 AM

2311HF10003

Get access to the CMC "SELECT A TEST"

MAINTENANCE COMPUTER (CMC) -QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK TSK

Select the "1x HF COM 1" member system
 Select the " HF1 IBIT" test to go to the HF

Push the "START INITIATED BIT" button to

 After 20 s, a green button shows that the HF 1 IBIT TEST passed.

0

Step 1

Do a HF 1 IBIT TEST as follows

Select the chapter "23 COMMUNICATIONS".

1 IBIT TEST page.

start the IBIT test.

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page USE OF THE CENTRAL

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• Test

↔ Verizon LTE 8:40 AM · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	r 8 💼 F
Session 1 23 Aug 2017 N72345 Report	ir
faults	V
RH INBD BRAKE TEMP DATA FAIL	>
3230LGC1001	>
2311HF10003 HF1 POWER AMPLIFIER FAULT	>
C 2311HF20003 HF2 POWER AMPLIFIER FAULT	>
4900CMC0066 CMC APU/GIO3A MAINT FAULT	>
repair steps	>
reference docs	>
shop notes	>
pictures	>
Quick Search Sessions Profi) 10

In Design: Automate Repair reports and store in the cloud

Honeywell Internal

Who we are

SparkCognition is an enterprise AI company with software solutions that help customers

Analyze increasingly complex data stores





Reveal actionable insights

Identify and automate optimal responses

Closed Series B funding of \$56.5M in venture capital in February 2018



Customers





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