



Passenger Security Statement

An effective and reliable passenger security checkpoint can no longer be solely defined and supported by the ICAO Annex 17 baseline measures. Unfortunately, we still do not have appropriate, consistent, and integrated explosive detection solutions deployed at all major airports. And passengers, though subject to security charges, are not being processed in a timely manner. In the meantime, there are new, emerging and in places effective but unadopted technology solutions that can address some of these challenges. Overall, a risk-based approach to screening better enables efficiencies that improve processing times and seek to address queuing and throughput challenges. Industry and regulators must work together, via multilateral recognition programs designed to enhance the overall performance of security checkpoints and support agreed minimum connection times, as a matter of urgency.

Background and Current Status

- The current challenges faced by airports are the result of limited resources (including personnel), a lack of proportionate, effective, and timely risk-based security policies and a broad range of inconsistent, unintegrated, and poorly articulated security checkpoint screening operations and associated technologies that fail to recognize and adopt internationally recognised best practices. This results in unnecessary delays, unnecessary costs, systematic inefficiencies and terminal capacity and congestion issues, potentially generating additional vulnerabilities in landside areas.
- In some jurisdictions passengers and/or airlines are charged a [security fee](#) and, rightly, expect to be processed in a timely, efficient and professional manner. IATA's Airport Development Reference Manual (ADRM) 12th Edition indicates optimum wait times for security are set at 5 to 10 minutes. Additionally, ICAO Annex 9 Recommended Practice recognizes a performance standard for departure of no more than 60 minutes for the completion of all required departure formalities. Far too many locations fail to meet these recommended minimums.
- Latest ICAO Universal Security Audit Program (USAP) results indicate Annex 17 baseline security checkpoint screening implementation is currently below 50%. As a result, in some locations, airlines are required to implement secondary checkpoint screening measures at boarding gates. This is clearly unsustainable and unacceptable, and therefore an international, dedicated effort should be initiated to strategically improve this condition.
- The absence of Annex 17 baseline checkpoint implementation diminishes the opportunities of multilateral cross-border recognition that facilitates the removal of transfer screening for international passengers. We strongly encourage the establishment of multilateral recognition programs, lead by States and industry, that are designed to enhance checkpoint security screening arrangements and support agreed minimum connection times as a matter of urgency.
- Opportunities exist to create and mutually recognizably different but complimentary and equally effective screening processes and outcomes. Furthermore, national regulators need to identify, articulate, share and enact time-sensitive risk-based policies, based on new and emerging ICAO Annex 17 standards, to capitalise on these opportunities. Some of the largest airport gateways of the world, handling the majority of international scheduled traffic, have invested heavily in advanced screening technologies and integrated operating systems, yet they are rarely encouraged or formally approved to consider, design, apply or adopt time-sensitive risk-based security postures that more effectively manage, balance and deliver optimum



security and facilitation outcomes that effectively and unilaterally, leverage and support the investments they have made.

- A risk-based approach to screening better enables efficiencies that improve overall processing times and seek to address queuing and throughput challenges. Such an approach also supports improved security detection and deterrence, as cutting-edge screening technologies are increasingly automated, thus allowing security staff to apply more focused/in-depth alarm resolution procedures on a personalized case by case basis. With carefully considered adjustments in risk appetites, security settings, operational practices, and targeted technological enhancements, such as the use of randomness, unpredictability, and variable/target specific algorithmic detection capabilities, we could increasingly move away from the more generalized static restrictions and rule-based mitigation measures.
- The perfect counter example are the “urgent and interim” guidelines on security controls for Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAGs) in the form of arbitrary limits and bans, that were proposed by ICAO more than 15 years ago, pending the deployment of appropriate Liquid Explosive Detection Systems (LEDS) by States and at airports. Unfortunately, we still do not have appropriate, consistent, and integrated explosive detection solutions deployed at all major airports and, where we do, in many cases they are not subject to bilateral or multilateral agreement or recognition that would better facilitate transfer passengers and/or wider adoption.

A call for Action

The more progressive **regulators** and **airports** must lead by example in exploring, trialling, articulating, showcasing, and deploying innovative solutions based on advanced detection technologies, open architecture principles, and risk-based processes. When investing in new equipment, systems or processes, to meet the new and emerging civil aviation security objectives and challenges. Collectively, industry and regulators cannot wait another 15 years to ensure all major international airports adopt appropriate screening methods that can detect the presence of explosives and explosive devices carried by passengers on their persons or in their cabin baggage.

Key concepts include:

- The overall operational performance (security, facilitation, quality of service, sustainability) of security screening checkpoints and systems, both originating and transfer, should form the basis of new global security **key performance indicators** (KPIs). Such measurements should allow for, recognize and actively encourage diversity in the effective deployment of different security solutions, technical criteria, equipment settings and operational practices, such as more randomness and unpredictability, as well as global benchmarking and comparison measurements to better facilitate increased multilateral recognition and the sharing of recommended best practice.
- The effective and timely use of **data** collected and/or shared in advance (and on a voluntary basis) in respect of departing passengers and/or their baggage, verifiable digital travel credentials and pre-travel verification initiatives or platforms, should be actively promoted by States and leading operators; and operationally integrated into risk-based ground screening systems allowing educated differentiation, smoother (and even contactless) processes for low-risk passengers and more targeted risk-based security measures for others.
- All actors should also look to explore if, how and to what extent **technologies** like central image processing (CIP) and open architecture software concepts can be further enhanced. These kinds of technologies enable upstream and/or off airport screening opportunities for cross-border and/or interagency, pre-clearing inbound passengers (and their baggage). This approach could form part of overarching inbound risk-based assessments, particularly where this helps to optimize the cost verses benefit arguments associated with processing of originating, transfer, and transit passengers.