



## Cabin Safety Chatter Market table notes

The following are the notes made by the Chatter market table hosts following discussions with delegates. They may not represent the views or opinions of IATA Cabin Safety, but they help raise discussion and give suggestions for best practice or areas for improvement.

1	Crew leadership and Management (54 Attendees)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Selection of crew leaders/in charge cabin crew varies:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 3 years' experience required</li> <li>○ 1 year for narrow body, 2 year for wide body</li> <li>○ Promotion can be based on seniority or performance skills/competency</li> <li>○ How do we promote when the recruitment pool is dried up?</li> <li>○ Age of recruits is sometimes too young/immature for this role.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Different models used:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ A pool of in charge cabin crew, actively flying in both roles</li> <li>○ All trained to operate as In Charge</li> <li>○ Cabin divided into separate areas with primary in charge overall and others assigned cabin areas/classes/zones</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Recurrent training for In charge – how to keep it relevant for those in the role for many years?</li> <li>• Suggested components of in charge training:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Generation gaps</li> <li>○ Conflict management</li> <li>○ Medical emergencies</li> <li>○ Second language</li> <li>○ Evaluation of cabin crew</li> <li>○ Evaluation of cabin leaders</li> <li>○ Cabin crew vs other management</li> <li>○ Coaching</li> <li>○ CRM</li> <li>○ Safety reporting</li> <li>○ Leadership</li> <li>○ Maintaining cabin safety during onboard rest</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Ongoing training flights for designated in –charge</li> <li>• Performance can be evaluated by cabin crew and pilots.</li> <li>• Training course duration varies from 2 days to 6 weeks.</li> <li>• Post training – some have a “buddy” system for up to 10 flights.</li> </ul>
2	Trafficking in Persons (42 Attendees)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TBC</li> </ul>
3	Unruly Passengers (56 Attendees)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some airlines provide training to ALL staff, not just cabin Crew</li> <li>• One acronym used in training – ABC : Ask, Bargain, Convince</li> <li>• Where a known problem with alcohol exists, one airline uses some or all of the following mitigations:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Removes duty free purchases from passenger on board</li> <li>○ Limits alcohol consumption to 2 drinks per person</li> <li>○ No alcohol service from midnight – 10am</li> <li>○ Breath analyzer at gate</li> <li>○ Fine passenger for any diversion due to behavior</li> </ul> </li> </ul>





- Need signs in airports for passenger awareness
- Add rules to the website for passengers to acknowledge rules of carriage
- Duty free outlets have equal responsibility to ensure amount sold is not excessive and remind that it cannot be consumed until after arrival.
- Challenges for single cabin crew operations
- Consider on board surveillance cameras to provide evidence
- Tactics to reduce alcohol consumption – delay, dilute and limit amounts.
- Need more severe punishment – consistently applied.
- Crew and ground staff to work together – ground staff just want the flight to depart.
- The overriding theme is that the regulators need to enforce stiffer penalties and support the carriers.

**4 Smoke and Fire (50 Attendees)**

- A team concept towards cabin firefighting is crucial. All groups agreed roles should be clearly followed during the initial phases of the emergency, but duties may be later swap as conditions dictate.
- Designate roles using acronym “ABC”, which also coincides with fire classifications
  - A=ttacker (firefighter)
  - B=ack-up (brings equipment/crowd control)
  - C=ommunicator (keeps flight crew (and others) informed)
- Some carriers advocate immediate donning of PBE, while others prescribed only to don as necessary. This facilitated some debate since toxic fumes are mostly invisible/odorless and could render crew incapacitated. In contrast, donning PBE may increase response time, limit peripheral vision, and impede verbal communication.
  - (FYI, some aircraft manufactures and municipal firefighting departments advise to don breathing equipment prior to entering any known smoke environment)
  - (Possible greater IATA clarification needed via future publications/recommendations)
- Need for more awareness about differences between smoke, odor/fumes, and fire. Example, smoke does not always result in a fire. Different colors of smoke may be indicative of a certain type of fire. In contrast, odor/fumes may not include smoke. Each situation requires unique crew awareness but procedures must harmonize since these events may be related.
- Some carriers use specific criteria, while others leave it open to cabin crew/flight interpretation regarding when to evacuate under cabin smoke conditions. Some use specific markers (e.g., unable to see next cabin exit sign) to indicate when an evacuation should be initiated.
- Odor/fume events must be correctly identified since most are indicator(s) of mechanical malfunction. To assist with accurate identification, some carriers issue lanyard cards (or have cabin crew manual references) with specific examples (burning metal, acrid, or “dirty sock” smell). This guidance must also be coordinated with the flight crew.
- Fumes (toxic cabin air) events are becoming more front-center amongst cabin crew and travelers.
- (Possible greater focus by IATA with enhanced recommendations provided to member carriers, or a discussion panel at a future Cabin Ops Conference)

**5 Safety Performance Indicators (52 Attendees)**





	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Many delegates want to know how to track/monitor SPIs</li> <li>• Some delegates wanted to be guided by regulators in deciding on appropriate SPIs.</li> <li>• How far back should SPIs track?</li> <li>• What data should be used within the calculations – e.g. number of sectors, number of passengers, number of rotations?</li> <li>• Most delegates desperately want more guidance on how to manage SPIs.</li> </ul>
<b>6</b>	<b>Social Media (59 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some crew do not feel comfortable with a formal report and prefer to post on social media. Airlines could consider a private social media platform/app to counteract this. Crew feel that posting on social media gives them anonymity.</li> <li>• Internal company sites are diluted by information not relating to safety.</li> <li>• Older generation vs younger generation – different habits.</li> <li>• What do you do with individuals who jeopardize the company's good name by posting on social media?</li> <li>• Most airlines have a company policy.</li> <li>• How do we train the crew in the use of social media?</li> <li>• Onboard wi-fi has contributed to crew sharing posts while on duty.</li> <li>• Encourage crew not to “check-in” on social media while at hotels down route.</li> <li>• Social media is not all bad, it can be used effectively for service recovery.</li> <li>• Passengers will likely post their complaints straight to social media as they feel it will be more likely to get resolved if publicly “shamed”</li> </ul>
<b>7</b>	<b>Lithium batteries and PEDs (59 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TBC</li> </ul>
<b>8</b>	<b>Passenger Behavior During An Emergency (57 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Problem areas: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Passengers taking baggage</li> <li>○ Language/poor communication</li> <li>○ Use of PEDs to record event</li> <li>○ Frequent travelers do not pay attention</li> <li>○ Negative panic as passengers might freeze at the door or seat</li> <li>○ Passengers not prepared, passive or too slow to respond effectively.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Airline policies might add to the issue: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Charging for checked baggage causes more in the cabin</li> <li>○ Allowing PED use might encourage filming</li> <li>○ Providing Wi-Fi encourages immediate posting to social media</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Briefings to passengers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Fine line between too thorough and complicated</li> <li>○ Briefings incomplete</li> <li>○ Does it make a difference having a manual demo or video demo? Any data to support this?</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Passenger preparedness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ There is an opportunity for more standardized global procedures</li> <li>○ How can passengers be more prepared and educated?</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Evacuation commands could be standardized</li> <li>• Include the above issues and concerns in cabin crew training exercises</li> </ul>
<b>9</b>	<b>Brace Positions (56 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a need for standardized brace position, difficulties within airline groups worldwide</li> </ul>





	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seat position and pitch should be considered</li> <li>• Crew jump seat height is an issue for smaller crew as they are not able to place their feet firmly on the floor.</li> <li>• What is the brace position for lap held infant?</li> <li>• 50% of the participants were not aware of ICAO Doc relating to brace positions</li> <li>• Seat back features may cause injury to head/face – latches, IFE etc.</li> </ul>
<b>10</b>	<b>Cabin LOSA (57 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most airlines had a form of cabin LOSA</li> <li>• Some regulators make it mandatory</li> <li>• Some cabin crew not receptive to feedback</li> <li>• Can create union/workforce issues if not managed</li> <li>• It can be hard to be objective</li> <li>• How do we use the results?</li> <li>• Needs to be supported at high level – endorsed by CEO</li> <li>• Must be interactive and include all of the crew.</li> <li>• Relies on mutual trust and a positive safety culture.</li> </ul>
<b>11</b>	<b>Risk Assessment (49 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TBC</li> </ul>
<b>12</b>	<b>Door Operation (62 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where door operation from outside is standard, cabin crew may become less practiced in opening door.</li> <li>• Contributing factors to incidents: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Fatigue,</li> <li>○ Different aircraft types</li> <li>○ Crew seniority</li> <li>○ Audits</li> <li>○ Inspections</li> <li>○ Type variants</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Single flight attendant operations can increase likelihood of injury</li> <li>• Mitigations/solutions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Cross check – stop, drop, review</li> <li>○ Stickers and placards on doors</li> <li>○ Checklists</li> <li>○ Reading out loud</li> <li>○ Training</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>13</b>	<b>Comfort Devices (56 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operators who allow – 10</li> <li>• Operators who don't – 13 (Note tried not to include operators more than once)</li> <li>• Top reasons/issues <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Not confident safe for the child</li> <li>○ Number of devices coming on to the market how keep assessing. Many operators still trying to comprehend what are the devices passengers are wanting to use.</li> <li>○ How communicate what devices are allowed to crew, and continue to update.</li> <li>○ Managing passenger's expectations – they don't often listen/read info provided by airline</li> </ul> </li> </ul>





	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Who is responsible for ensuring they are stowed in turbulence? Crew risking their own safety to check?</li> <li>○ How restrain in turbulence (clear air)</li> <li>○ Access to emergency equipment</li> <li>○ Inflation covering the decompression panels</li> <li>○ Passengers have been seen using gaspers to try to inflate the devices</li> <li>○ Doesn't fit all seats. Interference with IFE boxes</li> <li>○ Should we limit the number on board – otherwise limited to number of window or middle seat in block of three. This could be a huge number.</li> <li>○ Question – how many are we actually seeing onboard? Lots of talk however are we seeing them. Crew not often reporting use.</li> <li>○ Some operators will approve only one device e.g. ones that don't inflate due to time it takes to deflate, risks of cabin depressurisation, which is an additional step. So review needs to assess how quickly they deflate and if a release valve</li> <li>● Suggestions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Devices to have warning/conditions of use written on them. That way consistent SAFE use and clear for passenger to see/understand the necessary requirements for use. This should assist mitigating misuse by passengers who don't read or ignore the airline's requirements</li> <li>○ IATA Guidance Table in BPG provides hazards for operators to consider when reviewing and a decision tool which address the compliance and safety risks with each device.</li> <li>○ Communications – important to provide the crew with the why. Give them an understanding of the guidelines being used to assess devices so they can assess any new devices coming onboard too</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
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<b>14</b>	<b>Emotional Support Animals (52 Attendees)</b>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Travelers make abuse of the system, e.g. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ passenger declare untrained pets as emotional support animal as pax can transport them free of charge</li> <li>○ doctors are willing to issue certification for an animal without actual need for an ESAN</li> <li>○ relation between doctor &amp; patient not verified by airline</li> <li>○ passengers can buy certification online</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Different rules &amp; lack of regulations, making it difficult for codeshare partners to adopt each other policies (e.g. USA allows many sorts of animals, Russia/India/Brazil do not allow at all, EU accepts only dogs, other countries additionally also allow cats...)</li> <li>● General confusion between PETC (pet in cabin) &amp; ESAN (Emotional Support Animal)</li> <li>● ESAN are not trained (unlike service animals, e.g. guide dog)</li> <li>● Unruly passengers reports related to animals are increasing</li> <li>● There is no limit in size and weight of the animal or amounts brought on board</li> <li>● Hazards: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Animals can bite other passengers &amp; crew members</li> <li>○ Animal can cause an allergic reaction or annoyance to other passengers</li> <li>○ Animal is a loose object and not properly restrained in critical phases of the flight</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Possible mitigations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Stronger regulation by national authorities instead of leaving risk assessment to the operators</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Enforce government body certified harnesses for safe transportation of animals on board (they could be provided by the airline or should be bought by the passenger)</li> <li>○ Enforce preclearance of ESAN with stricter certification requirements (from licensed dog trainers, vet, psychotherapists)</li> <li>○ Risk assess need of muzzling for certain breeds to be known as more aggressive (e.g. Pitbull Terrier).</li> <li>● Could COSTG start dialogue with US-DOT to help them understand our concerns?</li> <li>● Other thoughts: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Seat manufacturers could design seats where a larger dog may fit underneath (e.g. by removing life vest to somewhere else)</li> <li>○ Airlines implement facility seating to separate animals from allergic passengers</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>15</b>	<b>Onboard Theft (49 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Suggest IATA to come up with guidelines</li> <li>● Operator has no SOP and no training for cabin crew</li> <li>● Cabin crew not to confront the passenger, to inform PIC</li> <li>● Security to meet on arrival</li> <li>● Advise passenger to stow baggage with zipper / handle facing inward <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ difficult for thief to unzip or remove bag from overhead bin</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Mostly, item stolen are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ cash</li> <li>○ high value merchandize bought from Duty Free</li> <li>○ passport</li> </ul> </li> <li>● To announce on ground for passenger to take care of personal belongings at all times</li> <li>● To prompt on screen for passenger to take care of personal belongings</li> <li>● Cabin crew to be more vigilant</li> <li>● cabin watch every 10-15mins during night flight</li> </ul>
<b>16</b>	<b>Food Safety (39 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Sponsored table hosted by Medina Flight Quality</li> </ul>
<b>17</b>	<b>Inflight Medical Assistance (41 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● More assistance needed from gate</li> <li>● Training of airport staff in how to deal with medical event should be considered</li> <li>● Is there any emotional support for crew/passengers after a death on board?</li> <li>● Many airlines would like feedback from medlink on what happened post event to the patient.</li> </ul>
<b>18</b>	<b>Hazard Log (36 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● TBC</li> </ul>
<b>19</b>	<b>Fatigue Risk Management System for Cabin Crew (59 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Delegates were a mixture operators, regulators and unions</li> <li>● Most regulators were Asian and do not have regulations to mandate FRM</li> <li>● Only a handful of operators had an FRM programme in place and this was usually because it is mandated by their regulator</li> <li>● Some of the operators without an FRM programme receive fatigue reports from their cabin crew and manage this as part of sickness policy.</li> </ul>





	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An operator with an FRM raised a concern on how to get CCMs to actively report, while another was concerned that their reporting level was low because the CCMs saw fatigue as a natural part of the job and not a safety hazard.</li> <li>• Many were concerned that reporting fatigue could lead to their contract not being renewed as it was deemed that the role was not suitable for the individual.</li> <li>• Many airlines without an FRM programme were concerned about the costs of introducing one, the impact on productivity - and could not see the benefits.</li> <li>• Operators wanted IATA to provide guidance on setting up an FRM programme, training content and who to contact if they get stuck</li> <li>• A few suggestions that that IATA should lobby ICAO to make FRM required globally to at least a minimum same standard (ISARP?)</li> </ul>
<b>20</b>	<b>Cabin Safety Action Group (49 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSAG is a focus point of SMS applied to Cabin Ops;</li> <li>• CSAG in organization must be part of Safety Department or Flight Ops but not under Cabin Line Operations or Training Department (CSAG Autonomy);</li> <li>• CSAG should be not perceived as a "Risk Assessment Factory" but impartial on cabin safety evaluation with no pressure for forced YES output;</li> <li>• Ideal CSAG meeting should be organized every month (end of month in order to collect all data of previous month);</li> <li>• Ideal CSAG Stakeholders participants: FLIGHT OPS, TRAINING, HUMAN FACTOR, O/B SERVICE DELIVERY, CABIN LINE OPS, SECURITY, GROUND SAFETY, MAINTAINANCE, OCCUPAION HEALTH and other representatives when necessary for specific rising issues such as Catering, Suppliers, Hotel Accommodation, Rostering Department etc.</li> <li>• INPUT CSAG: Reports, Data, Investigation, Risk Assessment Request, Audit and Inspection, Benchmark, Cabin Safety Performance, Evaluation and impact of new procedures;</li> <li>• OUTPUT CSAG: Risk Assessment delivery, Safety trends analysis, Cabin Safety Bulletin, Cabin Safety Promotion (classrooms, conferences, meetings), Recommendations, Training (best practice), Address of new policies and standards.</li> </ul>
<b>21</b>	<b>Crew Experience Levels (57 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TBC</li> </ul>
<b>22</b>	<b>Safety Promotion (57 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Many different ways to promote safety to crew: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ App</li> <li>○ Videos</li> <li>○ Boards</li> <li>○ Newsletters</li> <li>○ Face to face promotions with management</li> <li>○ Conference style meetings</li> <li>○ E-mails for immediate response to hot topics</li> <li>○ Controlled social media (internal sites)</li> <li>○ Quarterly updates from Flight Safety</li> <li>○ Pushed items through company iPad/tablet</li> <li>○ Magazines</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Best ways include case studies, real experiences and articles by own cabin crew.</li> <li>• Recognition of cabin crew – “heroes”, best reports etc.</li> <li>• Constantly adapt to see what works. Change from time to time.</li> </ul>





<b>23</b>	<b>Child Restraint (43 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• EASA guidelines, comprehensive but vague for children 2-7 years old.</li><li>• Vague rules on child restraint seat allocation.</li><li>• Universal labels needed and should be attached to body of device not cushion.</li><li>• Should a parent be able to purchase a seat for a child who is not using a CRD?</li></ul>
<b>24</b>	<b>Safety Briefing Best Practice (58 Attendees)</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• TBC</li></ul>

