

Jet Fuel Business Continuity Plan (BCP)

Drafting Guidance

February 2026 (Updated in May 2026)

Jet fuel is critical to airport and airline operations, and even short disruptions can trigger significant operational and economic impacts.

A Jet Fuel Business Continuity Plan (BCP) provides a structured framework to manage supply disruptions such as pipeline failures, refinery outages, or contamination events.

IATA recommends a BCP be built on scalability, cross-sector coordination, data transparency, and predefined escalation triggers.

With clear governance, defined activation thresholds, and coordinated communication, a well-designed BCP strengthens resilience and protects confidence in air transport during fuel crises.



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1. Introduction: What is a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and why is it essential

A Jet Fuel Business Continuity Plan (BCP) is a strategic framework that enables airports, fuel suppliers, and airlines to sustain operations during and after a fuel disruption. It outlines the measures, communication protocols, and coordinated actions required to maintain or restore fuel availability when normal supply chains are compromised, whether due to refinery outages, pipeline failures, contamination events, or transport delays.

The BCP provides proactive management tools integrating risk assessment, contingency planning, and stakeholder coordination. It defines critical functions, assigns responsibilities, and establishes escalation thresholds to ensure a swift, unified response that protects operational continuity, financial performance, and confidence in the aviation network.

Jet fuel reliability underpins every aspect of airline operations. Even minor supply interruptions can quickly cascade into major fuel disruptions and rationing scenarios. Many airports rely on intricate supply chains that span import terminals, multi-product pipelines, rail, coastal vessels, and road transport, often lacking or flexibility. The concentration of fuel infrastructure in urban areas further limits expansion or relocation options, reinforcing the importance of a robust, regularly tested BCP to safeguard the industry's resilience.

Current market trends¹ further amplify these risks. For example, in South Africa, domestic refining capacity has declined sharply, with several refineries closing or converting to import terminals. Consequently, imported jet fuel now accounts for nearly 60% of national demand, up from 20–30% over the past five years.² Similar patterns are emerging in Australia and New Zealand, where all onshore refineries may close by 2030.³ These shifts increase exposure to import delays, contamination, customs bottlenecks, and constraints at import terminals.

From an airline's perspective, a well-developed BCP is essential. It provides clear activation triggers, defines tiered backup supply scenarios, and establishes pre-agreed decision protocols, transforming crisis response from a reactive scramble into a structured and managed execution.

This document focuses on practices to ensure jet fuel supply in the face of upstream disruptions. Adequate planning of jet fuel infrastructure is well covered in a separate publication.⁴

¹ <https://www.iata.org/globalassets/iata/publications/sustainability/in-depth-refineries-in-focus.pdf>

² <https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/africas-richest-country-has-about-half-of-its-oil-refining-capacity-shut/jz5jzw9>

³ <https://www.dcceew.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/72895-1.pdf>

⁴ <https://www.iata.org/contentassets/ebdba50e57194019930d72722413edd4/guidance-fuel-storage-may08.pdf>

2. Examples of why a BCP is required in the aviation fuel sector

2.1. Global case studies

Real-world disruptions in aviation fuel supply have exposed the fragility of airport fuel resilience when contingency measures are not clearly defined or coordinated. Events such as refinery outages, pipeline failures, port congestion, and fuel contamination demonstrate that even minor lapses in preparedness can result in significant operational and financial consequences.

IATA's case reviews and global fuel campaigns reveal that airports without tested BCPs faced prolonged supply interruptions, poor communication between suppliers and airlines, and limited stakeholder coordination. In contrast, airports with structured and rehearsed BCPs were able to mitigate impacts, maintain minimum stock levels, and resume operations more quickly.

The following examples illustrate real-life supply chain failures and their impact on airline operations.

2.1.1 New Zealand (Auckland – 2017)

Overview

In September 2017, a critical failure occurred in the sole pipeline transporting aviation fuel from New Zealand's only onshore refinery, located at Marsden Point, to the intermediate fuel terminal (WIRI Oil Services Limited – WOSL), situated in South Auckland, which serves Auckland Airport. The rupture resulted in a complete disruption of the jet fuel supply to the airport for a period of 10 days,⁵ exposing a significant systemic vulnerability at the nation's primary airport.

Impact

In the absence of alternative supply solutions, fuel suppliers were compelled to implement rationing measures across all airline operators. Over a ten-day period, jet fuel allocations were reduced to approximately 10% - 30% of standard uplift volumes, resulting in more than 200 flight cancellations,⁶ refueling diversions, and tankering operations from Australia and domestic airports. Within three days, these emergency measures placed considerable strain on the broader national jet fuel supply chain and stock levels at other New Zealand airports, which were similarly dependent on the same single import terminal, further underscoring the systemic weaknesses of New Zealand's aviation fuel logistics.

Continuity gaps identified

- Reliance on a single pipeline with no alternative route.
- Absence of validated road or coastal shipping alternatives.

⁵ <https://www.dia.govt.nz/Auckland-Fuel-Line---Options-Report>

⁶ <https://www.dia.govt.nz/Auckland-Fuel-Line---Final-Report>

- Undefined minimum stock levels at WOSL and Auckland airport.
- No multi-agency governance to coordinate rationing and communication.

Key lessons

Fuel resilience cannot be predicated on a single mode of logistics, particularly for a nation's principal gateway airport. The 2017 pipeline rupture highlighted the lack of infrastructure resilience and the absence of pre-established alternative logistics pathways, such as contracted trucking or trucking alternatives. This single-point failure highlighted the critical need for a diversified and robust fuel supply chain to ensure continuity of aviation fuel delivery in the event of disruptions.

2.1.2 South Africa (Johannesburg – 2025)

Overview

On 4 January 2025,⁷ a fire at Natref (Sasol/Prax JV) in Sasolburg, the only inland crude refinery in Johannesburg, forced a shutdown after significant damage was caused to the crude distillation unit. Sasol warned that refinery output of jet fuel would be affected, specifically flagging the impact on O.R. Tambo International Airport (JNB). The outage, at a refinery that accounts for a 50-60% share of the inland supply on the East Coast, left the country with only one crude refinery operating, situated 1,500 km away from JNB. The disruption extended through March 2025, and heightened reliance on imports routed via pipeline and rail, which already had operational restrictions.⁸

Impact

The incident revealed several structural vulnerabilities, including limited or nonexistent strategic and on-airport fuel reserves, constrained import flexibility due to berth and terminal scheduling, pipeline slot limitations, and insufficient rail capacity. Additionally, the crisis response was hampered by slow and fragmented regulatory coordination.

Continuity gaps identified

- Insufficient strategic storage and no rapid import clearance process.
- Lack of fuel resilience planning.
- Fragmented communication among refineries, importers, and airlines.
- No predefined stock thresholds to trigger national coordination.

Key lessons

⁷ [Fire at Natref could lead to fuel supply interruptions -](#)

⁸ [2024-South-African-Energy-Trade-Report.pdf](#)

A fuel disruption of this scale highlights how refinery outages can rapidly cascade into airport fuel rationing and force operational workarounds, such as tankering, technical stops, and the offloading of passengers and cargo. The Natreff incident underscores the importance of pre-contracting alternative supply sources, increasing buffer stocks, and expediting government approvals to prevent import delays caused by administrative bottlenecks.

BCPs must actively integrate customs, port authorities, and regulatory agencies as key partners in crisis response. Rapid recovery depends on predefined fast-track procedures, shared escalation triggers, and a unified communication channel to ensure consistent visibility and messaging across all stakeholders.

2.1.3 United Kingdom (London Heathrow – 2024/2025)

Overview

Between 2022 and 2025, London Heathrow Airport (LHR) has faced persistent fuel storage constraints as post-pandemic traffic rebounded, and maintenance outages and delays in tank capacity projects further reduced operational cover, leaving a limited buffer at Europe's busiest airport.

Operational impact

Heathrow continues to operate with insufficient fuel storage relative to throughput requirements. This limited capacity has periodically forced airlines to tanker additional fuel into LHR, increasing operational costs and constraining scheduling flexibility and payload.

While a complete fuel outage was avoided due to the robust practice and execution of a fully endorsed BCP for LHR, these events have shown the vulnerability of a major global hub operating with minimal on-airport storage.

Continuity gaps identified

- Insufficient storage to accommodate demand fluctuations or supply disruptions.
- Deferred infrastructure upgrades leading to an ongoing capacity shortfall.
- Limited transparency and coordination between terminals, pipeline schedulers, and airline operators.

Key lessons

Major hub airports require proactive capacity planning and greater data transparency among all fuel supply stakeholders. BCPs should clearly define minimum stock thresholds and escalation triggers, establish real-time data sharing and communication protocols, and ensure infrastructure investment cycles are aligned with projected traffic growth. These points are clearly defined in LHR's BCP and are crucial in maintaining a stable fuel supply.

However, long-term resilience will depend on the continuous renewal of infrastructure, coordinated planning efforts, and regular stress testing of the fuel supply system.

2.2. Summary observations

Across all three regions, recurring themes can be identified:

1. Infrastructure redundancy is vital; a single source of supply creates a systemic risk.

2. Strategic stockholding must be determined, monitored, and linked to activation thresholds
3. Regulatory integration (customs, energy, and transport agencies) accelerates recovery.
4. Transparent communication through a single coordination channel reduces confusion and delays.
5. Regular simulation and testing ensure preparedness translates into operational capability.

These lessons form the foundation of IATA's recommended BCP Framework for Jet Fuel Supply, detailed in Section 3 of this guidance document.

The key takeaway is clear: every stakeholder in the jet fuel value chain, including airport operators, storage companies, fuel suppliers, and airlines, must maintain a robust, regularly tested BCP aligned with industry standards. This is essential to safeguard safety, operational reliability, and public confidence in air transport.

3. IATA recommended framework for a BCP

3.1. Purpose and scope

This section outlines the IATA-recommended framework for developing, maintaining, and activating BCP for aviation fuel supply at airports. It provides a structure that ensures fuel resilience across airports, storage terminals, and distribution networks.

The framework draws on lessons learned and best practices from recent global disruptions (see Section 2.1). It is designed for implementation by airport fuel operators, airlines, suppliers, and regulators to ensure a coordinated, predictable, and transparent response during fuel shortages or infrastructure failures.

3.2. Core principles of fuel continuity planning

3.2.1 Proportionality and scalability

BCPs should be risk-based and proportional to each airport's exposure, considering annual throughput, on-airport days of cover, supplier diversity, and single points of failure such as sole supplier pipelines, constrained jetties, or limited tankage. Authoritative guidance for airports stresses tailoring continuity plans to local hazards and critical dependencies and testing them regularly. This includes mapping the fuel system end-to-end (import terminal, pipelines/rail/road, storage, hydrant) and quantifying acceptable stress points. Airports with higher complexity or constrained redundancy typically warrant more robust mitigation (e.g., extra stockholding, alternative delivery modes, or rapid customs/permits pathways).

3.2.2 Cross-sector coordination

Effective resilience relies on robust integration across the entire aviation fuel ecosystem, encompassing aviation operators, fuel suppliers, transport and fuel farm operators, airport authorities, and key government departments, such as customs, ports, and energy regulators.

Clear interfaces between government and industry are essential for continuity planning. Fuel suppliers, government agencies, and airport authorities must have pre-established protocols in place for emergency import approvals, priority access to port or pipeline infrastructure, and logistics prioritization for fuel delivery during disruptions. This level of inter-agency coordination enables streamlined customs clearance, expedited port access for inbound fuel shipments, and designated traffic flows for fuel tankers or rail deliveries during crisis situations.

3.2.3 Transparency and data integrity

All stakeholders must maintain real-time visibility of fuel inventories, import schedules, and delivery flows. A centralized reporting framework facilitates early identification of potential stress points, enabling timely activation of contingency measures, including activation of a BCP.

Access to accurate, real-time data enables airlines to proactively adjust their operations, such as up-gauging aircraft to increase fuel efficiency or scheduling technical stops. These measures require advance planning and have operational impacts on crew rostering, duty-time compliance, aircraft rotation/scheduling, and engineering cycle maintenance (e.g., brake and tire checks), illustrating the importance of early information sharing and coordinated decision-making across the aviation ecosystem.

3.2.4 Pre-defined triggers and thresholds

BCPs should incorporate measurable indicators such as minimum stock thresholds, infrastructure outages, or contamination events that automatically trigger escalation protocols and convene the crisis management team.

Escalation criteria may be based on airport stock levels or infrastructure failures that materially affect supply resilience.

Another practical traffic/threshold trigger is the traffic light-based alert system currently used in the Australia/New Zealand region, which provides a clear and standardized method for assessing and communicating fuel supply risk levels: e.g.⁹

- Green: Operating normally with the capacity to recover from potential disruptions to production or imports.
- Amber: Some concern, but recovery is expected if temporary supply issues are resolved.
- Red: No capacity to recover from disruptions affecting primary or redundant supply routes.
- Black: Supply issue unavoidable; it requires demand management measures coordinated jointly with industry stakeholders.

This structured escalation framework ensures consistent situational awareness and timely coordination across airlines, suppliers, and airport authorities.

For the purpose of this document, the discussion regarding escalation triggers will be based on a volume threshold, as explained in Section 3.2.4.

3.3. Governance and roles

3.3.1 Airport Fuel Emergency Committee (AFEC)

Each major airport should establish an Airport Fuel Emergency Committee (AFEC), chaired by the fuel consortium or designated operating agent. Membership should include airlines, aviation trade organizations, fuel farm operators, airport authorities, and, where appropriate, government officials such as delegates from

⁹ <https://ncc.gov.au/images/uploads/DEJFBASu-031.pdf>

the civil aviation and energy authorities. This multi-stakeholder structure ensures that local decisions are aligned with national-level strategies and that operational responses are both timely and coordinated.

Airline representatives:

When establishing an AFEC or a similar fuel crisis coordination group, it is essential to ensure a balanced representation of airlines. Membership should reflect the operational landscape of the airport while also enabling effective and timely decision making. As a baseline, the group should include at least two of the major airlines operating at the airport, as these carriers typically hold the most detailed understanding of local fuel infrastructure, operational constraints, and day-to-day requirements.

At the same time, broader airline participation is necessary to consider views from different types of operations and avoid decision making that may unintentionally favor locally based or dominant carriers. To achieve this, many airports limit core membership to the top ten airlines by RPKs, which keeps the group manageable while still reflecting the majority of fuel demand. IATA also participates in these groups in a neutral capacity, representing the interests of all airlines and supporting transparent, industry aligned coordination throughout the fuel disruption.

Key responsibilities of an AFEC can include:

- **Implementing local response measures:** AFECs are responsible for executing airport-level actions under the broader national (if applicable) jet fuel BCP framework. This includes adapting national guidance to local infrastructure, operational constraints, and stakeholder capabilities.
- **Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) issuance:** In coordination with regulatory authorities, AFECs facilitate the timely publication of NOTAMs to inform airlines of fuel availability constraints, operational changes, or contingency procedures.
- **IATA Global Fuel Portal:** It is the responsibility of the **AFEC** to ensure that all relevant portals, including the **IATA Global Fuel Portal**, are updated in a timely and accurate manner. This is essential to maintain clarity and consistency across the industry.
- **Communicating allocation decisions and stock forecasts:** AFECs serve as the central point for communicating daily fuel stock levels, allocation decisions, and forecasted supply trends to all relevant stakeholders. This transparency enables proactive planning, minimizing disruptions and miscommunications.
- **Coordinating logistics and technical recovery actions:** AFECs oversee the coordination of fuel logistics, including alternative supply routes, temporary storage solutions, and technical recovery efforts such as tank cleaning or infrastructure repairs. Their role is critical in restoring normal operations swiftly and safely.
- **Voting rights:** It is recommended that voting rights on critical operational decisions, such as the issuance of NOTAMs that may trigger inbound tankering requirements, be limited to airlines and recognized airline associations. This ensures that decisions directly affecting flight operations and fuel planning remain in the hands of those with operational accountability and firsthand understanding of the impacts on schedules, safety, and network performance.

3.3.2 National or regional fuel crisis coordination

The BCP should have a mechanism that is activated at a predetermined threshold, bringing in officials from relevant ministries, and, where possible, fuel suppliers. It serves as the central decision-making body for coordinating national fuel supplies during a prolonged crisis.

Responsibilities:

- Monitor fuel stock positions and logistics performance for the country.
- Authorize national-level rationing or prioritization measures.
- Coordinate inter-agency communications and public messaging when fuel supply impacts a critical airport.
- Escalate any import duty and clearance issues.

3.3.3 Product quality crisis management

A BCP should clearly outline the documents to reference when handling jet fuel and address concerns related to product quality. It should also specify which individuals and organizations to consult if a parcel of product fails specification testing.

The following section lists the recommended documents and organizations for both normal fuel handling and fuel quality issues. At least two primary contacts should be provided for each company, including one out-of-hours contact.

1. **Joint Inspection Group (JIG)** – Global standard for aviation jet fuel handling, quality controls, and operations from refinery to aircraft wing-tip.

Key documents:

- a) Safety Information Document (SID #1) Emergency Response Planning
 - b) GP4.01 – Business Risk Assessment and Management for Aviation Operations. (This document forms the foundation of any effective BCP by identifying risks before planning)
2. **ATA Specification 103** – Standards for Jet Fuel Quality Controls at Airports has been widely adopted across the United States of America.
 3. **Canadian Standards Association (CSAB836)** – Canadian standard for jet fuel storage, handling, and dispensing.
 4. **Independent Testing Laboratories** – Third-party companies that can assist airports with additional testing if the product is off-specification, especially in locations where oil companies are unable to retest the product.

It should be noted that any airport operating under the JIG standard is required to have an approved and tested BCP.

3.4. Testing, training, and review

3.4.1 Continuous improvement

A BCP should be treated as a living document, reviewed annually, and validated through desktop exercises to ensure it reflects current infrastructure, regulatory developments, and lessons learned from actual disruptions.

Desktop exercises are an effective way to test the plan's robustness and uncover procedural or communication gaps. Each airport should conduct at least one full-scale exercise per year, simulating realistic

disruption scenarios and involving all critical stakeholders, including airport authorities, fuel farm operators, fuel suppliers, airlines, regulators, emergency services, and industry associations.

The objectives are to evaluate the effectiveness of the AFEC, validate communication protocols, and assess the coordination of logistical and operational responses under pressure. Scenarios should cover elements such as fuel rationing, NOTAM issuance, technical recovery planning, and stakeholder briefings.

By rehearsing these situations in a controlled environment, stakeholders can identify capability gaps, refine contingency measures, strengthen inter-agency collaboration, and ensure personnel are familiar with their roles, enabling a swift, coordinated response during real disruptions.

3.4.2 Post-incident reviews

Following any fuel supply disruption event or full-scale exercise, a comprehensive "lessons learned" report should be developed and circulated within 30 days. This report must capture key observations, response effectiveness, coordination challenges, and any deviations from the established BCP protocols.

The review process should involve all relevant stakeholders who participated in the exercise to ensure a holistic assessment. Findings should be discussed in a structured debrief session, with clear documentation of recommended improvements.

These insights must be formally incorporated into the next revision cycle of the BCP to ensure continuous improvement. This iterative approach strengthens preparedness, enhances stakeholder coordination, and ensures that future responses are informed by real-world experience.

4. Pre-drafting considerations

The following outlines key considerations to address before drafting a BCP, which could follow the model presented in Appendix 1. While not exhaustive, it highlights the most essential steps that should be undertaken.

Stakeholders' buy-ins are critical at this stage to ensure fuel suppliers, airport authorities, and the relevant government departments are willing to act and support when a BCP is activated.




Figure 1 – BCP considerations

5. Conclusion

In aviation, uninterrupted fuel supply is not just a logistical requirement; it is the cornerstone of operational continuity. A BCP is therefore not a procedural formality but a strategic imperative. Past disruptions, from pipeline failures to refinery outages, have shown that preparedness, coordination, and transparency distinguish a controlled response from a cascading crisis.

A robust BCP enables airports, fuel suppliers, and airlines to respond cohesively when disruptions occur. It establishes a shared operational language, aligns decision-making thresholds, and embeds accountability across the fuel supply chain. The goal is not only to restore supply but to maintain confidence in the aviation network's ability to recover swiftly and safely.

Airports should treat the BCP as a living framework, regularly reviewed, tested, and refined to reflect evolving infrastructure, rising traffic volumes, and emerging risks. Ultimately, the strength of any BCP lies in collaboration. Through joint governance, transparent data sharing, and well-rehearsed response protocols, the aviation community can transform fuel resilience from a vulnerability into a competitive advantage. The commitment to continuity planning today will define the industry's ability to deliver reliable and sustainable air transport tomorrow.

6. Appendix 1: BCP drafting template

6.1. Approach

The elements outlined in Appendix 1.1 serve as a guide to the key sections and topics to consider when drafting a BCP. As previously noted, airports vary significantly in terms of infrastructure, supply chain complexity, geography, and regulatory context. Therefore, completing the preparatory work described in Section 4 is essential to identifying these differences and supporting the development of an effective and well-tailored BCP.

6.2. Table of contents example (not exhaustive)

The following is a list of topics that can be applied when drafting a BCP.

1. Plan Documentation Overview

Details the version history, authorship, and approval process for the BCP document.

1.1. Recipient Directory

Lists individuals and roles who are designated to receive and use the BCP.

2. Overview of Potential Risks

Summarizes the types of disruptions the BCP addresses.

2.1. Fuel Farm Operator Structure Diagram

Displays the organizational chart relevant to the fuel farm operations.

2.2. Fuel Supply Flowchart

Illustrates the supply network and logistics supporting fuel delivery.

2.3. Personnel Shortage Scenarios

Outlines procedures for handling partial or complete loss of key staff.

2.4. Facility Disruption Scenarios

Explains contingency measures for loss or damage to operational facilities.

2.5. IT System Failure Response

Describes how to manage and recover from IT system outages.

2.6. Fuel Supply Interruption Response

Covers strategies for dealing with disruptions in fuel supply from terminals.

3. Response Strategy for Risks

Provides a structured approach to managing and mitigating operational disruptions.

3.1. Initial Response Checklists

General checklist for immediate actions across all risk types.

3.1.1. Checklist – Personnel Loss

Steps to address staffing shortages and maintain operations.

3.1.2. Checklist – Facility Loss

Actions to restore or adapt operations when facilities are compromised.

3.1.3. Checklist – IT System Failure

Guidelines for managing IT outages and maintaining functionality.

3.1.4. Checklist – Supply Disruption

Response plan for fuel supply interruptions.

3.2. Disruption Assessment and Escalation

Instructions for evaluating the severity of an incident and escalating the response.

3.2.1. Key Stakeholder Directory

Contact information for internal and external stakeholders.

3.2.2. Emergency and Support Contacts

List of emergency contacts and technical support teams.

3.3. Continuity Plan for Essential Operations

Steps to maintain or restore critical business functions during a disruption.

3.4. Plan Closure Procedures

Checklist for deactivating the BCP and returning to normal operations.

4. Staff Training Requirements

Outlines training goals and categories to ensure staff readiness.

4.1. Training Timeline

Schedule and types of training sessions for staff.

5. BCP Testing Protocols

Describes the need for regular testing to validate the BCP's effectiveness.

5.1. Testing Calendar

Details past and upcoming BCP tests and their formats.

6. Risk Reduction Measures

Lists actions and responsibilities aimed at minimizing operational risks.

7. BCP Activity Log

Chronological record of BCP activations, updates, and exercises

7. Appendix 2: Issuance of NOTAMs

In the event of an aviation fuel supply disruption or incident with the potential to affect aircraft refueling operations or lead to an airport fuel shortage, the impacted fuel supplier(s) and/or the fuel farm operator shall ensure the prompt provision of accurate and comprehensive information regarding the nature, severity, and anticipated duration of the disruption. Notification shall be made immediately upon identification of the occurrence to all required stakeholders, no later than two (2) hours after the event becomes known.

Examples of development or incidents requiring notification to stakeholders include the following:

- **Reduced fuel delivery** - Import delay, refinery constraints, or off-spec product
- **Reduced rate-of-delivery** (volume per hour) - e.g., reduced pipeline flow rate and SCADA issues
- **Terminal-specific** constraints or operational limitations

Upon receipt of such notification, the AFEC (or an approved authority such as the airport operator, in the event where the AFEC has yet to be set up), in coordination with the impacted fuel supplier(s) and/or fuel farm operator, shall conduct an immediate assessment to determine the extent of the disruption, the anticipated operational impact on airport and airline activities, and whether conditions warrant the activation of the BCP which will in most cases include the issuance of a NOTAM.

NOTAMs are notices containing information concerning the establishment, condition, or change in any aeronautical facility, service, procedure, or hazard, the timely knowledge of which is essential to personnel concerned with flight operations. Their use is governed by the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) contained in Annex 15 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (also called the Chicago Convention), which addresses Aeronautical Information Services.

Annex 15 determines that States are responsible for establishing an Aeronautical Information Service (AIS/AIM), which includes the origination and dissemination of NOTAMs. While States may delegate certain operational tasks related to NOTAMS, overall responsibility and authority remain with the State. Thus, the AFEC must coordinate NOTAM issuance in accordance with applicable national AIS/AIM procedures.

All NOTAMs shall contain clear, accurate, and comprehensive information sufficient to enable aircraft operators to make informed operational decisions. In cases where operational impacts are foreseen to affect airlines in the future, advance notice must be given so they may implement necessary operational measures, including crew rostering adjustments, aircraft rotations, aircraft substitutions or up-gauging, and, where required, flight cancellations or schedule modifications.

A typical NOTAM has the following message structure:

- A) ICAO Aerodrome code (*four letters*)
- B) Start date and time (UTC) *YYMMDDhhmm*
- C) End date and time (UTC) *YYMMDDhhmm*
- D) Schedule (*if applicable*)
- E) NOTAM text (the substance)

Every NOTAM also has a reference number issued by AIS typically with the format NNNNN/YY.

The following are examples of possible fuel shortage scenarios that will trigger the issuance of a NOTAM:

Scenario	AFEC Decision	Example of NOTAM Message
1.a Development or incident that could result in the gradual depletion of the airport's stock levels, leading to a potential drop below a critical level over time. 1.b. Development or incident resulting in supply levels falling below acceptable thresholds	- Prohibit outbound tankering. - Maximize inbound tankering	A) EGLL B) 2604180000 C) 2604252359 E) DUE TO FUEL SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS, ALL OPERATORS ARE TO CEASE OUTBOUND TANKERING AND MAXIMIZE INBOUND TANKERING
2. Development or incident that will cause a fuel shortage at the airport in the immediate future.	Fuel rationing applied to all flights	A) LIMC B) 2604220000 C) 2605022359 E) DUE TO FUEL SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS, FUEL RATIONING IS IN EFFECT. JET A-1 FUEL UPLIFT IS LIMITED TO 80 PERCENT OF NORMAL REQUIREMENTS. OPERATORS ARE REQUESTED TO CONTACT FUEL SUPPLIERS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. Note: More details of the critical failure can be given if deemed appropriate by the approved authority.
3. Development or incident is resolved, and airport fuel stock levels return to normal.	End of required action on fuel uplift.	A) LIMC B) 2605010000 C) 2605012359 E) FUEL SUPPLY HAS RETURNED TO NORMAL OPERATING LEVELS. PIPELINE. JET A-1 FUEL UPLIFT RESTORED TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. PREVIOUS FUEL RATIONING NOTAM XXXXX/26 CANCELLED.